Our series on 17th century warfare continues with a look at how French armies were constituted, and how their attitudes towards certain tactics changed. We begin with an examination of the massive increases of European armies across the board, but we soon refine our focus, and examine the machinations of King Henry IV of France (r. 1594-1610), who made the most of new theories in infantry and cavalry tactics. The story is by no means a straightforward one of consistent, sensible progression. Instead, it is a tale of hard knocks and tough lessons, which inculcated within the French military thinkers a respect for new methods of making war, and a willingness to experiment and take ideas they appreciated from their Dutch and Swedish neighbours.

Such developments say a great deal about the spread of new military theories in the West, as much as they provide a clear example of the interconnectedness of Europeans, who served in each other’s armies and swapped drill manuals in military institutions. It’s a story which I’m sure you’ll find fascinating, so come and join me for this latest instalment of 17th century warfare! Thanksss!

Hello and welcome history friends patrons all to our TYW series looking at warfare in the 17th century. Last time, the French example of dealing with developments in fortifications – the trace italienne, was discussed, and we concluded that while these developments were unquestionably important, it was not so black and white as to state that, over 17th century, the MR transformed France. Important additional factors, even down to the diplomatic isolation of Louis XIV, and the range of the cannon, had a central impact on how France developed over the 1600s. In the last episode we didn’t look all that intently on the actual soldiers themselves, so in this episode we’re going to do just that. How did the French army change between the 15 and 1600s, and what impact did these changes have not just on its ability to fight the TYW, but also to defend itself against attack throughout that eventful century? Let’s find out…

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One thing about historians is that they will always rush to defend their specific field of expertise when one of their peers makes a generalising statement about some era or idea which involves it. The MR idea, for instance, provoked such intense debate among historians because Michael Roberts’ original essay looked at *all* of Western Europe, and attempted to make generalising statements to support its conclusions. We’ve seen already that Geoffrey Parker feels Roberts’ essay unfairly and inaccurately portrayed the Spanish capabilities during the first half of the 17th century; in the last episode we saw John A Lynn respond to Parker’s idea that the trace italienne system of fortifications could explain army growth across Europe; in the next episode, we’re going to see why the Ottoman case is not so easily forced into any easily defined category. The point is, while theories are the bread and butter of historians, in practice, for a theory to be viable it has to make a certain amount of assumptions and discount certain segments of evidence to get by.

It’d be easy to get frustrated with history as a discipline in this respect – what, you may be wondering, is the point in Roberts’ theory when it blatantly contains inaccuracies and simplifications which cannot be applied as a blanket idea to all the varied peoples of the continent? That is a valid question, and thankfully, we’re not here to answer it. However, what theories do tend to do is provoke what we mentioned earlier – a response from the historians that are experts on that particular field. They write articles or books, and their peers respond, and the ideas get spread about the historiographical landscape, and next thing you know, you have a full blown historical debate on your hands, not to mention numerous fascinating, well-researched articles and books which would never had existed had these historians not felt compelled to answer a challenge in the first place.

In short, there is a lot wrong with the MR theory, but it is thanks to its existence in the 1950s that so many quality articles and books are available to us now. Why else would such intricate articles need to be written to detail French army growth, or the impact of cavalry, or the importance and design of fortifications? While he would probably never admit it, Michael Roberts MR idea was critical not just because it proposed a new methodology for explaining how and why warfare in the 17th century developed, but also for the kick it gave historians to write about previously neglected topics. I like to imagine that Roberts knew what he was doing in that respect, but that’s probably a bit of a romanticised version of that historian’s motives. Certainly though, the MR provided a handy buzz word to search for, since when you found it being discussed between the 60s up to the present day, you were quite likely to find within that same discussion a new piece of research assessing a previously understated element of 17th century European warfare.

