‘The spring and summer of 1914 were marked in Europe by an exceptional tranquillity. Ever since Agadir the policy of Germany towards Britain had no only been correct, but considerate. All through the tangle of the Balkan Conferences British and German diplomacy laboured in harmony. The long distrust which had grown up in the Foreign Office, though not removed, was sensibly modified… Germany seemed, with us, to be set on peace.’ Winston Churchill reflects on the pre-war mood, 1931.[[1]](#footnote-1)

By late 1911, Germany had suffered a painful diplomatic loss in the Second Moroccan Crisis. The crisis over the future of Morocco had initially seemed like an opportune moment for Germany to gain concessions. Yet, once Britain placed its thumb more heavily on the Entente scale, the German government came to reckon with its miscalculation. Whatever its causes or its course, the events of the Second Moroccan Crisis are arguably less important than its immediate impact. We have already seen the increased cooperation of Anglo-French general staffs, and their identification of Belgium as a point of contention, but in Berlin the sense of dissatisfaction among the Generals particularly facilitated a striking new development. For the first time in over a decade, Moltke was now pushing for a steady increase in the size of the German army. Schlieffen, the former chief of the German general staff, explained the dilemma in stark statistical terms in mid-December 1911:

Because 65 million Germans do not deploy more trained soldiers than 41 million French, Germany will be in a minority even vis-à-vis France alone, completely aside from the English and perhaps also Belgian troops that will come to her aid. Whether the English fleet and army as well as the French fleet have gained in spirit of enterprise for the possible war is unclear, but the self-confidence and desire for war of the French army and the whole nation has in any case increased substantially in the last summer.[[2]](#footnote-2)

Schlieffen made an important point, also noted by Moltke. Despite the disparity in population between them, by 1911 the German army was scarcely twenty thousand men larger than the French. This may seem surprising, particularly if we view the prelude to the First World War as a clear example of arms race. At sea, as we have seen, Germany was spending unprecedented sums of cash, but even at its height, Germany was only matching half of British naval expenditure. The disparity between the two naval powers was obvious, and the continuation of the naval program was unlikely to change it, at least not for the foreseeable future. In the German army, although state expenditure on the army steadily increased – from £33 million in 1901 to £46 million in 1911 – the actual size of the army remained relatively static. For the period 1901-1912, the maximum number of German military effectives hovered between 607,000 and 619,000. The funds which might have been spent on army increases were diverted to the Navy instead; Germany’s naval budget thus soared from £10 million in 1901 to £23.5 million by 1913.

We might wonder at what the gung-ho German generals thought of this comparatively small pool of soldiers. In fact, this reassessment of priorities which emphasised naval expenditure gelled with the German General Staff, which interpreted a larger army as dangerous, since it would be composed of more socialists and liberals. The safest army was one beholden to the Prussian Junker class, and the best way to preserve this conservative military culture was to maintain recruitment levels.[[3]](#footnote-3) The new army bill changed this with immediate effect. By 1913 Germany’s army had swollen to 782,000, and the French attempted to respond by scraping the barrel to gather an army of 700,000 men. These numbers were not final, nor were all the soldiers ready for to go over the top by 1914, but still, the Franco-German competition on land was clearly reaching a pivotal phase.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Something had clearly happened to affect this new arms race on land, and it appears to have begun with real earnest following the Second Moroccan Crisis. In November 1911 the Kaiser, his ministers, the generals, and many ambassadors approved the presentation of a new army bill to the Reichstag. This bill was passed six months later, and contained flexible provisions which meant its recommendations could be updated as circumstances required. Political reasons may have formed a part of the government’s calculations. The 1912 Reichstag elections could bring more socialists and liberals, and there was great disappointment and bitterness following the uninspiring outcome of the Moroccan Crisis. By standing firm, alluding to the inherent militant patriotism of all Germans, perhaps the government could seize more influence in the Reichstag, thus keeping domestic challengers at bay. Bethmann Hollweg, the German Chancellor, appears to have believed that Anglo-German relations would be damaged by a new naval law. Would it not be better to avoid this danger, and revert these funds to the army instead?[[5]](#footnote-5) If domestic politics was a consideration though, of far more importance was the impression that the military balance of power had swung against Berlin.

In some respects, despite trying to pursue a policy of bluff, Kiderlen did not seek to leverage German military might in ways we might expect. He consented to leaving the fleet dispersed, rather than calling it to readiness or cancelling manoeuvres, as the British admiralty had done. Along with Bethmann Hollweg, Kiderlen also approved the annual autumn manoeuvres for the German army, despite fears that this would leave Germany’s western border ‘militarily almost defenceless.’ Remarkably, this was done because Kiderlen feared that cancelling the manoeuvres would induce the Entente to declare war. As Entente officials watched Germany closely, the Kaiser approved the dismissal of those conscripts who had served two years in uniform. This was intended as a peaceful message, the French ambassador was told. The message was received, and France also dismissed its most senior conscript classes. These actions suggest that Kiderlen, having first burst onto the scene with a bold, belligerent policy, quickly got cold feet when he realised the forces ranged against him.[[6]](#footnote-6)

In other ways, the German mood was pacific. Above all, Kaiser Wilhelm’s refusal to countenance war immediately placed limits on how far Kiderlen could go. Yet it is remarkable that Kiderlen believed he could go far at all. If the First Moroccan Crisis confirmed Anglo-French solidary, then the Second Crisis could only reinforce it. Had the Germans been informed of discussions behind the scenes, they may have played matters even more cautiously. Yet, since not even all the Cabinet were included in these discussions, we cannot necessarily fault Kiderlen for getting his calculations so wrong. He was certainly neither the first nor the last German statesman to misjudge the circumstances of the moment, or his opponents.

