



**MALCONTENT NEWS
RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR
SITUATION REPORT**



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Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 176

It has been 3,094 days since Russia occupied Crimea on February 27, 2014.

There was limited fighting in northeast Donetsk, with Russian forces attempting to advance in the direction of Vyimka from Spirne and Mykolaivka without success.

Near Bakhmut, Russian forces and their proxies fought positional battles on the outskirts of Soledar supported by artillery and attack aircraft and attempted to advance into Bakhmutske without success.

PMC Wagner Group, Russian airborne VDV forces, and elements of the LNR 2nd Army Corps, supported by the Russian air force, attempted to advance on Bakhmut from three directions without success.

In the Svitlodarsk Bulge, PMC Wagner Group and LNR separatists attempted to advance on Kodema without success, and Russian forces attempted to advance on Zaitseve from Holyivskyi but could not make any forward progress.

Ukrainian forces shelled Russian positions in Svitlodarsk.

DNR separatists launched their first offensive toward Kamyanka since July 29. Belligerents fought a positional battle, and there was no change in the line of conflict.

Separatists attempted to flank Adviiivka by advancing from Novoselivka Druha and were unsuccessful.

There was an attempt to advance into Pervomaiske from the Russian-occupied areas of Pisky. Separatists were unable to move forward. DNR separatists attempted another open country advance from Lozove toward Pervomaiske and were unsuccessful.

In the southern part of the Donbas, DNR separatists attempted to advance in the direction of Vodyane without success.

Russian forces launched small attacks on the settlements of Brazhkivka, Dibrovne, and in the direction of Nova Dmytrivka. None of the advances were successful. There was fighting in the forests north of Mazanivka.

Russian positions in Izyum were shelled by Ukrainian artillery.

Operational Command South of the Armed Forces of Ukraine hinted that they attempted an offensive toward Stanislav and Shyroka Balka. The advance was unsuccessful.

The bridge at the Nova Kakhovka was hit again by rockets fired by High Mobility Rocket Artillery Systems (HIMARS), thwarting Russian combat engineer attempts to repair the structure.

Two Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missiles being used as ground-to-ground weapons hit the Black Sea University in Mykolaiv. This is the second attack on the campus in the last three days and one of four universities targeted by Russian missile strikes in the last 24 hours.

There is significant concern by the west and global nuclear power monitoring organizations that Russia is preparing for a false flag event at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant on August 19. A statement from the Russian embassy

in the United States raised eyebrows with specific accusations and the wording used.

The settlement of Nikopol was being attacked by rockets fired from MLRS located within the nuclear power plant compound at the time of publication.

Dmytro Zhyvytskyi, Sumy Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, reported that the settlements of Bilopillia, Krasnopillia, and Myropillia, were attacked.

A Russian ammunition depot in Timonovo, Russia, had a catastrophic explosion. Fire and rescue crews were standing off because it was too dangerous to approach the area. Timonovo and Basovo were evacuated, along with a nearby military base.

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. The Russian Ministry of Defense made no claims of capturing new territory for the first time since early July, and Russian troops have demonstrated they are


incapable of concentrating combat power in an offensive as they did in Luhansk.

2. We maintain that the 1st Army Corps of the Donetsk People's Republic and the 2nd Army Corps of the Luhansk People's Republic are combat ineffective.
3. Russian military doctrine has relied on indigenous militias and mercenaries to do the bulk of front-line fighting, such as in Chechnya, Syria, and the Central African Republic, to minimize official combat losses and weaken rump states – the waste of human capital among Donbas separatists has hobbled combat capabilities.
4. Russian defensive lines north of Slovyansk are under increasing pressure, with Ukraine now firing artillery on Russian positions within Izyum.
5. The number of "accidents" Russian military assets have experienced deep behind the line of conflict was likely caused by external forces and not a run of bad luck.
6. Russian missile attacks are targeting Ukrainian universities and higher learning institutions – actions connected to destroying Ukrainian culture and institutions.
7. The first signs of supply issues for Russian forces in the Kherson region are starting to appear.