But while we’ve looked at some elements of the MR already, to get us on track for examining how the French army changed, we need to assess what Michael Roberts was actually claiming to have occurred. These claims are paraphrased by our friend John A Lynn, who wrote that Roberts advocated…

…a revolution in tactics accomplished by the Dutch stadtholder Prince Maurice of Nassau (1584-1625) and the Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus (1611-32) drove the older Spanish system of massive, unwieldy infantry formations off the battlefields of Europe. New strategy took advantage of well-trained mobile armies to pursue victory, instead of prolonging stalemate. At the same time, standing armies emerged as land forces grew to unprecedented proportions, giving statesmen potent weapons of war for grand schemes. However, the gargantuan armies spawned in the seventeenth century burdened society with crushing taxation, heavy-handed bureaucracies, and all the weighty trappings of absolutism.[[1]](#footnote-1)

It’s a familiar argument – the simplistic and straightforward cause and effect idea, where one set of circumstances leads naturally to another, but the unique circumstances on the ground in each state – take even that country’s history with absolutism, for one example – are not considered. Why, for example, would the Dutch not have embraced absolutism, but the French did? In fact, while it is less popularly known, some historians would attest to the fact that absolutist control of the Orange family over Dutch society in the 1700s was merely an extension of the kinds of absolutist rule of French kings.[[2]](#footnote-2) Think also of Cromwell’s unflinching absolutist theocracy, or of the enlightened despotism of Frederick the Great, or even the small scale absolutism of the most minor German prince. These different threads of absolutist rule could of course all be debated by other historians, but Roberts’ claims that the MR led to absolutism and increased the central control of the state administration cannot be simply ignored – there are too many convenient developments to do that. This, again, is how historical debates are born.

Geoffrey Parker’s key contribution was the idea that manpower did not increase because of the tactical innovations of certain commanders – Michael Roberts singled out Gustavus Adolphus and Maurice of Nassau above all. Rather, Parker underlined the fact that the trace italienne made warfare more stagnant and plodding, and ensured that larger numbers of men would be required to fill the trenches surrounding the siege, and properly starve the defenders out. Indeed, the idea that army size increased steadily as the decades progressed, reaching a peak in the 1700s, is a somewhat simplified view, for two major reasons. Parker does not deny that armies ballooned in size, but he does make the point that first, armies had grown and fluctuated in size before, and second, these changes were not explained by Michael Roberts’ nomination of certain key commanders, but by the demands placed upon armies thanks to the trace italienne, and the steady growth of their neighbours.

We talked in the first episode of this series about knights and how important their influence and then their absence was for shaping how European armies were constituted. Parker adds to this point with the notion that, while fighting in the compact regions of North Italy in the last few years of the 1400s, the French and Habsburgs concluded that cavalry were less useful than infantry. What was more, whereas knights required a horse, armour, a page etc. to keep them afloat, not to mention the fodder to keep their horses standing, infantry, especially pikemen, could be equipped with a sword, pike and helmet and sent to the frontline with far less cost. It would even be possible to deduct these measly costs from the soldier’s pay.

Parker perceives that this decrease in reliance on cavalry enabled European rulers to field far more men than before, and to develop the resulting tactics which would later be perfected. No longer was the charge of knights on horseback going to suffice if your foe fielded so many men with so many pointy sticks. Horses simply would not charge into these pikes – you would have to field pikemen of your own. Thus, while King Charles VIII of France fielded an army of 18,000 men in 1494, with about half of them cavalry, King Francis I fielded an army of 30,000 in 1525, and only a fifth of these were cavalry. The infantry had come to dominate, and as he established himself in the prime position of the army, the trace italienne made his further professionalization necessary, and the development of tactics and strategy to go along with his training essential.

But just how much did armies in Europe increase from the beginning to the end of the 1600s? Figures are predictably sketchy, but we can make some judgements on the numbers. Starting in the 1590s and ending in 1700, the Dutch armed forces grew from 20,000 to 100,000; the Swedes, from 15,000 to 100,000; the English, from 30,000 to 87,000 and the French, most impressively of all, from 80,000 to 400,000.[[3]](#footnote-3) Now, while that French number is shocking, we have examined in the last episode why the French in particular so inflated their army size; they had a lot of fortresses to garrison, with this act consuming as much as 40% of the army’s manpower. In addition, Louis XIV’s bullish foreign policy necessitated this mass mobilisation thanks to the diplomatic and military isolation of France.[[4]](#footnote-4) But stating these facts doesn’t help us answer some important questions. How, for instance, did the French *actually fight* during the later 16th and early 17th centuries; did French military innovation and tactics come from within France, or were these ideas imported from the likes of the Dutch Republic or Sweden, and finally, as an aside, what do these points tell us about the MR. Let’s tackle these questions now, with a look first at the kind of cavalry used by France.