As worrying as the increasingly cosy Anglo-French partnership was, Russia was an even greater concern – literally. The 1910 military reform program would increase the speed and organisation of the Russian army, by extension strengthening French defensive capacity. But Moltke and other militarists did not call for a pre-emptive strike against St Petersburg in 1910, or in 1911 when the reforms were still being consolidated. The Russians were aware of their momentary vulnerabilities while this reform and reorganisation process continued. To explain his country’s inaction during the Second Moroccan Crisis, Russia’s Ambassador to France, Alexander Izvolsky, told French Premier Joseph Caillaux in July 1911 that although Paris had Russia’s sympathy, in terms of military assistance:

We would in any case be all the more prevented by the fact that we are in no state to participate in a European war. We still need at least two years to reorganize our forces before we will be ready to face such a struggle.[[7]](#footnote-7)

Similar sentiments expressed by the Tsar suggested Russia would be a non-entity, and Premier Caillaux was informed over the summer by French staff visits to St Petersburg that four years was a more likely timeline if Russia was to be fully prepared. The crisis had awakened officials in London to their comparative unpreparedness in this respect – just what would an Anglo-German war look like for Britain? The meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on 23 August, referenced above, concluded with no concrete plans to show for it. But this assembly had compelled officials to think more precisely about how they would support France in the event of war. All were clear that France would lose if Britain neglected to intervene. However, whether the admiralty desired a blockade or the army wished for an expeditionary force, the prognosis was grim. A long war of exhaustion was the predicted outcome, where Germany would be ground down incrementally by Britain’s naval and economic might. There were no quick solutions. As Churchill noted in a memorandum on the subject, even if Britain could land in France and fight a defensive action until the numbers could be made to tell, this was hardly a reassuring prospect. ‘Such a policy demands heavy and hard sacrifices from France,’ Churchill warned, ‘who must, with great constancy, expose herself to invasion, to having her provinces occupied by the enemy, and to the investment of Paris, and whose armies may be committed to retrograde or defensive operations.’ In his study of European armaments before 1914, David Herrmann summarised these sobering deliberations:

All of these were fairly bloodcurdling prospects for the civilian ministers to contemplate. It was one thing for military men to say that British intervention could save France from catastrophe and give the Entente a fair chance of victory after initial defeats. To a strategist facing war, this was a reasonable calculation of advantage. To a diplomat in peacetime, however, this looked like a terrible prospect. A war without British intervention would mean the defeat of France followed by German hegemony on the continent. A war involving Britain would begin with retreats and heavy sacrifices, and probably end in ultimate victory—if the generals were right. All of this assumed that plans and preparations were ready, which they were not, and that the British mobilized on the same day as the French, an eventuality the government was certainly not prepared to guarantee. In the face of the military prospects as put forward by either the army or the navy, it is not surprising that Asquith and Grey preferred to solve the Moroccan question by negotiation.[[8]](#footnote-8)

Considering these grave implications for a policy of confrontation, it is little surprise that 1912 was ripe for a period of détente between Britain and Germany. Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, the German Chancellor, had his own reasons to reduce tensions with Britain. Despite approving the new army bill, the 1912 Reichstag elections returned a majority of Social Democrats, making them both the largest German party and the largest social democratic party in the world. The pro-government bloc became more radical as a consequence, identifying more closely with the military; most of the right leaning and reactionary groups joined the Defence Association, a new organisation aimed at increasing German military might. Bethmann Hollweg would thus have to balance between the two extremes of German political opinion, the reactionaries, and the radicals. Per the constitution, he needed only the Kaiser to maintain his Chancellorship, yet any bills Bethmann Hollweg wished to put to the Reichstag would now come under greater scrutiny. This difficult domestic situation recommended a policy of accommodation with Britain.

There were also compelling foreign policy reasons to seek this détente; as we have learned, in late September 1911 Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire for its Libyan ambitions. The unpredictable consequences which might follow could be best dealt with if Germany and Britain joined their efforts to prevent any escalations or complications.[[9]](#footnote-9) Any Anglo-German détente would have to grapple with the increased animosity between the two countries following the Moroccan crisis. As British ambassador to Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen, appreciated, the public mood in Germany was hostile towards Britain. ‘I wish I could give a better report of Anglo-German relations,’ Goschen wrote in mid-January 1912, ‘but my few English-loving German friends tell me that they have never known the feeling of irritation against England so strong and so widespread as it is at present, I am afraid this is the case.’[[10]](#footnote-10)

Sir Edward Grey also had domestic reasons for persevering with Germany. Like Bethmann Hollweg, he had come under intense criticism for his diplomacy during the Moroccan crisis. Indeed, Grey was subject to much greater criticism than his German counterpart, as a ‘Grey must go’ campaign began within his own Liberal Party, and seventy members of the party joined a Liberal foreign affairs committee aimed at avoiding a German war. Grey was thus converted to this policy of détente by this domestic pressure, though two major obstacles threatened such a policy. The first was Germany’s membership of the Triple Alliance, and potential conflict between British interests and those of Germany’s allies. The second was more formidable, and revolved around the naval race. Could a concerted effort at détente overcome at least this second issue, even if a political compromise could not be found? Removing the naval race from the equation could have an immediate effect on Anglo-German relations, both in the public mood and in diplomatic terms. The effort, for both Grey and Bethmann Hollweg, was thus worth it for the potential advantages, and the détente entered its first phase with the despatch of the British Minister of War, Viscount Haldane, to Berlin.[[11]](#footnote-11)

The choice of Haldane was intended to please the Germans, who had originally asked for Churchill to meet with Tirpitz. Neither Churchill nor Grey wished to make the journey, for reasons of distrust and to avoid sending a signal to the French which might be misconstrued. It was thus better to send Haldane, who was still a Cabinet minister focused on matters of war. Haldane had also studied in Gottingen, and had translated German philosophical works, so he would not feel like an outsider in Berlin. Haldane’s fluency in German was matched by his knowledge and appreciation of German history, literature, and culture, to an extent that he was described as ‘made in Germany.’ Surely, there was no better man to navigate the complexities of the German court and press for British interests.[[12]](#footnote-12) A memo written by Grey, Churchill and Lloyd George detailed the three principles which should underpin Haldane’s mission. He was to affirm the fundamental role of naval power for British security, and if possible to reduce the German naval program. He was to signal British willingness to aid Germany in its colonial endeavours. Finally, he was to establish reciprocal assurances which would prevent either power from joining in a combination against the other.[[13]](#footnote-13)

