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SUMMARY – DAY 611

It has been 3,532 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 247 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine. It was one of the quietest days recorded since February 24, 2022.

Jump to the Action Report.

Summary:

- Ukrainian forces have established a bridgehead on the left bank of the Konka River in Kherson
- The table for Russian versus Ukrainian heavy equipment losses using information from the former Oryx Database has been updated as of October 28, 2023
- There are map updates
- High winds caused widespread power outages across Ukraine and killed at least four people, impacting the amount of information available through social intelligence
- The high winds caused a significant reduction in the number of airstrikes and drone attacks and prevented



- frontline troops from flying smaller reconnaissance drones, slowing operational tempo
- Fighting restarted in the Kupyansk AO in Kharkiv with no change in the situation
- Ukrainian forces advanced toward the Zherebets River, reaching the western edge of Serhiivka
- Russian forces continued their attacks near Khromove
- Fighting continued in the Klishchiivka AO with no change in the situation
- Russian tank operators in the Klishchiivka AO reported they can only operate at night and can't come closer than 8 to 9 kilometers to the LOC due to Ukrainian drones
- Russian forces continue their attempts to advance from the Krasnohorivka Plateau towards Stepove
- Based on new intelligence, we've overestimated Russian control of the railroad tracks northeast of the Avdiivka Coke Plant
- In Avdiivka, a stubborn pensioner and her cat Masha are Internet-famous
- Russian sources claimed the primary offensive is north of Avdiivka and fighting on the south flank are subordinate attacks
- Russian forces are remotely mining the Ukrainian position and the no man's land between, suggesting the ongoing operational pause is going to be extended
- The situation in the Orikhiv AO remains stable



- WarGonzo claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to make marginal gains west of Robotyne and north of Nesteryanka
- There are unconfirmed reports of Ukrainian drone strikes in occupied Crimea
- Ukrainian forces have established a bridgehead at Krynyk and are maintaining their landings at Pishchanivka and Dachi
- The Birds of Magyar (jagga jagga) are holding fire control on the approaches to Krynyk
- Czech President Petr Pavel warns that if Ukraine falls, Europe falls
- New Minister of Defense of Slovakia Robert Kaliniak wants to "revise" its defense treaty with the United States
- Chechen Akhmat claims that PMC Wagner mercenaries are joining "en masse"
- PMC Wagner Telegram channels say they are not joining Akhmat
- Russian propagandist Maryana Naumova may be in trouble for telling too much truth about the poor conditions in the occupied territories
- Russian Forces have introduced a new kamikaze drone called Italmas, which is a smaller, cheaper, domestically developed Shahed-136 knock-off



- The Brigade Commander of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry was awarded Hero of Russia for getting 80% of his brigade killed or wounded over the summer
- Members of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry are complaining they have not been rotated in over a year
- United States and European companies are supplying Russia with the parts needed to make Kh-47 Kinzhal and Iskander short-range ballistic missiles
- We have an update on the strange story of the Russian commander who ordered three of his soldiers killed in August 2023 to hide a murder
- Seven Ukrainians are stuck between the Russian and Georgian border
- The bodies of 50 Ukrainian soldiers were repatriated
- Officials have confirmed that the Chinese container ship NewNew Polar Bear damaged the Balticconnector pipeline with its anchor, but it remains unclear why
- Russia raised its prime lending rate from 13% to 15%



DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:


- 1. Russia's use of human wave attacks has caused rapid deterioration of the situation in the Avdiivka area of operation (AO). Despite the ongoing operational pause, Ukrainian forces are facing significant challenges.
- 2. Russian commanders have put mission objectives over all other considerations, and they are committed to capturing the Avdiivka salient regardless of the cost.
- 3. In our assessment, there is the possibility of Ukraine attempting a larger-sized wet crossing near Kherson.
- 4. The soft response by Ukraine's allies after Russian aggression on Ukraine's border will eventually lead to a significant incident that could result in military intervention.
- 5. We assess the commitment made by Ukraine's allies to provide the same level of military aid in 2024 as provided in 2023 as negative news due to Russia bypassing ineffective sanctions, increasing defense production, and receiving significant support from Iran and North Korea.
- 6. We maintain that Russia is stockpiling missiles and drones for large-scale attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure as the weather continues to degrade.



7. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.



TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP




About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted <u>like this</u>, it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

Russia-Ukraine War Report Map




KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure





North of Kupyansk, mutual fighting restarted in the area of Synkivka. To the east, Russian forces continued their tactical assaults on Ivanivka without success. Reports by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) about A Russian attack "in the area" of Petropavlivka being repulsed was likely a squad or platoon sized Russian sabotage and reconnaissance unit (DRG).

¹ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13255


https://t.me/mod_russia/31900 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

³ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13255



DONBAS REGION


LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, and capture the rest of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents





In the Svatove AO, Ukrainian forces made additional gains in the direction of Raihorodka and Serhiivka, with the line of conflict (LOC) now 500 to 1,000 meters from the Zherebets River. The Ukrainian 68th Jager Brigade continues to restrict the freedom of movement of the larger but lesser equipped Russian forces. Fighting for control of the ridge that overlooks the river is ongoing.

⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/31900 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁵ https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17941




In the Kreminna AO, the Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) made its daily claim of positional fighting in the area of Dibrova.6

⁶ https://t.me/mod_russia/31900 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]



NORTHEAST DONETSK




Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut AO, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire Donetsk region by December 31

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk, collapse the Russian flanks north of Bakhmut, capture the T-513 Highway south of Bakhmut, liberate the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, advance to the administrative border of Luhansk, and minimize civilian casualties



On the edge of Bakmut, RMOD reported continuing tactical assaults in the area of Khromove.⁷



In the Klishchiivka AO, mutual fighting continued north and east of Klischiivka and east of Andriivka with no change in the situation. A video released by Russian state media revealed that Russian tanks acan't approach the LOC due to the number of Ukrainian drones. The tanks can only

⁷ https://t.me/mod russia/31900 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


⁸ https://t.me/uniannet/115812



operate at night and provide indirect fire 8 to 9 kilometers away from Ukrainian positions.



SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK




Russian Objective: Capture the remainder of the Donetsk Oblast by December 31

Ukrainian Objective: Find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses, lock Russian troops in place, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



While heavy fighting continues in the Avdiivka AO, it does not match the intensity of October 10 to 23, and there are indications that the ongoing Russian operational pause isn't going to end with improving weather.



Based on open source intelligence, the Russian main offensive in the Adviivka AO is on the north flank, with a mission objective of capturing the Avdiivka Coke Plant and taking physical control of the T-542 Highway, the key



Ukrainian ground line of communication (GLOC – supply line).⁹

Russian forces have started dropping remote landmines on Ukrainian positions and in the no man's land between the forwardmost lines of friendly troops (FLOT) of both combatants. The deployment of mines is a defensive measure and would suggest that Russian commanders need more time for resupply and reconstitution.

Russian forces launched a tactical assault in the direction of Keramik from the Novobakhmutivka area that ended in failure. 11 12 Russian forces continued tactical assaults at the railroad tracks east of Stepove and remained unsuccessful. 13 14 We adjusted the line of conflict northeast of the Avdiivka Coke Plant based on Russian reports of continued fighting for control of the terrikon and Russian sources describing the area between the railroad tracks and the approaches to the Krasnohorivka Plateau as a no man's land.

⁹ https://t.me/vozhak Z/475

¹⁰ https://t.me/uniannet/115787

¹¹ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13255


¹² https://t.me/wargonzo/16076

¹³ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13255

¹⁴ https://t.me/wargonzo/16076



A video from Avdiivka showed Ivanovna, a retired school teacher, is still living in her bombed-out apartment with her cat, Masha. 15 The apartment of the pensioner is one of the last ones that are still somewhat intact in the badly damaged building. Ivanovna refuses to evacuate.



Fighting on the south flank is a subordinate attack meant to lock Ukrainian troops in place. Russian sources are complaining about the lack of artillery and armor support, resulting in losses. A Russian milblogger fighting in

¹⁵ https://t.me/itsdonetsk/110661

¹⁶ https://t.me/vozhak_Z/475




Avdiivka wrote, "I understand perfectly well that our area is not key, and all these assaults are needed to stretch the [Ukrainian] forces, not to give them the opportunity to transfer reinforcements from our area to the north and to keep the enemy on their toes constantly. I understand. But without proper artillery preparation, all this only leads to losses."

