



MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

May 23, 2023 – A



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

5/23/23-A 23:59* PST

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Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.

⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.



SUMMARY – DAY 453 7

DAILY ASSESSMENT 8

TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP 10

UKRAINE WEATHER 11

SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY 12

KHARKIV 13

DONBAS REGION 16

LUHANSK 16

NORTHEAST DONETSK 20

SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK 27

ZAPORIZHIA 32

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION 34

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE 35

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE 36

RUSSIAN FRONT 37

THEATERWIDE 43

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES 45

SUMMARY – DAY 453

This is the first update for May 23, 2023. Coverage of the events in Belogord continues to dominate the information space, limiting intelligence in other operational areas. According to local officials, there was also a widespread Internet outage in occupied Luhansk, associated with faulty equipment, which may have limited information in that area.

It has been 3,370 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 86 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

- The Daily Assessment will be updated with each report
- Weather and soil conditions will be in the last report of the day
- If an anticipated report is not created, weather and soil conditions will be released as a Flash Report
- Each report will contain unique information and continue in a condensed format

The map is back! [War Map](#)

DAILY ASSESSMENT


We assess the following:

1. The border incursions and temporary occupation by Russian partisans have highlighted weaknesses within the Russian Federation Armed Forces, with questions openly asked on Russian state media on how this could have happened and the state of the military, causing an information space crisis for the Kremlin.
2. There is an extreme risk that Russia will launch a large-scale retaliatory missile strike on Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure over the next 48 to 72 hours – weather dependent – with the scope limited to available inventory.
3. Russian tactics have validated our assessment that the Kremlin has moved to launching a small number of missiles on a more frequent basis and targeting areas with little military value but are appealing to an internal audience as proof of continued successful operations.
4. We maintain Private Military Company Wagner (PMC) Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin's claims that Russian proxy forces have fully captured Bakhmut is dubious.
5. The rift between the Russian Ministry of Defense and PMC Wagner Group continues to disrupt Russian

military operations in the Soledar and Bakhmut operational areas resulting in territorial losses on the flanks and Prigozhin's announcement that PMC Wagner will withdraw from Bakhmut on May 25. However, there are no signs that this has started.

6. Ukrainian forces have stopped their retrograde operation in Bakhmut and continue to hold two pockets of defensive positions within the city.
7. In preparation for larger offensive operations, Ukrainian forces continue shaping operations on multiple axes, creating panic and uncertainty among gauleiters, Russian administrators, and military leaders.
8. Weather models indicate that bezdorizhzhia will return by the end of May, leaving conditions unfavorable for significant military operations through June 5.
9. We have identified shaping activity by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in four locations that could indicate a larger attack is being prepared.


TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

UKRAINE WEATHER



The ECMWF Euro model forecast has improved, but eight regions of southern Ukraine and occupied Ukraine have posted storm warnings for May 24 due to a moderate chance for severe thunderstorms. The Donbas looks drier, with rain on Wednesday morning and Saturday through Monday. The forecast model predicts 25 mm of rain for Saturday in the Bakhmut area! Highs will be from 19° to 33° Celcius, with lows from 13° to 21°. Thursday and Friday will have summer heat with highs ranging from 26° to 33°. The full moon is on June 4, the new moon is on June 18, and the longest day of the year is June 21.


SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY



The May 31, 2023 GFS forecast indicates soil saturation will be from 25% to 95% to 40 centimeters deep, with the wettest conditions around Donetsk and the driest conditions on the east bank of the Dniro in Kherson.


Soil saturation along the line of conflict is at 45% to 75%, with the highest levels in the Vuhledar Operational Area. The weather models have moderated, but bezdorizhzhia will be an issue from May 26 to the end of the forecast period of May 31. Conditions for armor and heavy equipment will be unfavorable through June 7, except in eastern Kherson and western Zaporizhia and the Kupyansk Operational Area.

KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, hold current defensive lines, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict


Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorychna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



Dvorichna Operational Area

- The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) and Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo, reported continued fighting in the area of [Masyutivka](#), with Russian forces suffering significant losses.¹

¹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)




Kupyansk Operational Area

- The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) reported that Ukrainian surveillance, reconnaissance, and sabotage (DRG) units were operating in the areas of [Orlyanke](#).²

² https://t.me/mod_russia/26774 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, prevent further Ukrainian advances, control insurgent activity


Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents



Kreminna Operational Area

- WarGonzo claimed that Russian forces made marginal gains in the direction of [Nevske](#) but did not provide photographic or video evidence, and no other Russian or Ukrainian source reported significant fighting in the area.³


³ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12698>



- Ukrainian source DeepState reported that Russian forces continued to make gains in the [Serebryansky Woods](#) in the direction of Hryorivka, on the south bank of the Siverskyi Donets River.⁴
- We did not adjust the war map as the advance they recorded is already in alignment with our existing line of conflict and may represent tactical gains and losses as Russian and Ukrainian forces trade defensive positions in the same area – which is a military way of saying DeepState isn't wrong and we're not right

⁴ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16645>

because Russian and Ukrainian forces have been fighting over the same defensive positions for months.




Lysychansk Operational Area

- GSAFU reported that Russian forces made repeated attacks in the direction of [Bilohorivka](#) and were unsuccessful.^{5 6}

⁵ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)


⁶ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Capture Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties




Northwest Bakhmut Operational Area

- WarGonzo reported a Russian attack in the direction of [Hryhorivka](#) was unsuccessful, while GSAFU reported a Russian attack “in the direction” of [Khromove](#) failed.^{7 8}

⁷ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12698>


⁸ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)



North Bakhmut

- WarGonzo claimed Ukrainian forces made marginal gains in the direction of Yahidne without photo or video evidence – we did not adjust the map.⁹

⁹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12698>



Bakhmut

- Ukrainian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops still held limited positions in the area of the [Mig-17 statute](#) and the eastern edge of Khromove.^{10 11}
- Russian sources have not provided any photo or video evidence of their presence in the area of the former Mig-17 statute, with most victory videos contained to the areas east of the railroad tracks.
- Colonel Serhii Cherevaty, Operational Command East (OKE) spokesperson, said, "We hold a number of

¹⁰ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

¹¹ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16645>

buildings in Bakhmut. And we also have fortifications, trenches, and strongholds there, including in the southwestern part of the city. This is a small bridgehead in the area 'Airplane,' which is kept to prevent the complete capture of the city by the Russians. And there is an opportunity to deliver ammunition and everything necessary for defense."¹²


- Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Maliar stated, "The activity of the enemy's offensive actions in the Bakhmut direction decreased somewhat. At the same time, the number of shellings is consistently high. In the city of Bakhmut, the fighting has subsided. The enemy continues to clear the areas under his control. Our troops control the southwestern outskirts of the city in the 'Airplane' district."¹³
- PMC Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin reinforced that Wagnerites would fully withdraw from all operational areas in Ukraine by June 1, saying, "PMC Wagner should as correctly as possible transfer Bakhmut to units of the Russian Federation Armed Forces," adding that If the Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) is unable to do this, it will discredit the Kremlin leadership while proving that PMC Wagner has the most effective troops.¹⁴

¹² https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/3564

¹³ <https://t.me/annamaliar/790>

¹⁴ <https://t.me/rybar/47488>

- We estimate that Ukrainian forces maintain control of approximately 1.00 square kilometers of Bakhmut (.48 square miles) divided into two pockets, or roughly 1.80% of the city, which is 41.6 square kilometers.



Klishchiivka Operational Area

- Russian forces attempted to regain lost positions in the direction of [Ivanivske](#) and were unsuccessful.¹⁵
- Ukrainian forces [cleared more of the forested tracks](#) west of Klishchiivka and east of Stupochky, and we


¹⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12698>



moved the line of conflict south and east of the Siverski Donets-Donbas Canal.

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
SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, consolidate gains made during the winter offensive, and set conditions for September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Lock Russian military assets in place, defend the existing line of conflict while finding and exploiting weaknesses, destroy troop concentrations and

command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics





Avdiivka Operational Area

- The Russian 1st Army Corps made another attempt to advance past the railroad tracks east of [Novokalynove](#) but was unsuccessful.^{16 17}

¹⁶ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

¹⁷ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12698>



- WarGonzo reported that Russian forces also continued attempts to advance on [Avdiivka](#) with no success.¹⁸
- The commanding officers of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd platoons of the 110th Brigade of the 1st Army Corps  [surrendered along with 25 surviving members of the company](#) after they were sent to the forward line of friendly troops (FLOT) with only four magazines each for a three-day rotation.¹⁹
- This is in addition to 22 1st Army Corps Storm Battalion members taken prisoner the day before near Pervomaiske.