Grey recognised the importance of obscuring British goals, in case they alarmed the French. Grey’s view, communicated to Sir Francis Bertie, British ambassador to Paris, was as follows: ‘It happens to be convenient for Haldane to go to Berlin about the business of a University Committee for Scientific Education, over which he presides there.’ Haldane was to ‘see Bethmann Hollweg, and have a very frank exchange of views about naval expenditure and other things, in order to discover whether the Germans will do anything in connection with that expenditure, and what they want in return.’ This latter question was somewhat concerning; what price would Berlin demand in return for reducing its naval program? Grey accepted that this uncertainty did not bode well. ‘The question is not very easy,’ he wrote, adding that:

The Germans are very vague about what is possible as regards naval expenditure; and, though we are quite prepared to satisfy them that we have no intention of attacking them or supporting an aggressive policy against them, we must keep our hands free to continue the relations which we already have with France.[[14]](#footnote-14)

Grey was right to feel pessimistic about the prospects of success. What he seems to have overlooked was the significant impact his own underlings would have on the failure of the mission. Sir Arthur Nicolson, the undersecretary of the Foreign Office, interpreted any concessions to Germany as likely to offend Russia, which he wanted to avoid. Yet Nicolson was charged with equipping Haldane with the necessary documentation and advice for his trip. Nicolson had made his feelings on the Haldane mission plain to Francis Bertie in Paris.

I do not myself see why we should abandon the excellent position in which we have been placed, and step down to be involved in endeavours to entangle us in some so-called “understandings” which would undoubtedly, if not actually, impair our relations with France and Russia.

Ambassador Bertie was similarly opposed; he had already tipped off Poincare, the French President, and he continued to goad the French Foreign Office into applying pressure on Grey. Bertie interpreted the mission as a ‘foolish move’ designed to silence the ‘Grey must go radicals’ in the Cabinet.[[15]](#footnote-15) Eyre Crowe, now the assistant undersecretary at the Foreign Office – essentially, Nicolson’s subordinate – also weighed in. ‘It would be a political mistake of the first magnitude to allow the German government to squeeze concessions out of us and leave them quite free to pursue the policy of carefully preparing their inevitable war against us,’ Crowe fumed. Indeed, it seems the entire Foreign Office was opposed to Grey’s initiatives, even if some in the Cabinet pushed for it.[[16]](#footnote-16) With such a lack of enthusiasm for his mission, Haldane was hampered even before he arrived in Berlin on 8 February 1912. He proceeded to send home several reports of his meetings with the German Chancellor and Kaiser, which make for fascinating reading as a peek behind the curtain of German politics at the time. In a diary entry written in the evening of his arrival, Haldane reflected on the key points of the meeting with Bethmann Hollweg, identifying from an early stage what the main obstacles were. His first meeting with the Chancellor lasted for over an hour and a half, and therein:

I told him [Bethmann Hollweg] that I felt there had been a great deal of drifting away between Germany and England, and that it was important to ask what was the cause. Germany had built up, and was building up, magnificent armaments, and with the aid of the Triple Alliance she had become the centre of a tremendous group. The natural consequence was that other powers had tended to approximate. While the fact to which I referred created a difficulty, the difficulty was not insuperable; for two groups of powers might be on very friendly relations if there was only an increasing sense of mutual understanding and confidence. The present seemed to me to be a favourable moment for a new departure. The Morocco question was now out of the way, and we had no agreements with France or Russia except those that were in writing and published to the world.[[17]](#footnote-17)

At this point, Haldane recorded that Bethmann Hollweg interrupting him to ask if it really was true that Britain had no secret arrangements with her Entente partners. Perhaps Bethmann Hollweg had gotten wind of the secret talks between the Anglo-French general staffs, or perhaps he was simply fishing. Either way, Haldane provided him with his unreserved assurances that no such secret agreements existed. Indeed, Haldane ‘saw no reason why it should not be possible for us to enter into a new and cordial friendship carrying the two old ones into it perhaps to the profit of Russia and France as well as Germany herself.’ From here, the German Chancellor issued more concrete proposals for Haldane to consider. This was a neutrality agreement, where Britain and Germany would agree not to join in attack against the other. Haldane gave his cordial approval for it, but the fleet issue would be addressed in more detail the following day, when Admiral von Tirpitz and the Kaiser would be present.[[18]](#footnote-18)

A new German naval bill was on the cards, but before it was presented to the Reichstag alongside the army bill Haldane had a chance to remove it, or at least reduce or postpone it. The new bill proposed three next German dreadnoughts over six years, with one new ship every two years, to serve as the basis for a third naval squadron. Tirpitz was unlikely to move on this point, considering his personal investment in the naval race. In political terms as well, Tirpitz already set out the minimum commitment Germany would require from Britain. He described this in a telegram to a colleague on 8 February 1912: ‘England may not participate in a war between Germany and France, no matter who the “attacker” is.’ If, Tirpitz understood, ‘we cannot obtain this guarantee then we will simply have to continue arming in order to be up to the Anglo-French entente which has, de facto, the character of an offensive alliance.’ This was exaggerating the actual terms of the Entente, but it does capture the sense of mistrust Germany then felt for British diplomacy. As London had weighed in behind France in the Morocco crisis, it is not surprising that Berlin suspected her aggressive intentions, or that Bethmann Hollweg sought clarification that Britain was not secretly locked in an offensive alliance with Paris.[[19]](#footnote-19) This also highlights the serious challenges Haldane would face, since Tirpitz was clearly reluctant to give up any advantage so long as Britain remained free.