8. We maintain the battlefield is frozen across Ukraine, and time is running out for both belligerents to launch brigade or army-sized offensives.

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TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP




Information about changes made to the map: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgency, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at Saky Naval airbase. Based on your feedback, we have moved the “flags” into the category of “Archived Offensives.” The layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted, like [Kherson](#), the link will take you to the exact location explained in the Situation Report.

You can visit our war map at <http://www.rusvukrmap.com>


DONBAS REGION

SLOVYANSK-BILOHORIVKA-BERESTOVE TRIANGLE



Russian Objective: Maintain territorial control and Ground Lines of Communication, control insurgency, and integrate captured territory into Russia

Ukrainian Objective: Prevent advances on Siversk, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk, support insurgents, exploit weaknesses, interdict supplies



There was limited fighting in northeast Donetsk, with Russian forces attempting to advance in the direction of [Vyimka](#) from Spirne and Mykolaivka without success.^{1 2}

Russian artillery shelled Verkhnyokamyanske, Hryhorivka, Ivano-Daryivka, Serebryanka, Siversk, Bilohorivka [Donetsk], and Berestove. They also shelled the Ukrainian Ground Line of Communication (GLOC – supply line) between Fedorivka and Spirne. Russian forces also carried out airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in Bilohorivka [Donetsk].

¹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook AM Report](#)

² [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook PM Report](#)

Further west, Kryva Luka on the Siverski Donets River was shelled.

Members of the 2nd Army Corps of the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) shared pictures of a person equipped with a man-portable drone jammer.³ The pictures of a separatist soldier equipped with an advanced piece of Russian military hardware were juxtaposed with him wearing an ill-fitting uniform and flip-flops with socks.

³ <https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1560455077185331200>




ASSESSMENT: Unchanged from August 17

On August 13, we assessed there would be continued sporadic fighting in northeast Donetsk, but we did not anticipate renewed significant combat operations. That assessment was tested this week. The 2nd Army Corps of the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) is combat ineffective and incapable of carrying out offensive operations even with the support of Russian artillery.

The destruction of the command center for the 2nd Army Corps in Lysychansk and the Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group headquarters in Popasna may have degraded decision-making capabilities. We maintain that any additional fighting in this region before mud season will be positional, spoiling attacks, and probes.


BAKHMUT



Russian Objective: Capture the Bakhmut-Soledar complex and collapse the Svitlodarsk salient before August 31, interdict the Bakhmut-Siversk T-5013 Highway GLOC

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Bakhmut-Soldar while managing equipment and personnel losses, minimize civilian casualties, and defend GLOCs


Russian attempts to advance on Bakhmut continued without changing the line of conflict.



Russian forces and their proxies fought positional battles on the outskirts of [Soledar](#) supported by artillery and attack aircraft and attempted to advance into [Bakhmutske](#) without success.^{4 5}

⁴ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook AM Report](#)


⁵ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook PM Report](#)



PMC Wagner Group, Russian airborne VDV forces, and elements of the LNR 2nd Army Corps, supported by the Russian air force, attempted to advance on [Bakhmut](#) from three directions without success.

An airstrike hit the settlement of Vesela Dolyna, but Russian ground forces did not attempt an advance.

Russian forces and their proxies supported by airstrikes also attempted to advance on [Zaitseve](#) (10 kilometers southeast of Bakhmut) from Semyhirya and were unsuccessful.



In the Svitlodarsk Bulge, PMC Wagner Group and LNR separatists attempted to advance on [Kodema](#) without success, and Russian forces attempted to advance on [Zaitseve](#) from Holyivskyi but could not make any forward progress.

Ukrainian forces shelled Russian positions in Svitlodarsk.⁶

⁶ <https://t.me/rybar/37419>

A news report from Russian state media highlighted PMC Wagner and their forward operating base in Dolomitne.⁷ Due to poor operational security, the location was easily geolocated and revealed that Russian forces are not as far north as the Russian Ministry of Defense has reported. The mercenaries wore Ukrainian military uniforms in the video, which is considered a war crime and a breach of military protocol. For professional soldiers, wearing the uniform of the enemy in an attempt to deceive them is viewed as an act of cowardice.