‘It is better that I should die with arms in my hands, than live to see my kingdom ruined, and myself forced to seek assistance in a foreign country.’[[5]](#footnote-5) These were the words of King Henri IV of France, who assumed the crown of that country following the ruinous wars of religion which ripped France apart. Not only did they rip France apart, they also provided the perfect opportunities for the powers of Europe to get involved; the English and Dutch supported Henri, the Protestant candidate from the House of Bourbon, and the Spanish supported the Catholic candidate. This conflict only ended in 1598 with the Peace of Vervins between France and Spain, but much would have to be done in time for the next showdown between France and Spain, which King Henri IV of France anticipated in the not too distant future. As it happened, Henri would be assassinated in 1610, and would never get the chance to wage war against the Habsburgs again. Yet, his contribution towards the French army must still be considered if we are to properly grasp how the France’s armed forces went from ruined, divided and distraught in the final decades of the 1500s, to holding Europe to ransom under Henri’s grandson Louis XIV, a century later.

Henri was known as the king who would put himself in danger while on horseback for the sake of inspiring and willing his men onto victory. When the Duke of Parma, Spain’s foremost military commander at the time, confronted Henri in a siege outside the town of Aumale in 1592, Parma remarked: ‘I expected to see a general; this is only an officer of light cavalry!’ The remark implied that the aspiring King of France was somewhat amateurish, and that he also took great risks while commanding his men. As the historian Ronald S. Love wrote though, Parma was mistaken:

What Parma failed to grasp…was Henri's appreciation of the pivotal role in warfare of mounted forces, whose battlefield effectiveness he enhanced more than any other commander of his day. He dispensed with obsolete formations for more efficient ones, adapting his weaponry accordingly; he distinguished between types of military horsemen and their specialized functions; and he made original use of the relatively new dragoons. In short, Henri IV was a "cavalry specialist" whose innovations transformed the mounted branch into a far more mobile and deadly force than was available to his Spanish and League enemies, thus making a unique contribution to the late sixteenth-century military revolution.[[6]](#footnote-6)

Ronald S. Love was far from the only historian to refer to King Henri IV as a ‘cavalry specialist’, and the title is important when we consider the trend in Europe at the dawn of the 17th century.[[7]](#footnote-7) As we established earlier on, infantry had become the mainstay of the battlefield following the eclipse of knights and their replacement by the cheaper and more numerous pikemen from the early 1500s. Henri’s decision to transform cavalry into cavalry armed with rudimentary versions of the carbine, and to incorporate them into his army as a separate and distinct unit with its own strengths and weaknesses to play upon, tells a vibrant story.

Henri’s example is also fascinating because of how he dealt with the problems of his army, namely, its lack of funds and means to pay for the cavalry he needed. To make up for his lack of coin, Henri encouraged nobles loyal to him to field their own mounts and pay for their own equipment, in return for great gains into the future once victory had been won. This tactic, while a bit cheeky on the surface, worked well most of the time, but shortages continued to plague Henri, and forced him to make the absolute most of the cavalry that he did have. This determination to squeeze as much efficiency as possible out his rare mounted units led to a dramatic level of innovation among Henri’s cavalry. Ronald S. Love notes of these innovations:

Henri adapted the cavalry tactics and formations of his day to compensate for the problems with his mounted troops and to permit them to fight on a superior footing against their more numerous and better-provided enemies, whatever the circumstances. Specifically, instead of relying upon the essentially medieval attack…still generally used by other forces (whereby the heavy cavalry would charge with the lance in two thin, extended lines forty feet apart) the Bourbon monarch trained his men to form compact squadrons six or seven ranks deep and to charge with the sword, dispensing with the unwieldy lance and using pistols only in the ensuing melee.[[8]](#footnote-8)

The use of the lance by the late 1500s underlines the idea that military tactics in France were in need of a change. The cavalry and its aristocratic roots had been awkwardly tugged along since the beginning of the 16th century, even while the infantry gained an increasing importance on the battlefield and the mass cavalry charges of yore became far easier to parry and block than before. This by no means meant that cavalry charges had become obsolete, nor would they for several hundred years, but it did mean that battles between French cavalry on either side of the wars of religion frequently boiled down to clashes with the lance, and unwieldy efforts to close in with the enemy. Unless a breach could be exploited in the infantry, these cavalry appeared very similar in appearance and tactics to the knights of the middle ages, and they were just as inflexible.

