



MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

August 18, 2023



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 540

It has been 3,460 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 175 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine. Today's report is combat only.

- Podcast restarts by the second week of September
- Positional fighting continued in Kharkiv and Luhansk
- Fighting south of Bakhmut continues with no changes
- Russian forces renew offensive efforts near the Krasnohorivka plateau
- Marinka has been erased from the face of the earth, but fighting continues
- A Ukrainian attack east of Urozhaine catastrophically fails
- Large convoys move through Mariupol
- Ukrainian forces control an estimated 75% of Robotyne based on geolocated videos
- The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs building in occupied Enerhodar was heavily damaged, with casualties
- Bulgarian Minister of Defense warned that Russian aggression in the Black Sea could result in a direct conflict with NATO forces

- Russia claims it shot down a Ukrainian S-200 anti-aircraft missile modified for a ground attack over Crimea
- Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Ihor Klymenko, reported that 11 sections of the “upper part” of the Kakhovka Dam were destroyed
- At least one Shahed-136 kamikaze drone struck near a civilian area in Khmelnytskyi
- In Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, someone raised the Ukrainian flag over the FSB headquarters building
- Special report – individual first aid kit controversy
- Full report returns on Saturday
- Did we mention podcast restarts the second week of September

Two quick comments on today's New York Times and Washington Post stories. We have repeatedly warned that anyone providing casualty estimates for Russia or Ukraine for the duration of the war does not know what they are talking about, which is why we do not provide these assessments. The New York Times story ratio of killed in action versus wounded for Russia and Ukraine does not add up and is close to World War I rates. The Washington Post story citing “anonymous intelligence sources” claiming that Ukraine's attempt to take Melitopol has failed and the summer offensive is disappointing Washington has a huge

gap. Has anyone from the General Staff or the Office of the President in Ukraine said publicly the explicit goal was to liberate Melitopol, or was this information leaked to the press? If the "intelligence official" was extrapolating this information based on the fighting at Robotyne and Verbove, we offer our services to U.S. intelligence because looking at a map, where Russian defenses are, Russian troop positions, terrain, and what Ukraine is doing, the goal is not Melitopol.

Ukraine's summer offensive has had plenty of problems and mistakes, and we've documented them over the last two-and-a-half months. We remind our readers that many journalists declared the Ukrainian 2022 summer offensive equally dead a year ago.

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:


1. The growing number of combat ineffective and combat destroyed Russian units is forcing Russian commanders to rotate remaining reserves to hotspots in regions outside their assigned AO. In our

- assessment, Ukraine has the battlefield initiative in every AO except Dvorichna.
2. We maintain the next phase of the summer offensive has likely started in two operational areas, but we still require more data to make a firm declaration.
 3. We remain concerned about Ukraine's capacity to turn tactical gains into operational success and strategic victories.
 4. It is unlikely that Ukraine will execute a wet crossing of the Dnipro River with a battalion-sized or larger force.
 5. Despite Ukraine's likely start of the next phase of its summer offensive, we maintain that Western partners are not meeting their promised military training, heavy equipment, and ammunition dates, negatively impacting Ukraine's military capabilities.
 6. Russian and Belarusian aggression and threats on the borders of Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Black Sea coast will continue to expand and lead to an international incident if Ukraine's allies do not take a stronger posture.
 7. Russian President Vladimir Putin's stature, both inside and outside of Russia, remains weakened after the failed Prigozhin Insurrection, and there continues to be a small but very real possibility of another insurrection or coup attempt. Additionally, his weakened state and economic uncertainty make it

- more difficult to do another wave of formal mobilization.
8. Our assessment that the Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces, was accurate, with continued reports of fighting between units, fratricide, and desertions.
 9. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community is negatively impacting Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.
 10. Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.
 11. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)


TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorychna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



Dvorchina Operational Area

Our earlier assessment that Ukraine has stabilized its defensive lines is proving to be accurate. Mutual fighting continued northeast of [Synkivka](#) with no change in the situation.^{1 2} The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMD) continued to report that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive in the area of [Vilshana](#).³ We cannot verify reports that Russian troops are being pulled from Kharkiv and Luhansk to reinforce Zaporizhzhia.


¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11208>

² https://t.me/mod_russia/29523 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

³ https://t.me/mod_russia/29523 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections


Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents



Svatove Operational Area

RMOD reported that Ukrainian forces continued to be on the offensive in [Novoselivske](#), where positional fighting continues.⁴


⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/29523 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]



Kreminna Operational Area

Fighting continued in the area of [Dibrova](#) and the [Serebryansky Woods](#), with the intensity increasing.⁵ Attempts by Ukrainian forces to advance were unsuccessful.

⁵ https://t.me/mod_russia/29523 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




Lysychansk Operational Area

Russian forces, supported by the Russian air force and army aviation (VKS), launched a company sized attack on [Bilohorivka](#) [Luhansk], suffered losses, and returned to their defensive positions.⁶


⁶ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11208>

NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections


Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties



Siversk Operational Area

The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) reported that Ukrainian forces launched an offensive on [Berestove](#).⁷

⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/29523 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




Klishchiivka Operational Area

There were no reports of significant fighting in [Klishchiivka](#) for the first time in over two months. Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo reported a Russian counteroffensive near [Andriivka](#) failed, and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported a Russian counteroffensive on the western edge of [Kurdyumivka](#) also failed.^{8 9}

⁸ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14446>

⁹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11208>




Toretzsk-Niu York Operational Area

GSAFU reported a Russian attack that failed east of Toretzsk, which was likely in the [Shumy](#) area.¹⁰

¹⁰ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11208>


SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,


destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



Avdiivka Operational Area

Long-time readers and listeners know this pattern after 18 months. After failing to advance around Avdiivka and exhausting their combat potential, Russian forces have restarted attacks in the area of the Krasnohorivka plateau. This has been the indicator that the final phase of a Russian offensive cycle in the Avdiivka AO has been reached, followed by an operational pause of up to six weeks before the cycle restarts at Krasnohorivka or Vodyane/Opytne. Russian forces attempted to advance in the direction of

Novokalynove without success.¹¹ Mutual fighting was reported in the “district of” Avdiivka, a broad area.^{12 13}



Marinka Operational Area

Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that a Russian offensive east of Krasnohorivka, supported by the Russian air force and army aviation (VKS), ended in failure.^{14 15}

¹¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11208>


¹² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11208>

¹³ https://t.me/mod_russia/29523 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

¹⁴ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11208>

¹⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14446>

Positional fighting in what was [Marinka](#),  [literally wiped from the map](#), continued.^{16 17}



Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Area

A Ukrainian advance in the direction of [Kermenchuk](#) ended with catastrophic losses of more than a platoon. The unit advanced in daylight through the open without artillery support, and more than 25 Ukrainian soldiers were killed during the failed assault.¹⁸

¹⁶ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11177>

¹⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/110646>

¹⁸ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17395>

ASSESSMENT: This is a shocking failure in the AO, considering how well artillery, armor, and light infantry worked together to liberate Urozhaine and maximize Russian casualties by maintaining fire control over Russian ground lines of communication (GLOC). Battlefield mistakes happen, but Ukraine cannot afford to continue to repeat these incidents. Yesterday, a similar incident in the Bakhmut AO involved a Ukrainian squad that had taken up defense in a poorly constructed Russian trench with no artillery support and was pinned down by small arms fire. A single kamikaze drone wiped out the unit.

Mutual fighting continued in the [Pryyutne](#) area with no change in the situation.¹⁹


Occupied Donetsk

Insurgents in Mariupol documented a large column of Russian forces, including four tanks, ten armored personnel carriers (APC), and 20 trucks of troops and ammunition moving toward Berdyansk.²⁰ They also reported that Russia has set up four more ammunition depots in civilian neighborhoods of Mariupol.

¹⁹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14446>

²⁰ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/12700>

ZAPORIZHIA




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians

Free Zaporizhzhia


Brigadier General Alexander Tarnavskiy, Ukrainian commander of the Tavria sector, reported that Ukrainian forces carried out 1,402 fire missions.²¹



Hulyaipole Operational Area

There continue to be reports of fighting just north of [Dorozhnyanka](#), with no change in the situation.