Based on the updated intelligence, we have adjusted the map and moved the line of conflict south to the outskirts of Dolomitne. This does not represent new territorial gains.

ASSESSMENT: Unchanged from August 8

In simplest terms, grunts with guns take territory, and grunts with guns hold territory. The Russian military doesn't have enough well-trained and well-equipped grunts with guns to support multiple offensive operations near Bakhmut and Donetsk while reinforcing defensive lines in Zaporizhia and Kherson.


⁷ <https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1560358492547981314>

The situation east of Soledar and Bakhmut has stabilized, but defending troops eventually must be rotated.

In attritional warfare, Ukraine can't compete. The question is, does Russia have enough troops left to throw at Soledar and Bakhmut and write off the casualties?

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SOUTHWEST DONETSK AND WESTERN ZAPORIZHIA




Russian Objective: Capture the Donetsk oblast to its administrative borders before August 31, push Ukrainian forces out of firing range of Donetsk city, defend the existing line of conflict in Zaporizhzhia to the Dnipro River

Ukrainian Objective: Defend the existing line of conflict while finding and exploiting weaknesses, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict


supplies and disrupt logistics, and prepare for or convince Russian forces they are preparing for a widescale counteroffensive

It has been five days since there was significant fighting west of Donetsk. The slowdown in offensive operations by the 1st Army of the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) is likely caused by a lack of adequately trained light infantry soldiers to advance into and hold new territory.



DNR separatists launched their first offensive toward [Kamyanka](#) since July 29.⁸ Belligerents fought a positional battle, and there was no change in the line of conflict.

Separatists attempted to flank [Adviiivka](#) by advancing from [Novoselivka Druha](#) and were unsuccessful.




There was an attempt to advance into [Pervomaiske](#) from the Russian-occupied areas of Pisky. Separatists were unable to move forward.⁹ The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported the Ukrainian positions in Pisky

⁸ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook PM Report](#)

⁹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook AM Report](#)

were shelled, indicating that Ukraine maintains a toehold in the village. In our assessment, Ukrainian troops remain in defensive positions near the E-50 Ring Road, the Butivka Mine ventilation shaft complex, and the northeast corner toward the destroyed international airport in Vesele.^{10 11}



DNR separatists attempted another open country advance from [Lozove](#) toward [Pervomaiske](#) and were unsuccessful.

¹⁰ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook AM Report](#)

¹¹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook PM Report](#)

In addition to the offensive actions, Russian forces used artillery and rockets from Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) to strike Niu York, Vesele, Avdiivka, Marinka, Opytne, Nevelske, Krasnohorivka, and Pervomaiske.

Russian and Ukrainian aircraft got into a dogfight over the skies of Ukrainian-controlled Pokrovsk, sending stunned residents into the street to watch the engagement.¹² Neither aircraft was shot down in the fight.

ASSESSMENT: Russia's failure to establish air supremacy will be a long chapter when the history of the Russia-Ukraine War is written. It is astonishing that six months after the invasion, Ukraine is flying active Combat Air Patrols (CAP) in the Donbas and seeking the initiative against Russian fighter aircraft. The introduction of NATO-provided AGM-88 HARM missiles, which target air defense radars, has enabled Ukraine to execute suppress enemy air defense (SEAD) missions. By blinding Russian air defenses, Ukraine has been able to step up air combat and ground attack operations.

¹² <https://twitter.com/mjluxmoore/status/1560325776477659143>

In the southern part of the Donbas, DNR separatists attempted to advance in the direction of [Vodyane](#) from [Taramchuk](#).¹³ The wording in the General Staff report has caused the fog of war to form. Taramchuk is well behind the known line of conflict. In our assessment, this was carefully worded in the report for operational security reasons, and fighting is likely closer to [Solodke](#) or [Stepne](#).