¹⁸ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12698>


¹⁹ <https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1661122966334197760>

- GSAFU reported that the Russian 1st Army Corps troops continued their attempts to advance toward [Sjeverne](#) through the no man's land north of Vodyane, suffered heavy losses, and retreated to established defensive positions.²⁰
- Undaunted by multiple failed attacks and surrendering troops, the Russian 1st Army Corps attempted to advance into [Pervomaiske](#) from Pisky, suffered heavy losses, and returned to defensive positions east of the E-50 Highway Bridge that divides the two settlements.^{21 22}

²⁰ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

²¹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

²² <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16645>



Marinka Operational Area

- Checks the calendar and sees it is a day that ends in "Y." Fighting for [Marinka](#) continued within the remains of the city and the area around it, with Russian forces launching 30 attacks throughout the day.^{23 24 25 26}


²³ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

²⁴ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

²⁵ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16645>


²⁶ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12698>

ZAPORIZHIA



Russian Objective: Prepare for a Ukrainian offensive, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate Russian-occupied areas, prevent further Russian advances, exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, and protect civilians



Hulyaipole Operational Area

- RMOD reported that Ukrainian DRG units were operating in the area of [Olhivs'ke](#).²⁷

²⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/26775 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

Free Zaporizhia

- Russian forces conducted 92 fire missions, three airstrikes, and seven drone attacks on 23 settlements along the line of conflict.²⁸

Occupied Zaporizhia

- Ukrainian sources reported that rockets fired by HIMARS struck a building housing Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) troops, killing ten.²⁹ We cannot independently verify the claim.

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

- No update

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

- Operational Command South (OKS) reported that eight vessels of the Black Sea Fleet were on patrol, including

²⁸ https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/18973

²⁹ <https://t.me/zaborzp/44789>

two frigates capable of launching up to 16 Kalibr cruise missiles.³⁰

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Free Kherson


- Russian forces conducted 64 fire missions firing 271 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad and Smerch rockets, drone-delivered IEDs, and bombs.³¹
- The city of Kherson was attacked 11 times with 47 munitions.
- In Kozatskyi, a mortar strike killed one civilian, and in Llove, an artillery strike killed a pensioner and wounded a 49-year-old man.³²

³⁰ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/30942>

³¹ <https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/539>

³² <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/6088>

Occupied Kherson

- Hola Prystan was shelled, sparking a significant fire  [that was visible from the west bank](#) of the Dnipro River.³³

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE


Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

The region was stable.


³³ https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/7536

RUSSIAN FRONT



Russian Objective: Repel Russian partisans out of Belgorod, stabilize the border, and maintain civil order

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government




Belgorod Operational Direction


- Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that partisans with the Free Russian Legion and Russian Volunteer Corps conducted incursions into [Gorkovskii](#), [Tsapovka](#), [Bogun-Gorodok](#), and [Shchetinovka](#), expanding cross-border classes to a front 45 kilometers long.^{34 35}
- At the time of publication, it was unclear if Russian partisans occupied any of the settlements.

³⁴ <https://t.me/rybar/47491>



³⁵ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/30944>



Grayvoron Operational Area

- Russian forces regained full control of [Grayvoron](#), [Gora-Podol](#), and [Zareche-Pervoe](#).
- Fighting continued in [Glotovo](#) on May 23, with a video showing Russian  [Colonel General Alexander Lapin personally commanding](#) defensive efforts in what appeared to be a staged video.³⁶
- Free Russian Legion partisans withdrew from the area throughout the day, with Russian forces establishing control of Glotovo.

³⁶ <https://t.me/rsotmdivision/7534>

- Russian partisans withdrew from Kozinka, with Russian state media staging damaged vehicles to exaggerate claims for internal optics. We left a small forested area west of the border checkpoint as contested based on  [reports from PMC Wagner](#) and an audio recording shared by Russian sources of  [continued fighting](#).³⁷
- Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov announced that the counter-terrorist operation regime in the oblast had been canceled, but residents were still not cleared to return to border communities.