²¹ <https://t.me/otarnavskiy/205>




Orikhiv Operational Area

Geolocated videos indicate Ukrainian forces control up to 75% of [Robotyne](#), with more objective Russian sources reporting they continue to be pushed back. At the time of publication, the American news agency CBS reported that Ukrainian troops had advanced past Robotyne, but we could not verify the report. Russian sources claim that Ukrainian troops are also advancing on [Novopokrovka](#) by flanking Robotyne. One pro-Russian source released an updated map, which aligned almost perfectly with our latest assessment, suggesting that Ukrainian forces have advanced further south. Ukrainian source DeepState also updated their map, showing an advance on the T-803

Highway south of [Novopokrovka](#), and has a smaller gray area than our current assessment.

ASSESSMENT: We have not geolocated any new videos or pictures that would cause map adjustments, but DeepState is very conservative in its assessments. We may be underreporting Ukrainian success in the Verbove-Novopokrovka area. We maintain that Ukrainian forces are attempting to connect the breaches at Robotyne and Verbove into a six-kilometer-wide gap. Russian forces are under tremendous pressure to hold their defensive lines in this area. We maintain that Ukrainian forces intend to advance southeast in the direction of Verbove and not south in a direct attack on Tokmak. We have not seen a large commitment of remaining reserve forces in the Orikhiv or Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka AOs, which would indicate that Kyiv has made a decision on where their main thrust of the counteroffensive will be – or if there will be one.

Occupied Zaporizhzhia

A targeted first-person view (FPV) drone attack  [struck the third floor of the Ministry of Internal Affairs](#) of temporarily occupied Enerhodar while area police leaders were holding a meeting.²² The illegitimate head of the city department, Colonel Chesanov Pavlo Valeriyovych, the illegitimate head of the investigative department, the illegitimate head of the duty unit, and several other senior leaders were seriously injured in the attack and transferred to Melitopol. The top three floors of the building were heavily damaged by fire.

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

There was no update on the status of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

²² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/110638>

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

Operational Command South (OKS) reported two missile carriers with the Black Sea Fleet, a frigate and a submarine, on patrol with the capability to launch up to 12 missiles.^{23 24} There was no information on the composition of other vessels at sea.

The Bulgarian Minister of Defense, Todor Tagarev, believes a clash in the Black Sea between Russia and NATO is possible. "Russia is imposing its [commands] and trying to impose its will aggressively," Tagarev said, recommending that ships pass through the territorial waters of Romania and Bulgaria to avoid further incidents. "We cannot rule out such an option [*a military incident with Russia – Ed.*]. We are working to prevent this from happening [but] Russia is constantly provoking NATO."²⁵

Temporarily Occupied Crimea

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reported

²³ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/110663>

²⁴ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/39905>

²⁵ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/18/7416187/>


air defenses shot down a Ukrainian S-200 air defense missile modified for a ground attack near Bakhchisarai. Local reports said there was a large explosion in the area.²⁶

²⁶ <https://t.me/genichua/13727>

KHERSON

Russian Objective: Prevent Ukrainian advances into eastern Kherson, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, prepare the region for illegitimate elections in September 2023, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks on Ukrainian civilians, lock Russian troops and military assets in place, and protect civilian lives



There were no significant changes to the situation.

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Khmelnytskyi

Khmelnytskyi Oblast First Deputy Administrative and Military Governor (OVA) Serhii Tyurin reported at least one Shahed-136 kamikaze drone struck the city of Khmelnytskyi, damaging more than 30 homes. Eight people were wounded, with two hospitalized.²⁷

²⁷ https://t.me/zinkevich_igor/7783

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives


There wasn't any significant activity reported. Information about the drone attack launched by Russia is in the **Theaterwide** section.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent further insurrection, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

Nizhny Novgorod

In the city of Nizhny Novgorod,  [the Ukrainian flag was raised over the Russian Federal Security Service \(FSB\) building.](#)²⁸ The flag was up for almost 24 hours before the Ministry of Emergency Situations came and removed it. It is unknown how the flag got there in the first place.