Russian forces continued raids meant to restrict freedom of movement near <u>Opytne</u> and north of Vodyane in the direction of <u>Tonenke</u>.¹⁷

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¹⁷ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13255






In the Marinka AO, Russian forces continued their tactical assaults in Marinka, with no change in the situation. 18 19 20

¹⁸ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13255

¹⁹ https://t.me/mod_russia/31900 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

²⁰ https://t.me/wargonzo/16076






Near Vuhledar, Russian forces continued their attacks south of <u>Novomykhailivka</u>. ²¹ RMOD reported that Russian troops conducted attacks in the direction of Vuhledar from <u>Mykilske</u>. ²²

²¹ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13255

²² https://t.me/mod_russia/31900 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]






In the Staromlynivka AO, Russian forces continued tactical assaults in the direction of Zolota Nyva and Staromaiorske, suffered losses, and returned to their defensive positions.²³

²³ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13255

²⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/31900 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




ZAPORIZHZHIA



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, prepare to launch a fall-winter offensive to capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Expand the breakthrough at the second echelon of the Surovikin Line, sever the Russian landbridge from Crimea to Donetsk, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians





Based on available intelligence, the LOC remained stable in the Orikhiv AO, although Russian sources claimed Ukrainian troops made new territorial gains west of Robotyne. Intense Mutual fighting continued on the western edge of Verbove, with both combatants suffering heavy losses. RMOD claimed that a Ukrainian attack west of Robotyne was repulsed, while a prominent Russian milblogger claimed, without evidence, that Ukrainian

²⁵ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13255



forces made marginal gains in the areas of <u>Rivne</u>, <u>Kopani</u>, and <u>Nesteryanka</u>.²⁶ ²⁷

²⁶ https://t.me/wargonzo/16076

²⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/31900 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]



BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

In occupied Crimea, there were multiple reports of drone attacks on Chornomorske, Evpatoria, and Saki. 28 29 At the time of publication, there was no other information.

²⁸ https://t.me/Crimeanwind/46598


²⁹ https://t.me/Crimeanwind/46599



KHERSON

Russian Objective: Prevent further Ukrainian advances into eastern Kherson, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks on Ukrainian civilians, lock Russian troops and military assets in place, and protect civilian lives



In Kherson, based on social intelligence, it is our assessment that Ukrainian forces have established a



bridgehead on the left bank of the Konka River and continue their shaping operation. Elements of the Ukrainian 137th Naval Infantry crossed the Konka River on October 14 and stormed the village of Krynky, which was defended by a platoon of Russian soldiers. The Russian unit was **taken** by complete surprise, with four killed in a home they occupied while eating breakfast.³⁰ The survivors fled into the nearby forest without a fight. A larger Russian assault force, which included the group that retreated, it tried to push the 137th out of Krynky and was repulsed, with Ukrainian forces taking two prisoners.³¹ Both of the POWs are mobiks, with one 39 and the other 60. Both arrived in August and were promised 200,000 roubles, which they never received.³² Incredibly, despite the occupation, a year of shelling, and the flooding of the Dnipro River in June, a pensioner couple still lived in the settlement and was evacuated to free Kherson.³³ On October 16, attempts to push the marines out of the village intensified but have remained unsuccessful. Since taking part of Krynky, approximately 50 Russian soldiers have been killed.34 Fighting for full control of Krynky continues.

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³⁰ https://twitter.com/i/status/1718322108655124730

³¹ https://x.com/GloOouD/status/1718322234698137630?s=20

³² https://twitter.com/GloOouD/status/1718325868286574962

³³ https://twitter.com/GloOouD/status/1718327048228266370

³⁴ https://twitter.com/GloOouD/status/1718327236418290052



A prominent Russian milblogger reported continued fighting in <u>Poima</u>, <u>Pishchanivka</u>, and <u>Pidstepne</u>.³⁵ The Birds of Magyar drone company has been very busy destroying Russian armored vehicles and transports trying to advance toward Krynky from Novi Laheri and Korsunka, destroying multiple vehicles.³⁶ Ukrainian forces continue to maintain the landings north of Pishchanivka and at Dachi.

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity in this area.

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³⁵ https://t.me/wargonzo/16076

³⁶ https://twitter.com/region776/status/1718162559302578437



NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent renewed insurrections, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest



There wasn't any significant activity.