Nonetheless, Haldane had to face this challenge head on when he met with Tirpitz and the Kaiser on 9 February. Again, Haldane reflected on the meeting in his diary. Tirpitz underlined that the new naval law was anticipated for 1912, and ‘it was very difficult to get out of this.’ Haldane drove the point home, asserting that public opinion would not believe in an Anglo-German détente without some adjustment to Germany’s naval program. Wilhelm was ‘disturbed’ by this line of argument, and asked Haldane for suggestions. ‘After much talking,’ Haldane recorded that he developed a new proposal for the German fleet, whereby Germany would launch a new ship every three years, starting in 1913 and ending in 1919. This was accepted after some debate, representing perhaps the greatest concession Haldane acquired. In response, Tirpitz requested an understanding on British shipbuilding, referring to the two-power British naval standard as ‘a hard one for Germany,’ since Berlin ‘could make no admission about it.’ Reading between the lines, Haldane presented a different idea:

Germany must be free and we must be free, and we should probably lay down two keels to their one. In this case the initiative was not with us but with them. An idea occurred to all of us on this observation that we should try to avoid defining a standard proportion in the agreement, and that, indeed, we should say nothing at all about shipbuilding in the agreement, but if the political agreement was concluded the Emperor should at once announce to the German public that this entirely new fact modified his desire for the fleet law as originally conceived, and that it should be delayed and spread out to the extent we had discussed. For the rest, each of us would remain masters in our own houses as far as naval matters were concerned.[[20]](#footnote-20)

This granted additional importance to such an agreement, and refocused attention away from the thorny question of ships, to the arguably thornier question of Britain’s political position. Were Germany to sign to such a political agreement, it would have to be sufficiently robust to make up for the reduction in German ships. ‘The fact of the agreement was the key to everything,’ both Haldane and Wilhelm recognised, even if the latter believed Haldane’s proposals ‘would affect profoundly the tendency in ship-building.’ Wilhelm recommended Haldane meet Bethmann Hollweg again after lunch, which Haldane did. This conversation was frank and sobering, as both men recognised the pointlessness of an accord without the ship building issues resolved. As Haldane recorded:

The Chancellor said that if we could not meet them in their necessity for a new Fleet Law, the idea of agreement must go to pieces, and that things would grow worse. He had done and was doing his best – what the result of failure would be was a matter of destiny. I observed that I was as anxious for an agreement as he was, and my colleagues were anxious too. But how would our agreement look if it were followed by more ship-building?[[21]](#footnote-21)

Even if the new fleet law was adjusted as Haldane requested, he appreciated that the appearance of any new German dreadnoughts would cast doubt upon an Anglo-German agreement. The following day, Haldane thus found Bethmann Hollweg willing to disrupt the naval law entirely, if it meant a guarantee of British neutrality in its place. Haldane was even advised by Baron von Stumm of the German Foreign Office to the effect that Haldane could aid Bethmann Hollweg’s quest if Britain attempted to drive a harder bargain on the fleet. As Haldane recorded:

The Chancellor, said Baron von Stumm, was not going to let this [Anglo-German] agreement – which was the dream of his life – founder because of Tirpitz, and it would help him, Stumm thought, if I took a very strong line to the effect that there must be further naval concessions. I took the hint, and when I went to the Chancellor’s house at 5 o’clock, I began by saying that English public opinion would not improbably be unmanageable and, I thought, with reason. He said he saw my point. He would do his best. But the forces he had to contend with were almost insuperable. Public opinion in Germany expected a new law and the third squadron, and he must have these.[[22]](#footnote-22)

Bethmann Hollweg’s account over 8-10 February 1912 shed further light on these conversations. Therein, the Chancellor emphasised his priorities, which did not revolve around the fleet:

Personally I was determined to champion utmost restraint in the question of the fleet building program, if I were able to create a political agreement as a compensating counterweight. But this is where England failed. In long drawn-out negotiations Sir Edward Grey finally conceded the following formula.

Bethmann Hollweg outlined this formula as follows:

Because both powers share the desire to ensure peace and friendship with each other, England declares that she will not launch an unprovoked attack on Germany and that she will refrain from any aggressive policy against Germany. An attack is not part of any contract nor part of any combination of which England is currently a member, and England will not join any agreement that aims at such an attack.

But the German Chancellor was unimpressed with the subtext of this formula. It suggested that Britain would not attack Germany on its own, but said nothing about Britain’s participation in a Franco-Russian attack, let alone her support of these powers in matters of defence. Bethmann Hollweg suggested an addition that Britain would remain neutral ‘if war were forced on Germany,’ but neither Haldane nor Grey could accept this, ‘because of concern to be endangering the existing friendship with the other powers.’[[23]](#footnote-23) Haldane subsequently returned to London, but not before acquiring a draft of the new German naval law. This affirmed German intentions to continue discussions with Britain based on the progress already made.

The naval law discussed by Haldane and Bethmann Hollweg provided for the construction of three German dreadnoughts over six years, yet while this appeared to be a German compromise, it seems Haldane had not seen the fine print. The more precise financial terms of the naval bill seems to have taken the British government by surprise. Indeed, it suggested that if Britain was to match German naval expenditure, it would have to increase the naval budget by £14 million over the next five years. Once he returned home, Haldane found Grey distracted with domestic issues, including a miner’s strike. Haldane thus took a leading role in these more distant negotiations, carried on through respective ambassadors where required. Subsequent negotiations went in circles; Britain requested further reductions in this naval law; Germany requested declarations of neutrality along the lines discussed above; Britain refused to go along with these, and the German shipbuilding continued, now unfettered by British requests for reductions.[[24]](#footnote-24) Grey seemed to have now veered back to the Entente; efforts to undermine the talks by leaking them to the French may have had their effect, since the British Foreign Secretary was so concerned at alienating France that he resolutely refused the insertion of ‘neutrality’ into an Anglo-German agreement at all. By 19 March, Berlin had rejected the minimalist agreement London had proposed. The Haldane mission, so it seemed, had achieved nothing.[[25]](#footnote-25)

Although the 1912 Haldane Mission failed, it was not without consequences. As the Anglo-German talks continued after Haldane’s return, Bethmann Hollweg submitted his resignation on 6 March. This may have compelled the Kaiser to offer more substantive concessions on naval construction, but these were for nought so long as Britain would not confirm unconditional neutrality in a Franco-German war. The Kaiser, much like Grey, was undermined by domestic opponents. He refused to accept Bethmann Hollweg’s resignation, but when Tirpitz also threatened to resign if the naval law was not passed, the Kaiser felt forced to support him. When the German ambassador to London explained in stark terms how an Anglo-German rapprochement would never be possible without dispensing entirely with the new naval law, Tirpitz worked successfully to get him sacked. Marschall von Bieberstein, long-serving ambassador to Constantinople, was the replacement, and even if those in France and Britain were wary of Marschall’s reputation for intrigue, they respected his experience and skill. Grey finally met this new German ambassador in late June 1912. Marschall began by emphasising Germany’s desire for peace, as Grey recorded:

She had nothing to gain by taking further territory; war would be disastrous, because of the financial complications which would follow; and where the whole population was in the Army an aggressive war was impossible, for every family would feel it. I said that the real danger of war generally was in the occurrence of some incident which seemed to affect national honour. I agreed that, if there was a great European war, it was not likely to profit anyone, for even the Power which was successful in the war might, on being relieved from external pressure for a time, suffer to the extent of revolution from internal pressure.