Russian and Ukrainian forces fired artillery, mortars, and rockets from multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) from [Horlivka](#) to [Donetsk](#) city to [Velyka Novosilka](#) in the Donetsk oblast and [Hulyaipole](#) to [Orikhiv](#) to [Kamyanske](#) in Zaporizhia.

ASSESSMENT: Unchanged from August 16

We assess that Russian forces can't secure the remainder of the Donbas before August 31.

In southern Ukraine, Russian forces continue to press Ukrainian defensive lines due to the arrival of reinforcements and testing capabilities. It is also likely an

¹³ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook PM Report](#)




attempt to spread out Ukrainian resources to delay or prevent the next phase of the ongoing counteroffensive.

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KHARKIV REGION

NORTHWESTERN KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Prevent Ukraine from reaching the international border with Russia, protect the Belgorod-Kupyansk GLOC, break civilian will with continued terror attacks


Ukrainian Objective: Prevent further Russian advances on Kharkiv, pressure the Russian-controlled Shevchenkove-Izyum GLOC

There were no reports of significant fighting around Kharkiv. Russian and Ukrainian forces fired artillery, rockets from MLRS, and used tanks for indirect fire across the line of conflict. The General Staff reported that Ukrainian positions in Udy were shelled, and Pro-Russian sources and accounts have made no further claims that Udy is under Russian control.

ASSESSMENT: Unchanged from August 11


Our assessment on August 10 that Russian forces were testing the capabilities of the Ukrainian territorial guard taking over the defense of Izyum was correct. Positional fighting, reconnaissance, and probing for weaknesses will continue to occur.

IZYUM AXIS



Russian Objective: Hold the current line of conflict and prevent further advances by Ukrainian troops toward Izyum

Ukrainian Objective: Defend against advances on Slovyansk and capitalize on weaknesses in Russian defenses, continue to harass and interdict Russian GLOCs, execute Special Operation Forces (SOF) raids on Russian troops located behind the line of conflict



Russian forces launched small attacks on the settlements of [Brazhkyvka](#), [Dibrovne](#), and in the direction of [Nova Dmytrivka](#).¹⁴ None of the advances were successful. There was fighting in the forests north of [Mazanivka](#), likely related to the offensive toward Divrovne.¹⁵

Pro-Russian social media account Rybar reported that Russian and PMC Wagner Group positions with Izyum came under artillery fire from Ukrainian armed forces.¹⁶ It is the first time Ukraine has fired artillery within the city since March 31.

¹⁴ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook PM Report](#)

¹⁵ <https://t.me/rybar/37419>

¹⁶ <https://t.me/rybar/37419>

ASSESSMENT: Based on the intelligence reports and data from August 18, we believe that squad or platoon-sized Russian units are attempting to break through Ukrainian defense and flank their positions. Brazhkivka was recently liberated. The line of conflict sits on the village's northern edge, making it easier for Russian forces to interdict Ukrainian efforts to set up defenses.

The Ukrainian units fighting in this region are experienced, well-equipped, and have high morale. The Russian troops defending Izyum are LNR and DNR conscripts, Russian volunteer units, terrorist elements of the Imperial Legion, terrorist elements of the Rusich Group, and PMC Wagner. The admission by Russian sources that Izyum has been shelled has likely damaged morale.

Ukraine and Russia traded sporadic artillery fire along the rest of the line of conflict.

ASSESSMENT: Unchanged from August 7

We remain unwilling to call the ongoing action by Ukrainian forces a counteroffensive. We maintain that


Russian forces between Avdriivka and Kopanky are now in a salient and at moderate risk of encirclement if Ukrainian forces were to make a breakthrough.

It is implausible that Russian forces can secure the Donetsk oblast by August 31 without securing Slovyansk as part of that self-declared deadline.