THEATERWIDE

Czech Republic President Petr Pavel, speaking with ambassadors about the continued support of Ukraine and its sovereignty, said, "If Ukraine falls, then we will all fall."³⁷

The new Minister of Defense of Slovakia, Robert Kaliniak, said that during a meeting with the United States ambassador, he conveyed, "We will not send new shipments from Slovak ammunition depots to Ukraine, and the defense treaty [with the United States - Ed.] must be revised."

Under current agreements, the United States is using two airfields in Slovakia, is fast-tracking an order of F-16s to modernize Slovakia's air force, and is investing \$100 million in its airfield infrastructure.

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³⁷ https://t.me/uniannet/115850



The table for equipment losses was **updated on October 28**, **2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 - 24.



RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the Oryx Database from February 24, 2022, to October 28, 2023. 12,871
Russian (including Chef's Rebellion) vs. 4,666 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2279	307	7.42:1	Û
Medium Duty Tanks	158	375	0.42:1	_
Armored fighting Vehicles	1024	333	3.07:1	仓
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2957	780	3.79:1	仓
Armored Personnel Carriers	368	360	1.02:1	_
MRAPs	49	175	0.28:1	
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	223	388	0.57:1	_
Command and Communications Vehicles	254	18	14.11:1	Û
Engineering Vehicles	355	92	3.85:1	Û
Towed Artillery	328	165	1.99:1	Û
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	585	236	2.48:1	_
MLRS	299	50	5.98:1	
SAMs	189	130	1.45:1	
Mobile Radars	46	82	0.56:1	Û
EW/ECW	58	4	14.50:1	仓
Winged Aircraft	94	77	1.22:1	
Helicopters	139	37	3.77:1	仓
Naval Vessels and Submarines	17	27	0.63:1	_



MOBIKS, MOBILIZATION, AND MIR

The Commander of Chechen Akhmat special operation forces, Apti Alaudinov, claimed that former members of the Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group are joining Akhmat "en masse" and are being deployed to Ukraine.³⁸ "Wagnerites had been approaching me even before this; a certain number of soldiers had been joining us periodically. We now have a mass influx of Wagner PMC fighters into the unit," Alaudinov boasted.

Multiple channels affiliated with the Schrodinger state PMC denied the claims. Telegram channel Thirteenth wrote, "No 'Wagnerites' transferred to 'Akhmat,' as happens in the wet fantasies of Chechen TikTokers. And those two and a half cripples, as a colleague from Gray Zone said, who supposedly still transferred, they no longer have anything to do with the company."³⁹

Long-time listeners might remember that we shared some reports from Russian propagandist Maryana Naumova, who had made a series of reports in the occupied territories highlighting how Russian Mir hasn't been very good for

³⁸ https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/10/28/7426165/

³⁹ https://t.me/Separ13_13/21026



Ukrianians under occupation. We also shared two different interviews with men who had been fighting since 2014 and were child soldiers at the time of their enlistment.

It is reported that Naumova has run afoul of Russian prosecutors and is under investigation for discrediting the Russian Federation Armed Forces because of her reports with the "disappointed local population." 40

Russia has introduced a new long-range kamikaze drone called Italmas. The new drone was developed by ZALA, the same company that makes the Lancet. It is a lower-cost, smaller, and more crude version of a Shahed-136 with a smaller warhead. While the new drone causes less damage, its smaller size makes it harder to track on radar and for air defenses to target. It's also unclear if the Italmas is an internally designed Russian drone meant to replace or supplement the Iranian-sourced Shahed-136, which Russia is also making domestically with a number of modifications that are considered improvements from the original Iranian design. In our assessment, Italmas is currently being field-tested in a combat environment.

⁴⁰ https://t.me/informnapalm/19318

⁴¹ https://t.me/zloyodessit/20348



The commander of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade was given the title of Hero of Russia for the performance of the unit in the Orikhiv AO. The 810th is currently being reconstituted after it suffered up to 80% losses over the summer. 42

Family members of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry, who survived the Pavlivka offensive in October 2022 and the Vuhledar offensive in February 2023, are complaining Ministry of Defense and the Presidential Administration that the marines have not been rotated or permitted to take leave. ⁴³ Unit commanders warned that continued complaints from the troops or family members could be career-ending for officers and allegedly told some they're "not returning home at all."