Henri’s efforts to change this were not unprecedented, nor was he alone in believing that the old medieval tactic of charging while heavily armoured into other heavily armoured cavalry was in need of change. One of Henri’s peers, the Calvinist cavalry commander Francois de la Noue, commented that the emulation of medieval knights and the charge with the lance represented a ‘very bad formation’. De la Noue looked upon these lancers as considered outdated relics of an age before gunpowder when cavalry was exclusively aristocratic and noblemen refused from personal honour to ride anywhere but in the front rank. The pride of the nobility, de la Noue believed, meant that the old system was retained at the expense of proficiency, and it was this kind of ideology and traditionalism that King Henri was rallying against.

De la Noue appreciated from his years of experience commanding cavalry on the battlefield that the thin extended lines were flimsy and difficult to maintain in good order during the charge. Although effective against disorganized feudal levies, they could easily be broken by well-led cavalry or infantry in tighter formations, or simply by rough ground. Moreover, La Noue argued, the lancer was only capable of striking a single blow in the initial shock, unlike those cavalry armed with pistols that could fire at close quarters six or seven times with greater effect, and in the melee the lance was useless.[[9]](#footnote-9) Indeed, this struggle within French society between the practicalities and demands of warfare, and the desire for status, bravery and reputation, played a surprisingly important role in the development of cavalry tactics. Another historian has noted that:

By the end of the first quarter of the sixteenth century…various factors had combined to challenge the heavy cavalry's primacy. Other types of mounted troops were able to function far more effectively under the evolving conditions of war, but they still were plagued by issues of low status and thus remained an unappealing alternative for most noblemen. Although at least some of the nobles must have recognized that the heavy cavalry was in grave danger of losing its long-standing position as the star of the battlefield, the nobles still were not prepared to adapt by converting to a less prestigious type of mounted service, no matter how effective it might be.[[10]](#footnote-10)

By less prestigious, what was implied were the more flexible light or medium cavalry, as well as the pistol armed mounted infantry we met earlier.

The infantry were equally shaped by the lessons of the Wars of Religion. With less money to go around, the old tactic of the French crown to employ Swiss pike mercenaries went up in smoke, and it became necessary for Protestant infantry regiments to find ways to deal with the lack of funds, while still finding the means to defend themselves. This process was actually aided by the prevalence of partisan warfare which demanded small units acting independently and able to move in flexible formations through the countryside. Partisan warfare was bitter and bloody for sure, but this baptism by fire instilled within French infantry the concept of fighting as companies.

In the wars of religion, the tradition was for regiments, the largest formation of companies, to assemble for battle as a single line of small company squares in which soldiers stood only ten or twelve ranks deep. These company squares were separated by intervals equal to the front of one square. The gaps in the line could be closed in the event of a cavalry charge. Sometimes this arrangement would break down altogether, and large squares might be formed to combat a mass cavalry charge of thousands of horse. As per the rules of warfare at the time, a typical European regiment would field three to five thousand men; however, French infantry usually stood in regimental formations totalling no more than one thousand men, largely because manpower was scarce.

Appreciating this fact, Henri made the battalion the official unit of the French army, and was forced to compensate for the smaller size of this body of men by removing those gaps between the soldiers, and packing the pike and musketeers closer together. Removing the gaps meant that French infantry were much tighter and could respond better to the orders which were issued, but it also meant that pike and musket could be coordinated better as a fighting force. But how did it look on paper? Well, the pikemen were massed together in the centre of the battalion, flanked on either side by musketeers. On campaign, an average battalion contained about three hundred pikemen and one hundred musketeers. Henri's battalions were also designed to support each other in line or in a checkerboard formation, and to move and operate in tandem rather than what had been the norm with the larger regiments.

Regiments had been an impressive sight, since they claimed a size on paper of between one to five thousand men. However, as we saw, Henri was wise to appreciate that regiments were not well-suited to the French circumstances. The regiment was full of gaps and contained several independent companies, and the required manpower was rarely on hand to fill the quota and ensure that everyone played their role. Meanwhile, the smaller battalion was of a reasonable size, fielding about half as many men as the regiment, and the men were also packed closer together, increasing each soldier’s dependence on his peer.[[11]](#footnote-11) Once Henri began implementing the battalion as the default unit of the French army, its success began to show. Furthermore, the interdependence and cooperation between musket and pike was an innovation which Maurice of Nassau and later Gustavus Adolphus were to perfect. It is not entirely clear how much influence Maurice of Nassau had on Henri’s decision to switch up his army composition to suit its size.