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
DNIPRO, KHERSON & MYKOLAIV, ZAPORIZHIA REGION

KHERSON



Russian Objective: Prepare for a Ukrainian counteroffensive by building defenses, prevent further advances by Ukrainian troops toward Kherson, repair destroyed GLOCs over the Dnipro River, and prevent the expansion of the insurgency

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the Kherson oblast west of the Dnipro River, push Russian forces back far enough to end multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) attacks on Mykolaiv and Kryvvi Rih



Operational Command South of the Armed Forces of Ukraine hinted that they attempted an offensive toward [Stanislav](#) and [Shyroka Balka](#).¹⁷ The advance was unsuccessful. The report stated, "During the day, our units carried out offensive actions twice with the aim of capturing

¹⁷ <https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/videos/1260785751419847/>

new settlements. During one of the attacks, we met with two airborne assault units."

"During the counterattack, the enemy was hit by fire, as a result of which, he was forced to retreat to his original positions with the loss of tanks, armored vehicles and personnel."

The report stated that two Russian soldiers were captured. Neither the Russian Ministry of Defense nor reliable Pro-Russian sources mentioned any combat in the region. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management Systems (FIRMS) didn't show any heat anomalies, but thunderstorms have obscured satellite intelligence most of the week. There is a [video of fighting in this area](#), but it is only tentatively geolocated.¹⁸ Much of the region is open farmland separated by groves of trees. In it, Ukrainian artillery dismantles a line of Russian artillery pieces and support vehicles dug in among the trees.

The report added, "In response, the enemy tried to carry out an attack on the mechanized detachment in the direction of Oleksandrivka - Stanislav.


¹⁸ <https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1560253379095535620>

ASSESSMENT: Fighting for control of Oleksandrivka and Stanislav has continued since the first Russian forces advanced to the banks of the Dnipro Estuary in March. The settlement of Oleksandrivka has changed control so many times we have placed the line of conflict through the center of the settlement and marked the area north and south as contested. The city itself has been obliterated. Drone videos and pictures show heavy damage to almost every building, and basic infrastructure is destroyed.


Reading between the lines, we assess Ukraine is in Oleksandrivka with ongoing fighting between Russian airborne VDV forces versus Ukrainian mechanized infantry. There wasn't any actionable intelligence to adjust the map.

The bridge at the Nova Kakhovka was hit again by rockets fired by High Mobility Rocket Artillery Systems (HIMARS), thwarting Russian combat engineer attempts to repair the structure.¹⁹

¹⁹ <https://t.me/hueviyherson/24240>



A Russian ammunition depot was destroyed in [Blahodatne](#). The report indicates that Ukraine has been completely pushed out of Kyselivka, and we have adjusted the map based on this intelligence.



There weren't reports of widespread artillery fire along the Kherson axis, and Russian aviation hit Ukrainian positions on the Inhulets River bridgehead, including [Bilohirka](#) and [Lozove](#).

Operational Command South reported that two Russian Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) were transferred to the area as part of troop rotation and in an attempt to reinforce defensive positions.

ASSESSMENT: In our August 13 assessment, we reported that Russian military doctrine calls for BTGs to maintain enough supplies to be self-sufficient for three to five days.

In that assessment, we reported that one of the first signs that Russian troops west of the Dnipro were suffering from supply shortages would be a reduction in troop maneuvers and artillery fire. It has been five days since the last bridge across the Dnipro into Kherson was knocked out of commission. One day of data does not make a trend, but the only ground fighting done by Russian forces was when Ukraine took the initiative.

When Russia initiated the full-scale invasion of Ukraine 25 weeks ago, many BTGs were understaffed, with three companies and 30% of the personnel made up of conscripts – approximately 800 troops. In June, Russia reset the composition of a staffed BTG to 450 troops, just two companies. The addition of two BTGs into Kherson is likely recently formed volunteer battalions with little training and minimal combat power.

Given the GLOC restrictions into and out of Kherson, the deployment is likely personnel only. Corruption is deeply rooted in the Russian military, and this rotation may be driven by soldiers who have bought a transfer to the east bank of the Dnipro.

With all four GLOCs severed for Russian troops on the west bank of the Dnipro River, resupply will have to be done by barge, ferry, and helicopter. Carrying fuel, replacement equipment, artillery shells, and rockets will be challenging to sustain and support 25,000 soldiers.