Belgorod

- Russian sources reported that the territorial defense detachments in the Belgorod region were unarmed, which was allegedly the cause of the delayed response to the border incursion.³⁸
- The mother of an 18-year-old conscript soldier alleges her wounded son was drafted in November 2022 and was assigned to unit 91711, which was "scattered" to various points to guard the border in February 2023, leaving 25 troops, including their commanding officer, to guard an area 45 kilometers long.³⁹

³⁷ https://t.me/grey_zone/18769

³⁸ https://t.me/grey_zone/18778

³⁹ <https://t.me/vchkogpu/38676>

- Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov was going through some things with Russian state media unusually aggressive in their questioning. Peskov told reporters that President Vladimir Putin thought the incursions were “unimportant” and the Security Council would not meet to discuss the border situation. This is in sharp contrast to March 2023, when small incursions into the Bryansk region lasted only hours, resulting in an emergency meeting of the Security Council, sharp statements from the Kremlin, and a retaliatory missile strike on civilians and civilian infrastructure.
- Peskov refused to answer questions about the size of the force that crossed into Russia or its composition, if there were still Russian partisans operating in the Belgorod region, and why it took so long for there to be a response to the attacks.
- The Kremlin press secretary refused to comment on why over 10 billion roubles were spent on static defenses in the Belgorod region and why they failed to prevent the attack.
- **ASSESSMENT:** Grunts with guns take territory, and grunts with guns hold territory. Most Russian Federation Armed Forces are in Ukraine, and the Russian Ministry of Defense lacks the personnel to protect another 750 kilometers of the border. No amount of poorly cast, non-reinforced half-height

dragon teeth tossed on the ground without cables, razor wires, minefields, trenches, motion detectors, surveillance systems, and troops to watch the border will provide a secure solution.

- PMC Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin looking for new ways to be relevant, condemned the Kremlin and local Belgorod leaders in an interview, saying, "Several months ago, when I announced that I would train fighters in the Belgorod and Kursk regions, several things happened. First, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu called me and indignantly said: 'Don't meddle, Yevgeny Viktorovich, where you shouldn't. The Russian army itself is capable of defending the borders.' And second, there were several meetings with regional governors who also asked that they do it themselves. So how can we, as they say, get into someone else's wheelhouse? But when they f*** everything up, and people take to the streets with pitchforks, of course, then we will come and defend. What can we do? This is our Motherland. Bureaucrats, it's their fault that the enemy is breaking through."⁴⁰
- **ASSESSMENT:** Prigozhin did accuse Belgorod officials of attempting to block his training program for military-aged men who work in critical jobs, but the program was also ill-received by business leaders and

⁴⁰ https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1025

residents, with only low numbers of people volunteering.

Russian Front

- Near the Novozaovsk border crossing from occupied Ukraine to Russia, a man blew himself up with an IED after border guards attempted to detain him. Russian officials have not identified the person and, at the time of publication, had not accused Ukraine of an attack or labeled the incident as terrorism.

THEATERWIDE

- Germany offered to transfer Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, with Bundestag Deputy Roderich Kizewetter telling reporters, "Ukraine's partners must now go all-in and provide Ukraine with everything that Ukraine can use in combined arms combat, and that is permissible under international law. The aircraft subsonic cruise missile Taurus KEPD is an analog of the British Storm Shadow. At the same time, its range is up to 500 kilometers."⁴¹

⁴¹ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/30960>

- Germany also announced another military aid package which includes,
 - TRML-4D aerial survey radar system
 - Two Biber (Beaver) armored bridging vehicles
 - 54 Vector reconnaissance drones
 - Eight anti-drone systems
 - 17 heavy trucks
 - Seven semi-trailers
 - 34 pickup trucks
 - Eight Zetros trucks

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to May 18, 2023. 10,324 Russian vs. 3,374 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	1839	193	9.53:1	—
Medium Duty Tanks	126	307	0.41:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	852	270	3.16:1	↑
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2334	537	4.35:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	308	259	1.18:1	↓
MRAPs	44	55	0.80:1	↑
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	186	300	0.62:1	↓
Command and Communications Vehicles	240	12	20.00:1	↑
Engineering Vehicles	305	57	5.35:1	↓
Towed Artillery	210	121	1.74:1	↑
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	397	152	2.61:1	↓
MLRS	202	45	4.48:1	↑
SAMs	114	112	1.02:1	↑
Mobile Radars	32	59	0.54:1	—
EW/ECW	36	2	18.00:1	—
Winged Aircraft	82	66	1.24:1	—
Helicopters	87	29	3.00:1	—
Naval Vessels	12	26	0.46:1	—