It is entirely possible that in France, as in the Netherlands and Sweden, the circumstances on the ground compelled their leaders to make the most out of their position. As John A. Lynn notes though, the fact that these figures were all reforming their infantry tactics, and arriving at similar conclusions, buoyed each decision with a degree of confidence. Lynn wrote: ‘In all probability, the work of Maurice was all the more impressive to the French precisely because it rein- forced their own tactical development and offered refinements and improvements readily adaptable to French methods.’[[12]](#footnote-12) Frenchmen served in Dutch service to gain a better understanding of these tactics; Marshal Turenne, later a French commander of prime importance for Louis XIV’s wars, was a nephew of Maurice of Nassau, and was raised with the lessons of his uncle close to heart. Even while it cannot be guaranteed that Henri IV copied the Dutch example then, it can certainly be said that French military theory was influenced, impressed and encouraged by it. Little wonder that one historian referred to the Netherlands as ‘the military college of Europe.’[[13]](#footnote-13)

Just as French officers served under Maurice in early in the 17th century, so others went to school under Gustavus Adolphus’s brief flutter of military brilliance in the 1630s. Claude de Le Touf, baron de Sirot, who later commanded the reserve at the greatest French victory in the TYW, the 1643 Battle of Rocroi, gained invaluable experience 1632 and 1633 with the victorious Scandinavians. Once the French entered the war openly as enemies of the Habsburgs and allies of the Swedes, this contact with Swedish methods brought further adjustments in French tactics. About 1640, Turenne adopted the Swedish practice of marshalling infantry only six ranks deep, which made the line wider and provided greater opportunities for laying down fire. However, just as in the Dutch case, the emulation of some elements of Swedish practices did not mean that the French lazily copied the Swedes. This can be seen in the army composition, for while King Gustavus had increased both the number and offensive importance of his pikemen, Marshal Turenne reduced the number of pikemen to only one third of the entire battalion, adding more musketmen to compensate.[[14]](#footnote-14)

Thanks to the availability of drill manuals published in the 1650s and 70s, we know that by the middle of the 17th century, the preferred French method of forming an army was to create two main lines one in front of the other. In the centre of each line would be the infantry, with its battalions standing in checkerboard fashion, and those of the second line standing behind the gaps between battalions in the first. On the flanks stood the cavalry. If the manpower was available, an unofficial third reserve line of the raw recruits or less dependable cavalry and infantry were held, as were the older style of melee cavalry better suited to chasing fleeing infantry down, but vulnerable to musket fire.

Speaking again of the cavalry, we saw earlier how Henri IV debated long and hard about the best way to deploy them. Michael Roberts’ MR theory generalises that not until Gustavus Adolphus determined that the cavalry was better suited to the shock tactics of the charge, were the older tactics of the pistol or carbine armed cavalry rendered obsolete. I know what you’re thinking though; if you’ve been paying attention you’ll note that the consensus about cavalry was a bit all over the place. The utility of cavalry in France went from their appreciated shock value at the head of a heavily armoured charge in the early 1500s, to taking on firearms and making use of them, to going back to their roots as shock cavalry by the 1630s.

The changes should not be imagined as abrupt alterations to the way cavalry fought, but as responses to the demands played upon cavalry in a given battlefield. Furthermore, the idea that Gustavus Adolphus pioneered the return to cavalry’s more natural roots is somewhat flawed, especially when we consider the consistent debate during even Henri IV’s time about the best use of cavalry. During the turn of the 17th century, cavalry armed with carbines, pistols or other small arms tended to engage in wasteful manoeuvres as the caracole. The caracole turned the cavalry into something little better than faster moving infantry, and was immensely wasteful. Lynn describes the manoeuvre and its flaws:

To perform the caracole, a body of cavalry several ranks deep approached the enemy. The first rank fired its pistols, wheeled about, and rode to the rear of the formation to reload; the succeeding ranks fired and wheeled in turn. By the time the last rank had fired, the first would be ready to discharge its weapons once again. The intention was to blow a hole in the enemy square, but when used against infantry the caracole almost invariably cost the attacking cavalry more than the defending infantry, because infantry muskets outclassed cavalry pistols in range and power.[[15]](#footnote-15)