²⁸²⁸ <https://t.me/informnapalm/18517?single>

BELARUSIAN FRONT

There were no significant developments.

THEATERWIDE

Russian launched 17 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones at Ukraine from the north, with 15 shot down, mostly over the Chernihiv and Kyiv oblasts.²⁹

The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs prevented an assassination attempt on the deputy head of the State Security Service (SSU), Yevgeny Sokur, and detained the suspects. The assassination attempt is not believed to be related to Russian aggression but due to an ongoing tax evasion criminal investigation.³⁰

SPECIAL REPORT: There are growing accusations by combat medics, volunteers, and the survivors of Ukrainian soldiers killed in combat that individual first aid kits issued to troops are woefully inadequate after almost 18 months of war. Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Maliar reportedly

²⁹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/110691>

³⁰ <https://t.me/suspilnenews/23478>

ordered all units to audit the status of first aid kits among Ukrainian units, and the results are, in a word, frustrating. Some units are reporting their chain of command made no such request, while others said they were simply told to check their first aid kits. Others reported the kits they have are from the Cold War, with medical supplies replaced in the 1990s, and other units reported they don't carry first aid kits due to their bulk.

The audit is ongoing in part due to a controversy over tourniquets. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense purchased 40,000 tourniquets made in China, which broke when soldiers tried to use them. An internally designed tourniquet, the Dnipro-2, has also created controversy, with some units insisting on only using them and others reporting the design is defective. Ukrainian officials have said that setting a singular standard will cause a bottleneck in the supply chain because of the volume of first aid kits required. When Russia expanded its war of aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the quality of Ukraine's individual first aid kits was a key and well-documented advantage. With the supply exhausted, maintaining a supply of the kits they had in February 2022 was not done.

While Kyiv has reported that wounded soldiers are taken from the battlefield in as little as 15 minutes, wounded soldiers report that waiting to get to a stabilization station is up to eight hours. It is important to note that each case is unique, and in certain situations, it would be impossible to evacuate a wounded soldier quickly. Volunteers we spoke with said field hospitals are understaffed and frequently short of basic supplies. Once a Ukrainian soldier reaches a hospital, the survival rates are on par with NATO and allied medical facilities. However, losses due to a lack of portable respirators and failed tourniquets are reportedly a significant problem.

In our assessment, the issue of individual first-aid kits shouldn't be this much of a challenge. Ukraine could create a broader specification to prevent supply bottlenecks while standardizing kits. While Kyiv has done tremendous work in the last 18 months to find corruption within the government and the Ministry of Defense, preserving the lives of wounded troops when fighting attritional warfare should be one of the highest priorities. The only more critical priority is to prevent soldiers from getting killed and wounded in the first place. A single, effective, and trusted tourniquet is critical in a war where 80% of injuries are related to artillery and mines. Ukraine cannot afford to make this kind of "unforced error" on the battlefield.



The table for equipment losses was **updated on August 16, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

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RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES


Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to August 16, 2023. 11,712 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,154 Ukrainian


Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2083	259	8.04:1	↓
Medium Duty Tanks	145	351	0.41:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	947	307	3.08:1	—
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2654	691	3.84:1	—
Armored Personnel Carriers	345	321	1.07:1	—
MRAPs	46	135	0.34:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	201	353	0.57:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	246	16	15.38:1	—
Engineering Vehicles	332	74	4.49:1	—
Towed Artillery	277	145	1.91:1	—
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	493	199	2.48:1	—
MLRS	255	50	5.10:1	—
SAMs	147	121	1.21:1	—
Mobile Radars	43	72	0.60:1	↑
EW/ECW	50	4	12.25:1	↑
Winged Aircraft	85	69	1.23:1	—
Helicopters	108	32	3.38:1	—
Naval Vessels	13	27	0.48:1	—


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


 **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


 **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.


 **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.