Production of the Kh-47 air-to-surface ballistic missiles and Iskander short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) are exceeding 2021 levels due to expanding production and Russia's ability to bypass existing sanctions.⁴⁴ An investigation by The Insider found that parts and machine equipment were still flowing from Poland, Germany, Lithuania, and the U.S. The materials and equipment have

⁴² https://t.me/Crimeanwind/46258

⁴³ https://t.me/vchkoqpu/43158

⁴⁴ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/46070



dual-use and are sent to a company called the "Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering," which is connected to the manufacturing of missiles.

We have another update on the story of the three Russian soldiers killed in occupied Luhansk over the summer to cover up the murder committed by their commander. In May of 2023, the commander, known by his call sign, Samurai, started collecting the materials being sent to the unit through supply and volunteers and requiring the 84 soldiers under his command to pay for it. Dissenters were allegedly beaten and tied to trees. Unit members escalated through the chain of command, but the complaints were ignored.

Allegedly, on the day of the murder, Samurai came to collect money from one of his subordinates, but they refused. The commander reportedly shot and killed the soldier. It remains unclear if Illshat, Salavat, and Aidar were witnesses or accomplices. The three were also killed, taken to a forested area, blown to pieces with grenades, and set on fire. Samurai then reported the three as deserters.

⁴⁵ https://t.me/bazabazon/22506



The plot unraveled after Samurai and his driver were arrested, with Russian investigators gaining a confession from the driver. The claim was verified after the man led investigators to the site where the three bodies were burned and found human remains.

WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

When Russia retreated from Kherson in November 2022, they took all of the prisoners with them. Seven Ukrainian men completed their sentences in Russia. After being released, they were immediately barred from staying in Russia by a Volgograd court and banned from entry for eight years. The seven were transferred to the Georgia border on October 11, where they have been denied entry. The group is now stuck in no man's land, where they sleep on the floor, and volunteers bring them food and water.⁴⁶

On Friday, the bodies of 50 Ukrainian service members were repatriated for identification and burial.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ https://t.me/astrapress/41078

⁴⁷ https://t.me/The3rdForceUA/20725



GEOPOLITICS AND ECONOMICS

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Korea, Park Chin, said that Moscow has been informed that if any technology is transferred from Russia to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, South Korea will "not turn a blind eye to the transfer of missile technologies." 48

Investigators in Finland have determined that damage to the Balticconnector Pipeline was caused by the Chinese cargo ship NewNew Polar Bear. The container ship arrived in several Russian ports missing one of its anchors, and a six-ton anchor belonging to the ship was recovered from the sea floor. The chief of the NBI in Finland, Robin Lardo, said, "The next questions are whether it was intentional, negligence, poor navigation, and that's where we get to whether there could have been a motive for what happened. It's too early to answer that question at this stage."

On Friday, the Russian Central Bank raised interest rates for the third time in three months, from 13% to 15%.

⁴⁸ https://t.me/couch iu/45559

⁴⁹ https://t.me/uniannet/115594



RUMORS

Many messages and e-mails we receive ask why we didn't cover a certain story or whether we are aware of a report and what we think. The rumor section is a list of claims or stories we are aware of but not reporting on because there isn't enough information to support or discover the truth.

- Is dictatorial president Vladimir Putin dead? Almost certainly not, but you keep asking so.
- Have more than 295,000 Russian soldiers died in Ukraine since February 24, 2022?
- Were two Russian generals seriously wounded and one admiral killed in Sevastopol? We're still waiting to find out, but it appears unlikely.



Notes on Sourcing Information

Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.

Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report: We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.

Rybar: We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.

War Gonzo: We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for *unique claims* about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.



Readovka: We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation. This is by no means a complete list of the sources we monitor.

Igor "Girkin" Strelkov: We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

Andrei Morozov: Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media: We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or unique Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination: The organization has not posted any update since June 9, 2023, and we have ceased monitoring.



Leonid Pasechnik: We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia: We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense: We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

Denis Pushilin: We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

Ramzan Kadyrov: The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

DeepState: We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or



misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

Institute for the Study of War: We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

Ivan Fedorov: We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

Vitaly Kim: When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government officials to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

Oleksiy Arestovych: We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.