The Russian Ministry of Defense has continued to send reinforcements west of the Dnipro, with 3,000 elite VDV troops arriving in the last week, swelling the number of troops to 25,000.²⁰ That is almost 20% of the entire occupation force in Ukraine, including LNR, DNR, Chechen, terrorists with the Imperial Legion, and PMC Wagner. Ukraine has been targeting ammunition and supply depots, logistics centers, and GLOCs, although the amount of supplies available in Kherson is unclear.

The first indication of supply issues is already emerging, with complaints online about drinking water shortages in supply drops and only receiving "dry rations" for meals. Another sign that supply issues have already started is the S-300 missile attacks on Mykolaiv have ended. Suppress Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) missions by Ukraine have helped limit the attacks, but a lack of supply of the larger S300 anti-aircraft missiles is likely contributing to the issue.

²⁰ [Stars & Stripes](#)

Russian Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) are designed to operate for three to five days independent of resupply. Signs that the supply situation is getting more severe won't appear for weeks but would include abandoned vehicles, increasing complaints about a lack of resources on Telegram, VK, and Live Journal, looting for food and fuel, and a reduction in artillery fire among front line units.

With mud season 30 to 45 days away and the first snow in 60 to 75 days, complaints about a lack of cold weather gear, hypothermia, and low morale from living in the mud would be another indicator that the supply situation is worsening.

There remain significant questions on when and if there will be a counteroffensive, and Kyiv has become increasingly contradictory on what will be next. Some officials have told the press that the counteroffensive has already started, including President Zelenskyy earlier in the week. An anonymous source close to the Ukrainian government told the Washington Post there would be no counteroffensive because Ukraine doesn't have the resources.

"We have to be honest - for now, Ukraine doesn't have a sufficient number of weapons systems for a counteroffensive. It's still possible to get a result, but if so it will be the result of smart Ukraine strategy more than of countering Russia with equal power."

The appearance of Czech hedgehogs in Kherson, Russian forces fearful of moving on the streets due to partisan activity, Russian commanders leaving the region, and local government and junior military officers occupying Kherson hospitals and schools to avoid HIMARS attacks all point to the same fact.

Regardless of what we may assess or think or what the Ukrainian government is saying – the Kremlin believes a counteroffensive is coming, and it will fight to hold the western half of the Kherson oblast.

MYKOLAIV

Russian Objective: Interdict personnel and equipment assembling for a counteroffensive, break civilian will with continued terror attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Prepare and stage for a counterattack, prevent further Russian advances, exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict

Two Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missiles being used as ground-to-ground weapons hit the Black Sea University in Mykolaiv.²¹ This is the second attack on the campus in the last three days. One building suffered heavy damage, while the windows and facade of another building were damaged.


The first attack occurred two days after a TV news report showed the college preparing for fall classes and students going through registration and orientation.

DNIPROPETROVSK AND ZAPORIZHIA

Russian Objective: Interdict personnel and equipment assembling for a counteroffensive, break civilian will with continued terror attacks, and turn popular opinion against Ukraine by terrorizing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

²¹ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/08/19/7363923/>

Ukrainian Objective: Prepare and stage for a counterattack, prevent further Russian advances, exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict



There is significant concern by the west and global nuclear power monitoring organizations that Russia is preparing for a false flag event at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. NBC News reported that Andriy Yusov, a Ukraine's military intelligence directorate spokesman, stated that Russia directed the Rosatom (Russia's state-run nuclear company) employees at Zaporizhzhia not to show up to

work.²² Video emerged inside Reactor Complex 1, showing at least five Russian supply trucks and a large cache of ammunition stored in the machine shop by the main turbine deck.²³ The location of the video was authenticated using archived photos from inside the power plant.^{24 25}

The turbine deck is interconnected to the reactor itself. Steam generated by the nuclear reactor is superheated and spins the turbine that produces electricity. The steam is then returned to the reactor unit to be reheated.