Marschall then addressed the other pain point in Anglo-German relations – the naval race. Typically, Marschall was eager to combat the impression that Germany’s navy was directed against Britain, but as usual these claims ring hollow when Tirpitz’ own inclinations are borne in mind. Still, Marschall’s explanations to Grey are worth bringing forward:

The Ambassador deprecated the suspicion entertained in some quarters in England that the German Fleet was being built against England — indeed at a later period of our conversation he remarked that it was the German Emperor's admiration for England that had stimulated his desire to have a fleet. I remarked that the naval expenditure was a great fact which could not be ignored. If our Fleet were inferior to the German Fleet we should run a tremendous risk for the considerations which operated against military war were necessarily not so strong against naval war, which did not involve the whole population; if once we were defeated at sea the consequences would be most disastrous to us. The Ambassador admitted that, for us, the Fleet was a more vital thing than for Germany. He realised that both countries had certain agreements and engagements which must be kept; but, without impairing these, he thought that we ought to have friendly relations.

Grey was of course in agreement that Anglo-German relations should retain a friendly character regardless of their differences. But Grey did perceive that Marschall had not been given any specific instructions. It seemed more likely Marschall intended to test the waters, before returning to Berlin for leave, and then resuming his London post with a clearer picture.[[26]](#footnote-26) Yet Marschall died shortly after accepting the post; Asquith later reflected that if Marschall had lived, the First World War would have been avoided. There was similar recognition in Berlin that a terrible loss had been incurred. Amidst this sense of great panic, Prince Lichnowsky was identified as the ideal candidate, and he arrived in London in mid-November 1912.[[27]](#footnote-27) The eighteen months of peace Lichnowsky enjoyed while ambassador to London do deserve our attention, but first it is important to consider the further consequences of the Haldane mission, above all in France. British opponents of the Haldane mission were quick to reflect on its failure. Having leaked the details of the Haldane mission to the French government, on 16 February ambassador Bertie in Paris wrote a memorandum based on recent conversations with Grey and others in the Foreign Office.

I warned Grey that the press and public in France are very nervous and suspicious as to the result of the Haldane mission and that if we make these concessions to Germany for practically no return, it will be surmised that there must be some secret agreement to our advantage, for…if we signed a formula binding ourselves not to join in any combination to attack Germany we might tie our hands very inconveniently as regards France.

When Grey responded by asking Bertie if he believed France intended to attack Germany, Bertie gave the following intriguing reply:

The first attacker is not necessarily the real aggressor. The French government are aware of recent great military preparations in Germany. What are they for? If the movements of German troops towards the French frontier and other measures indicated warlike intentions by Germany I thought that the French troops might be first to cross the frontier, as they might thereby gain a great military advantage which with the French temperament would be of the highest importance as if a victory were gained by them it would infuse a spirit into the French troops which would count for much in a campaign. The quarrel between Germany and France might be due to the former and she would be the real aggressor though not the one to strike the first blow.

This fascinating statement accounted for a situation where France felt forced to attack Germany owing to the military preparations made against her. This, Bertie claimed, did not signify that France was in fact aggressive, since she was only reacting to German aggression in the first place. One might ask whether this would also apply to Germany; if Germany attacked Russia, in the event of a Russian mobilisation, could it not be said that Germany was acting defensively in response to Russia’s aggressive moves? Unfortunately, Bertie does not record any reflections on this question, but it is remarkable that such a caveat could exist in his mind in the first place. Having the freedom to respond to the situation without prejudice to who the aggressor technically was clearly recommended itself to Bertie. He warned Grey further that Paris was worried Britain would be ‘hoodwinked’ by the Germans, in preparation for a strike against France once Britain was out of the way.[[28]](#footnote-28)

The French ambassador to London, Paul Cambon, managed to soothe the concerns of his countrymen when he advised Poincare in late March that the Haldane mission and its conversations had concluded. This likely came from Cambon’s impression of Grey’s delegation of the talks to his subordinates, and the German rejection of the rigid neutrality agreements we examined above. Cambon enjoyed a warm relationship with the Foreign Secretary, and reflected with some smugness on 22 March ‘And so evaporate the hopes and fears that ill-informed minds had invested in the visit of Lord Haldane to Berlin.’ But Ambassador Bertie was only too happy to puncture this sense of relief; the Anglo-German talks, he told Poincare, had not in fact ended, but were ongoing.[[29]](#footnote-29) This being the case, Poincare wrote anxiously to Cambon requesting more information. The telegram is worth looking at for the anxiety it shows in French considerations.

It was invaluable to learn that the British government had refused to be bound by a declaration of neutrality towards the German government, in the event that Germany should enter into conflict with a third power. But a meeting I had yesterday with the ambassador [Bertie] during which he expressed himself very freely, leads me to want a little more detail about the assurances you were given.

Poincare then recounted what Bertie had said, which Cambon was directed to consider very carefully:

After telling me he wanted to talk to me ‘as if he were not the ambassador,’ Sir Francis Bertie added: ‘Sir Edward Grey has just written to me that Monsieur Cambon was very happy with his assurances concerning the declaration of neutrality Germany has asked us for. This surprises me, because the fact that any such declaration has not been agreed does not necessarily mean it has been dismissed once and for all. What Germany wanted from us was not just the promise of straightforward neutrality; she wanted that neutrality to be benevolent, which is absurd because benevolent neutrality is no longer neutrality at all. Sir Edward Grey, to his credit, answered with a refusal; actually, he is totally surrounded at the moment by people who want to strengthen ties with Germany. I do confess that I no longer understand his politics: it worries me, even. We must prevent this declaration of neutrality from being agreed, which it is in danger of being within a very short time if the German government repeats the same demand. In truth, we are only being asked to commit to remaining neutral in the event that Germany is attacked. But, who can guarantee that France, provoked and threatened by the mobilisation of the German army will not be forced to take up the offensive? No, Monsieur Cambon must not give the impression of being happy. If you, yourself, speak to London firmly, they will be reluctant to commit the error I am dreading.’