The solution, it seemed, was to combine the best of both worlds – cavalry would fire as a group from a further distance, and then charge at the enemy to rupture its line. This would demand a level of coordination from the horses for sure, but it would also demand a great deal of the enemy infantry, who would be forced to endure a combination of infantry and cavalry tactics in quick succession. In addition, and a lesson which the French certainly *did not* learn from the Swedes, was that tactic which combined infantry in amongst the cavalry, to provide still more firepower for the initial discharge of the weapons. Then, if the cavalry needed to make a retreat after their initial charge, they could withdraw to a position behind this company of infantry, and prepare their charge again. The key was flexibility, and thanks to the ruinous experience of the Wars of Religion, the French army had been through the school of hard knocks, and emerged on the other side scarred but well educated and immersed in the arts of war.

Artillery was a similar story. While Gustavus Adolphus’ innovations in the realm of artillery are undeniable, the idea that he invented the concept and that the French copied it is difficult to support. Indeed, since the early 1500s experimentation with smaller calibres of cannon were the norm, and while the three pounder artillery most popular among Swedish armies saw extensive French use, most notably during the initial defence of France in 1636 against a determined Spanish invasion, such small pieces became less important. The reason why the smaller but more mobile pieces decreased in importance as the century went on had a lot to do with the trace italienne and popularity of the siege where French soldiers resided. Since the lighter field artillery could not punch through any respectable walls, and since this was what the artillery were needed for above all, there seemed little reason for the French to lug these small pieces with them. Artillery was split between field and siege guns, and since sieges were more common, the smaller calibre became less common on the battlefield, even while they did not disappear.[[16]](#footnote-16)

So in the last two episodes, we’ve learned much about how the French fought and why their tactics evolved as they did. It was not the case, as Michael Roberts would have claimed, that the French were caught in the waves caused by the MR. Instead, it was evolution, and adaption the circumstances unique to France, that affected such changes in how the cavalry behaved, how the armies were composed, why they expanded in the way that they did, and how all these parts blended together. We’re not finished with France by any means, but in the next episode, we’re going to take a detour down a Turkish road, and see what we can find. Expect to see the Ottomans provide their own exceptions to the idea that the MR brought about a paradigm shift in how conflict was conducted, and to provide a foil to the idea that, while the West was experiencing all of these changes, the Ottoman Empire was merely sitting on its hands. I hope you’ll join me for that, but until next time my name is Zack, and this has been our TYW series on warfare in the 17th century. Thanks for listening and I’ll be seeing you all soon.

1. John A. Lynn, ‘Tactical Evolution in the French Army, 1560-1660’, *French Historical Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Autumn, 1985), pp. 176-191; p. 176. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The end of the Dutch flirtation with absolutism under the House of Orange is examined in H. M. Scott, ‘Sir Joseph Yorke, Dutch Politics and the Origins of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War’, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1988), pp. 571-589. For its beginning see Pieter Geyl, ‘William IV of Orange and His English Marriage’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Vol. 8 (1925), pp. 14-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Geoffrey Parker, ‘The "Military Revolution," 1560-1660--a Myth?’, pp. 206-207. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. For both these points see John A. Lynn, ‘Recalculating French Army Growth during the Grand Siecle, 1610-1715’, *French Historical Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 881-906; John A. Lynn, ‘The Trace Italienne and the Growth of Armies: The French Case’, *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Jul., 1991), pp. 297-330. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Cited in Ronald S. Love, ‘"All the King's Horsemen": The Equestrian Army of Henri IV, 1585-1598’, *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 510-533; p. 512. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. *Ibid*, p. 510. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Sir Charles Oman, *The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century* (London: E.P Dutton and Co., 1937), p. 467. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Ronald S. Love, ‘“All the King's Horsemen"’, p. 514. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See *Ibid*, pp. 515-516. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Treva J. Tucker, ‘Eminence over Efficacy: Social Status and Cavalry Service in Sixteenth-Century France’, *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Winter, 2001), pp. 1057-1095; p. 1057. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See John A. Lynn, ‘Tactical Evolution in the French Army, 1560-1660’, pp. 177-179. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Ibid*, p. 180. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. J. W. Wijn, ‘Military Forces and Warfare, 1610-1648’, *The New Cambridge Modern History*, vol. 4 (Cambridge, 1970), p. 203 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. John A. Lynn, ‘Tactical Evolution in the French Army, 1560-1660’, p. 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. *Ibid*, p. 182. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. *Ibid*, pp. 183-186. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)