ASSESSMENT: Separate from an attack, Ukraine and Russia have experienced spontaneous, accidental detonation from older munitions, which can become unstable and explode with little provocation. In our assessment, the placement of ammunition within the machine shop breaches Article 56 Section I of the Geneva Convention. We analyzed what the Geneva Convention states about military occupations of nuclear power plants [on August 11](#).²⁶

²² <https://twitter.com/JoshNBCNews/status/1560278407954321416>

²³ <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1560377397223911425>

²⁴ https://twitter.com/Nom4d_14/status/1560320544905367552

²⁵ <https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1560317415938035716>

²⁶ [Malcontent News Russia-Ukraine War Situation Report – August 11, 2022](#)

The settlement of Nikopol was being attacked by rockets fired from MLRS located within the nuclear power plant compound at the time of publication.^{27 28}

Also, at the time of publication, the homepage for TASS, a Russian state news agency, was devoid of any news about Zaporizhzhia.

In a statement released by the Russian Embassy in the United States, the language added fuel to concerns of a looming false flag attack.²⁹

The embassy added that the Russian Ministry of Defense had accused the Armed Forces of Ukraine's intention to sabotage the power plant, leading to a radiation leak, a violation of the integrity of the nuclear waste storage facility, and moving the reactor into a state of abnormal operation. "The goal is to create an exclusion zone of up to 30 kilometers and accuse Russia of nuclear terrorism," the Russian embassy said.

²⁷ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/08/19/7363921/>

²⁸ <https://t.me/rybar/37419>

²⁹ <https://tass.ru/politika/15510931> [Russian State Media website – article contains disinformation]

ASSESSMENT: Our team of analysts is divided into two camps. Camp one believes this is a manufactured crisis. They cite the Russian Ministry of Defense's multiple accusations that Ukraine would deploy chemical weapons as a false flag and accuse Russia. They also added the provocations in Transnistria in May and the announcement that nuclear-capable weapons would be positioned in Belarus. Another example was blaming Ukraine for the inability to make safe grain shipments while still bombing Snake Island and ports in Odesa and Mykolaiv, targeting grain storage and shipping facilities.

Their position is the Kremlin cooks up a psychological warfare campaign every four to six weeks to try and damage western support of Ukraine. Their closing argument is that any major nuclear accident risks radiation spreading into the Donbas and Russia and could impact the water supply that flows into Crimea. Even if military planners have floated the scenario in the Kremlin, they believe it would be quickly dismissed.

Camp two believes this is a real threat and provocation and grew more concerned about the Russian embassy's statement that specifically stated "a reactor," indicating one, versus "reactors," which would be the more logical way to word the statement. They point out that weather

conditions would favor a staged nuclear accident on August 19, with a low-pressure system in south-central Ukraine producing northwest winds. Winds would carry radiation over western Ukraine, Moldova, and eastern parts of Romania and Bulgaria. In a major accident, the fog of war would prevent a ready assessment of which belligerent to blame. It would serve as an excuse for Russia to escalate the so-called "special military operation" further.

In our final assessment, as a team, we believe this is a psychological operation meant to cast doubt on Kyiv and its intentions.

CHERNIHIV & SUMY REGION

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources in places, break civilian will with continued terror attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Maintain enough force strength on the border with Russia to prevent Russian troops from crossing

Dmytro Zhyvytskyi, Sumy Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, reported that the settlements of

Bilopillia, Krasnopillia, and Myropillia, were attacked.³⁰ There is more information in the **War Crimes and Human Rights** section.

KYIV REGION

There wasn't any significant military action in this region.

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA & ODESA REGION

There were reports that Belbek military airfield in Russian-controlled Crimea was attacked. The reports were untrue. Russian air defenses were activated in Sevastopol and fired at least four rockets at an unknown target. The booster sections from Pantsir anti-aircraft systems were found in the Sevastopol region.

Russian anti-aircraft weapons were activated at the Kersch Bridge, which connects mainland Russia with occupied Crimea.³¹ Russian state media claims a Ukrainian drone was shot down by anti-aircraft fire.