Bertie’s inherent Francophilia thus presented itself to Poincare, who was now sufficiently shaken since ‘This advice comes from too friendly and respectful a source for me not to follow it,’ Cambon was told. The French ambassador was instructed to confront Grey and inquire further, without mentioning Bertie’s leaks. ‘It is extremely important,’ Poincare continued,

…that England should not commit to remaining neutral in a war between France and Germany, even in the event that the attack would seem to come from us. For example, could we legitimately be blamed for an attack, if a concentration of German forces in the region of Aix-la-Chapelle forced us to cover our northern border by crossing into Belgian territory?

Considering these sentiments, it might be argued that when Grey spoke of a free hand preventing a declaration of neutrality, what he really intended was to preserve the free hand of France. Britain could not ignore the possibility that France might be induced to attack Germany – who could say what would happen in the future – and it was better to commit to nothing rather than commit to a situation where France would be constricted and forced to await a German attack. It is certainly striking to see French concerns of appearing as the aggressor, considering how the July Crisis produced a defensive war in the French case. Yet it should be underlined again that Grey appeared sympathetic to the argument that a pre-emptive French strike against German mobilisation would be a legitimate act of war. He was not possessed of similar charity when he later regarded German behaviour in late July 1914. Poincare did acknowledge the secret Anglo-French staff talks, yet he concluded to Cambon that Britain would maintain its free hand, by extension liberating France from any constraints on her own war planning.[[30]](#footnote-30)

The angst continued in French circles through the spring of 1912. Even when Cambon and Grey departed for Easter holidays, the controversy resumed when they returned. All the while Bertie pressed Poincare to lean very hard on his boss. Nothing had been gained from Germany, yet Grey had not abandoned the idea altogether, so Poincare was advised by Bertie to maintain the pressure. Cambon’s certainty that Grey would never sign an agreement with Germany ‘however inoffensive it might be’ was not even shared by Grey’s subordinates, as Bertie’s confessions to the French Premier showed. In Grey’s view, it was clearly worth investigating whether Germany had something to offer which might improve Britain’s strategic or financial position. Now that it was plain the German navy would be steadily increased, and no political agreement was acceptable, Britain could only acquire colonial compromises of limited value. The first step towards an Anglo-German détente had failed, yet the policy of manufacturing détente continued.[[31]](#footnote-31) Sir Arthur Nicolson, the undersecretary of the Foreign Office, wrote to Ambassador Goschen in Berlin on 15 April. Here he affirmed that the efforts to reach an Anglo-German neutrality formula or understanding had failed, yet in his view, this was not an entirely negative outcome:

I trust that it means that the formula question has been definitely buried and that we shall hear no more about it. I was really uneasy lest we should be entrapped into signing some engagement which would offend the French and render them suspicious, for it would be fatal for us to take any measure which would in any way impair our relations with France. It is also quite clear that were we to do so, an unfavourable effect would be produced on our relations with Russia and also we should have to reconsider entirely the distribution of our naval forces, as we should not, as it apparently is the intention at present, practically leave the care of the Mediterranean to the French Navy. I have always maintained, and I have impressed as far as I can on those dealing with these matters, that it would be far more disadvantageous to have an unfriendly France and unfriendly Russia than an unfriendly Germany. The latter, it is true, can give us plenty of annoyance, but it cannot really threaten any of our more important interests, while Russia especially could cause us extreme embarrassment, and, indeed, danger, in the Mid- East and on our Indian frontier, and it would be most unfortunate were we to revert to the state of things which existed before 1904 and 1907.[[32]](#footnote-32)

When we assess the career of Sir Edward Grey, we thus must bear in mind the influences pressing upon him from his subordinates. These subordinates, like Nicolson, Eyre Crowe, and senior ambassadors, were of the view that a relationship with France superseded one with Germany in importance. For strategic reasons, the Franco-Russian alliance was the bloc of greatest interest to Britain, and Germany was to be a friendly but detached part of the international system. Thus a few days later in April 1912 we see Sir Edward Goschen in Berlin writing to Nicolson with a mixture of relief and excitement that the Anglo-German efforts had failed, and no agreement on a political formula or neutrality had been reached:

I need hardly tell you that I feel great relief at the idea that the Formula question is in the process of interment; it has always been my dream to be on cordial relations with Germany without any definite political understanding, and if, as I hope, the recent conversations have that result no one will be more pleased than I. They have tried hard to bustle us into a hampering formula and I rejoice that they have failed. You have been foremost in this good work.[[33]](#footnote-33)

The French could detect this anti-German trend among certain personnel in the Foreign Office, and during this period attempted to take advantage of it. Ambassador Cambon was optimistic that public opinion in Britain was in favour of transforming the entente into an Anglo-French alliance. He preferred to let his colleagues push this idea, however, because he had sensed a more useful development. Since it was clear that Germany was unwilling to restrict its naval building program, was it not better for Britain to acquire a kind of naval understanding with France? In John Kieger’s assessment of Cambon during his ambassadorship, the Frenchman is depicted as having a perceptive understanding of Anglo-French commitments. More specifically, by appreciating the limits of these arrangements and the imperative of a British free hand, Cambon manipulated Sir Edward Grey, drawing him into an accord where nothing would be stated, but implications impinging on British honour would be created.[[34]](#footnote-34) This is best seen in the development of Anglo-French naval talks, particularly in relation to the assignment of strategic zones. Just as the consequences of the Haldane mission were dissipating, Churchill presented a plan to withdraw the British Mediterranean fleet to better meet the German threat in the North Sea. As Samuel Williamson Jr. explained:

This shift left British interests dangerously exposed to a possible Triple Alliance naval attack in the Mediterranean. On their own, the French shifted their remaining naval units from the north to the Mediterranean, thus creating a situation in which they could argue that they were protecting British interests there. Not surprisingly, the French insisted that this new situation necessitated the clear establishment of Anglo-French naval talks, talks that matched the military ones. This time the Cabinet was informed and did agree to such talks, again on the condition that Britain was not committed to action. The talks began and became detailed and precise.[[35]](#footnote-35)

Cambon thus perceived that if France moved its fleet to cover the Mediterranean, this would signify a firm commitment to defend Entente interests, and Britain would hopefully feel compelled to defend the French coast from German attack. If this moral commitment could be pursued further, and provided for in a written statement, then this would represent something the French could lean on, and the British could maintain that nothing had materially changed. These conversations over the positions of the fleet proved more consequential than similar conversations regarding an Anglo-French alliance. Cambon also seemed to have more success with Grey’s Cabinet colleagues. By 23 August, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill opined that ‘Everyone must feel who knows the facts that we have all the obligations of an alliance without its advantages and above all without its precise definitions.’ This, indeed, was Cambon’s intention. He did not need an alliance when he could rely on the Foreign Secretary’s inviolable sense of honour.[[36]](#footnote-36)

Cambon went further still. In his conversations with Grey, he suggested that it would be of great help to the French government if Britain would agree to a secret note which compelled the two governments to work together in the event of war. Grey initially rejected this, since in his view, the original terms of the Entente addressed this contingency. But Cambon wished for it in writing, since it could be more legally enforceable. Predictably, Grey was apprehensive, but he understood that if France was to place the defence of its coasts in Britain’s hands, she would need reassurance that their understanding was based on something more than conversations from several years before. On 20 November 1912 – as the First Balkan War was stunning foreign opinion – a formula was finally agreed between Paris and London. It stipulated that in time of war the two countries would collaborate to prevent aggressions and maintain peace; each was clear that the freedom of action of the other was not compromised by the dispositions of the fleets. Typically, both Britain and France had their own interpretations on what had just been agreed. Poincare saw it as shoring up the Entente. Grey was less conclusive. As the historian John Kieger wrote, what was believed agreed was perhaps more important than what had actually been agreed:

Whether Britain had compromised her freedom of action is less important than whether she believed she had. Just as the issue was whether the French believed Britain had indeed made a greater commitment to her. It was, of course, on the basis of what each believed that they would act. Though on 1 August 1914 Cambon insisted that Britain had a moral obligation to defend France's northern coastline because France had transferred her fleet to the Mediterranean, Grey and the Cabinet believed Britain had retained its freedom of action unfettered.[[37]](#footnote-37)

We should be clear on what was developing in the background to European diplomacy during 1912. Britain had attempted to arrive at some formula in her German relations, with the advertised price of the German naval law. These efforts misfired, and German naval building continued apace.[[38]](#footnote-38) British relations towards France were based on a different dynamic; the feeling in Paris was that British power was urgently needed to redress the miliary balance, and her officials were evidently eager to develop a formula which enshrined British participation. The divisions in London over this question shows that there remained a hesitancy in British diplomacy. Britain was evidently willing to forge alliances – the alliance with Japan was maintained up to the First World War – yet in Europe, Grey wished to maintain a freer hand. Despite the objections of his subordinates, Grey leaned on the Entente’s existing terms rather than develop these further into a formal alliance.

Again, when our narrative addresses the stormy Parliamentary session of 3 August 1914, we will see firsthand how aghast contemporaries were at the very suggestion of British commitments to France. All the while, Grey was forced into a balancing act. He understood the Francophile sympathies of his subordinates, yet insisted Britain should retain its free hand until the final moment. Significantly, Grey did not seem to realise that an accumulation of understandings and positional agreements – such as the arrangement of the fleets – could entail consequences and obligations not unlike those of an alliance. As Cambon particularly appreciated, Britain could be tied to France through unconventional means, and he was determined to pursue as many of these as possible. As far as Cambon was concerned, French security required nothing less.

Yet, as we alluded to earlier, the failure of the Haldane mission did not represent the end of Anglo-German cooperation. Once the Balkan Wars erupted in October 1912, indeed, one could argue that this cooperation entered a new level of sophistication and mutual interest. ‘Let these people get on with it,’ Kaiser Wilhelm II wrote at the beginning of the war. ‘Either they will take some blows or they will deal some out; afterwards there will be time to talk. The Eastern Question must be solved with blood and iron! But at the right time for us! And that is now!’ A few days before the Balkan War erupted, the Kaiser authorised a four-point plan for Germany’s approach to the crisis. Not one of these points advocated intervention, instead arguing that Berlin should attempt to contain the conflict and avoid a wider war. His perspective was articulated with a Social Darwinist tinge that we may find distasteful, but Wilhelm was adamant that the Balkan powers should be permitted to test their mettle, as was the way of things for ambitious new nation states.

In fact, Wilhelm’s initial position even went as far as allowing Serbia to have Albania. The land, the Kaiser claimed, was not worth a European war. Yet by late November 1912, bolstered by several concerning telegrams from Vienna raising the alarm of Russian actions on their border, Wilhelm became more involved. His support for Austria in the event of a Russian attack had to be made crystal clear in Europe, but there was very little risk that Russia would attack.[[39]](#footnote-39) France had not been brought on board for a war in defence of Serbia, and on the point of avoiding a wider war, London agreed as well. As we saw in our Balkan Wars episode, Sir Edward Grey was eager to contain the war, and presented London as the site for an informal conference of ambassadors.