³⁰ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/08/19/7363917/>

³¹ <https://twitter.com/Liveuamap/status/1560333071278391296>


A [tornado raked the beach and resort area](#) of Saky, in Russian-occupied Crimea, less than two kilometers from the airbase, that experienced an “accidental” explosion last week. There were no reported injuries.³²

WEST REGION

There wasn't any significant military action in this region.

THEATERWIDE & EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS


³² <https://twitter.com/Flash43191300/status/1560522996862836737>



A Russian ammunition depot in Timonovo, Russia, had a catastrophic explosion.³³ [Videos from the area](#) showed multiple secondary explosions, including rockets, missiles, thermite, and potentially white phosphorus.³⁴ Fire and rescue crews were standing off because it was too dangerous to approach the area. Timonovo and Basovo were evacuated, and NASA FIRMS showed multiple secondary fires in regions away from the depot.

³³ <https://twitter.com/OAlexanderDK/status/1560321135660638209>

³⁴ <https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1560373467341529088>



Satellite images showed the region had two open-air ammunition depots, one that covered 147,000 square meters (1.6 million square feet). The homepage of TASS had no mention of the blast. Ukrainian officials have not claimed responsibility.

There are reports that the United States will announce another \$800 million in military aid to Ukraine by early next week. No details of what is included in the package were released.³⁵

³⁵ [Reuters](#)

Exiled Luhansk Oblast Administrative and Military Governor Serhiy Haidai suggested that the Russian offensive to capture Bakhmut has stalled out due to a lack of personnel. He accuses self-declared LNR government officials of rounding up all available men through forced conscription to form a larger offensive.^{36 37}

In Russian-controlled Novoazovsk in the Donetsk oblast, cars were lined up for kilometers awaiting to pass through a Russian military checkpoint.³⁸ The vehicles are traveling east into Russia. Tension is growing with the increased attacks deep into Russian-occupied territory in the Donbas and Crimean Peninsula.

WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The Russian Ministry of Defense is targeting Ukrainian higher education facilities just as the fall college season is about to begin. In the **Mykolaiv** section, we reported the second missile attack on the Black Sea University.

³⁶ <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5116>

³⁷ <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5119>

³⁸ <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/26795>

The Kramatorsk Technology and Design College and the Donbas State Machine-Building Academy, both located in Kramatorsk, were hit by rockets fired by MLRS.³⁹ Both schools suffered significant damage. The strikes occurred at night, and fall classes have not started.

A building on the campus of the National Aerospace Academy in Kharkiv was destroyed in an overnight missile attack.⁴⁰ A security guard who worked at the university was killed in the attack.

In Zolochiv, northwest of Kharkiv, Russian forces shelled the town library, which was completely destroyed after the building caught fire.

In Sumy, Russian artillery shelling of border communities badly damaged a primary school. Classes are scheduled to restart on September 1.

Intentionally targeting cultural, historic, scientific, religious, and educational facilities is considered a war

³⁹ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/08/19/7363927/>

⁴⁰ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/08/19/7363933/>

crime. Russia has used the derided Amnesty International Report from August 4 to justify attacks on civilian infrastructure and to maintain control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

GEOPOLITICAL

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he has agreed to a framework for a visit by an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mission to the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The agreement was reached after meeting with United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres in Lviv.

Zelenskyy said, "Nuclear security is an indisputable priority for the entire world...Mr. Secretary-General and I have agreed [to] the framework for a possible visit...in a legal manner and via territories that have not been captured by the occupiers."

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was also in the meeting and, during the joint press conference, declared, "We are alarmed by the hostilities at the [nuclear power plant]. We don't want to experience another Chornobyl. We are and will remain on Ukraine's side."

ECONOMIC

The rouble improved slightly with an “official” exchange rate of 59 roubles to 1 US dollar.

WTI crude oil climbed to \$89 a barrel, and Brent rose to \$95. United States RBOB wholesale gasoline for spot market delivery increased to \$2.99 a gallon (79 cents a liter).

SRW Chicago wheat futures dropped to 75 cents a bushel for December 2022 delivery. The last time the price was that low was in October 2021.