This overture effectively paused the more active portion of the war, and Europe could breathe a sigh of relief until matters escalated again in spring. The conference ran from December 1912 to August 1913, and served as a useful platform for the relevant powers to make their case. It also saw Ambassador Lichnowsky, still relatively fresh in his position as ambassador, represent Germany at the Conference, thereby increasing his influence and importance. The mood was cooperative, but on 2 December, Bethmann Hollweg made a speech to the Reichstag where he emphasised Germany’s obligation to assist Austria in the event of a Russian attack. It is not clear why the Chancellor felt the need to state in public what was already assumed in private. But the decision was poorly timed. It caused an immediate ripple in Anglo-German relations.[[40]](#footnote-40) Thus, on 3 December 1912 we see the German ambassador to London, Prince Lichnowsky, reporting home on conversations he had had with Viscount Haldane, then British Minister for War:

Lord Haldane called on me today in order to discuss the political situation with me. During the long conversation he emphasised repeatedly the necessity to reach an agreement on the conflicts in the oriental [later to be called the Albanian] crisis, because it could not be foreseen what results a war would have in which one or several of the great powers would become involved. England was completely peaceful and nobody here wanted a war, not least for economic reasons. But in the general European chaos which could result from Austria marching into Serbia if Serbia did not willingly clear the occupied Adriatic coast, it was hardly likely that Great Britain would remain a silent observer. I replied that I did not want to pose the question if this meant as much as that England would then proceed in a hostile manner against us. He replied that this was certainly not the necessary, but the possible, result of a war between the two continental groups… Should thus Germany be embroiled in the conflict by Austria, and thus end up at war with France, then currents would be created in England which no government could resist and whose consequences were entirely unpredictable.[[41]](#footnote-41)

This was itself a telling indication of British concerns, particularly over the possibility that the balance of power would be upset in the event of a Triple Alliance victory against Russia, France, and Serbia. One could even argue that this was Britain maintaining its free hand once again – the same free hand Grey had valued so highly during the Haldane mission earlier in the year. British intervention was not guaranteed, but it was a possibility in the event of a European war. Yet from Wilhelm’s zero-sum perspective, this seemed a warning to the effect that if Germany did find itself at war in support of Austria, Britain would be counted among its enemies. Lichnowsky’s telegram went unread for several days, but when the Kaiser did read it on 8 December 1912, he immediately gathered his available generals in a fit of anger. This was the context for the so-called War Council meeting. This meeting was later identified by Fritz Fischer as the smoking gun, which proved Germany’s determination to push for war. Was this a fair assessment? Had the Kaiser finally had enough of Britain’s insults? Was he now seeking to engineer a conflict between the two blocs, with Germany leading the charge against whatever response Britain might produce? Was détente truly dead? These questions deserve our attention, but we have crammed more than enough into this episode already, so please join me next time, as we conclude this story of Anglo-German relations.

1. Churchill, *World Crisis*, p. 87. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. 13 December 1911, Schlieffen to the editor of *Deutsche Revue* in Mombauer, *Documents*, p. 58. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. For these fears of social revolution within the German army see Joll and Martel, *Origins*, pp. 22-23. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. For these figures see Stevenson, ‘Was a Peaceful Outcome Thinkable? The European Land Armaments Race before 1914,’ in *Improbable War?*,pp. 131-132. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The deliberations which led to the 1912 German army bill are considered in David G. Herrmann, *The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War* (New Jersey, 2020), pp. 161-171. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. David Stevenson, ‘Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914,’ 138-139. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Quoted in David G. Herrmann, *The Arming of Europe,* p. 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. *Ibid*, pp. 157-158. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Steiner and Neilson, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War*, pp. 100-101. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. 12 January 1912, Goschen to Grey in Mombauer, *Documents*, p. 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ‘Détente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 1911-1914,’ *International Security*, 11, 2 (Fall, 1986), 121-150; 121-127. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. James Brown Scott, ‘Lord Haldane's Diary of Negotiations Between Germany and England in 1912,’

    *American Journal of International Law*, 12, No. 3 (Jul., 1918), 589-596; 589-592. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See 29 January 1912, Memorandum by Grey, Churchill, and Lloyd George in Mombauer, *Documents*, p. 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. 7 February 1912, Grey to Bertie in *Ibid*, p. 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Clark, *Sleepwalkers*, pp. 319-320. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. See Steiner and Neilson, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War*, p. 102. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. 8 February 1912, Haldane’s Diary in Mombauer, *Documents*, pp. 61-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. *Ibid*, p. 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. 8 February 1912, Tirpitz to Muller in *Ibid*, p. 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Quoted in Scott, ‘Lord Haldane's Diary of Negotiations Between Germany and England in 1912,’ 595. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. 9 February 1912, Haldane’s Diary in Mombauer, *Documents*, pp. 63-64. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. 10 February 1912, Haldane’s Diary in *Ibid*, p. 65. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. 8-10 February 1912, Bethmann Hollweg’s Memoirs: the Haldane Mission in *Ibid*, pp. 66-67. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Edward F. Willis, ‘Prince Lichnowsky's Mission to London,’ *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, 22, 4 (MARCH, 1942), 287-299; 289. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Steiner and Neilson, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War*, pp. 103-104. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. 25 June 1912, Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Goschen in in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley eds *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914*, vol. VI (London, 1930), pp. 757-758. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Willis, ‘Prince Lichnowsky's Mission to London,’ 290-292. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. 16 February 1912, Bertie’s Memorandum in Mombauer, *Documents*, pp. 67-69. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. See John Keiger, ‘Sir Edward Grey, France, and the Entente: How to Catch the Perfect Angler?,’ *International History Review*, 38, 2, (April 2016), 285-300; 289-290. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. See 28 March 1912, Poincare to Cambon in Mombauer, *Documents*, pp. 73-74. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Keiger, ‘Sir Edward Grey, France, and the Entente,’ 291-292. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. 15 April 1912, Sir Arthur Nicolson to Sir Edward Goschen in Gooch and Temperley eds *British Documents on the Origins of the War,* vol. VI, p. 747. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. 20 April 1912, Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Arthur Nicolson in *Ibid*, pp. 750-751. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Keiger, ‘Sir Edward Grey, France, and the Entente,’, 293-295. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Williamson Jr., ‘German Perceptions of the Triple Entente after 1911: Their Mounting Apprehensions Reconsidered,’ *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 7, 2 (APRIL 2011), 205-214; 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Keiger, ‘Sir Edward Grey, France, and the Entente,’ 295-296. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. *Ibid*, 297. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. For more on the race see Richard Langhorne, ‘The Naval Question in Anglo-German Relations, 1912-1914,’ *Historical Journal*, 14, 2 (Jun., 1971), 359-370. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. See Clark, *Wilhelm II*, pp. 190-193. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. *Ibid*, p. 194. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. 3 December 1912, Lichnowsky’s report from London in Mombauer, *Documents*, pp. 84-85. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)