



**MALCONTENT NEWS  
RUSSIA-UKRAINE  
SITUATION REPORT**

August 3, 2023



# Malcontent News

## Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

### 8/03/23 23:59\* PST

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## SUMMARY – DAY 525

It has been 3,445 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 160 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine. Today is a condensed combat-only report due to the successful uncrewed surface vessel attack on the Russian port of Novorossiysk.

- Severe thunderstorms impacted the operational tempo in the Donbas
- Russian Ministry of Defense claims they are on the offensive at Vilshana
- Fighting continues east of Berestove
- Russian forces advanced back to the P-07 Highway at Novoselivske
- Ukrainian forces on the offensive in the direction of Karmazynivka
- Intense positional fighting continues in the Serebryansky Woods
- Multiple Russian sources report that Ukraine controls the southern part of Klishchiivka, and no Russian troops remain in the northern half, but Ukraine can't advance through the gray area
- Multiple Russian sources report Andriivka has been abandoned, but artillery holds back Ukrainian forces

- House-to-house fighting has started on the first street in northwest Kurdyumivka
- Commander of the Ground Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrskiy, said that the pace of the offensive is not going fast enough in the Bakhmut area of operation (AO)
- Avdiivka and Marinka – you know the drill
- A Russian ammunition depot in Tokmak was destroyed
- Russia claims that 13 Ukrainian drones were shot down or disabled by electronic warfare near Feodosia
- The Project 775 Ropucha-Class large landing ship Olenegorski Gornjak was hit by a Ukrainian uncrewed surface drone (USV) amidships near Novorossiysk and severely damaged
- It is claimed that the Caspian Pipeline Consortium offshore gantry in the Russian port of Novorossiysk was hit by a USV, with the company denying there was any damage

## **DAILY ASSESSMENT**

We assess the following:

1. In our assessment, Ukraine's debut of the new Mk.5 uncrewed surface vessel, with 450 kilograms of explosives and a better mesh Internet connection,

appears to have solved the technical issues of earlier models.

2. We assess the Russian Ministry of Defense's blatant disinformation that there was no damage in the port of Novorossiysk is going to spark a new wave of distrust in the Kremlin with no possible way to suppress the near sinking of the Olenegorski Gornjak.
3. We maintain that Ukraine's application of tight operational security, an apparent operational pause, and a Stavka limited to security and military leaders indicates that larger military action is likely in the coming days.
4. Due to a lack of troop rotation, growing ammunition shortages, and weak commanders, we maintain that Russian combat potential is reaching the point of exhaustion, facilitating Ukrainian advances.
5. We maintain that the current Ukrainian military activity is subordinate offensives and shaping operations, and the main operation has not started.
6. We maintain that signals from Kyiv indicating the next phase of the summer offensive is being prepared are accurate. There are three operational areas where we believe the next phase could start.
7. Despite Ukraine's plans to move to the next phase, we maintain that Western partners are not meeting their promised military training, heavy equipment, and

- ammunition dates, negatively impacting Ukraine's military capabilities.
8. The Russian Federation's defacto blockade of the western Black Sea has put shipping in the territorial waters of Bulgaria and Romania at risk. The August 1 attack on the Romania border and Belarus's incursion into Polish air space are partially due to a lack of response from earlier incidents by the European Union, United Nations, and/or NATO.
  9. We maintain that Russian aggression on the borders of Ukraine and the Black Sea will continue to expand and lead to an international incident if Ukraine's allies do not take a stronger posture.
  10. Russian President Vladimir Putin's stature, both inside and outside of Russia, remains weakened after the failed Prigozhin Insurrection, and there continues to be a small but very real possibility of another insurrection or coup attempt.
  11. The Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces.
  12. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community is negatively impacting Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.


13. Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.
14. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)






# TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



**About the maps:** Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


## [Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

# KHARKIV



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict


**Ukrainian Objective:** Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvornichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



## Dvorichna Operational Area

The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) claimed they were on the offensive in the area of [Vilshana](#), which undermines mid-July claims of significant Russian advances in the same area.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28905](https://t.me/mod_russia/28905) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]



## Svatove Operational Area


RMOD claimed Ukrainian forces were on the offensive east of [Berestove](#).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28905](https://t.me/mod_russia/28905) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

# DONBAS REGION

## LUHANSK



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections


**Ukrainian Objective:** Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents

## Free Luhansk

Operational Command East spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Russian forces fired 496 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad and Smerch rockets fired by multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), indirect tank fire, drone-delivered IEDs, and bombs on Ukrainian positions and civilians from Dvorichna [Kharkiv] to Bilohorivka [Luhansk].<sup>3</sup> The Russian Air Force and army aviation (VKS) carried out 15 airstrikes.

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<sup>3</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/108429>



## Svatove Operational Area


Russian forces advanced back to the P-07 Highway, with fighting for the railroad station in western [Novoselivske](#) ongoing. We coded Novoselivske as contested and moved the line of conflict west.<sup>4 5 6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/108429>

<sup>5</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28905](https://t.me/mod_russia/28905) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>6</sup> <https://t.me/rybar/50410>




Russian mercenary milblogger Rybar claimed Ukrainian forces were on the offensive west of [Karmazynivka](#).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> <https://t.me/rybar/50410>






## Kremynna Operational Area

Intense fighting of platoon-sized units continued in the [Serebryanskyy Woods](#), with both combatants firing significant amounts of artillery and the Russian Air Force and army aviation (VKS) providing close air support to Russian troops.<sup>8 9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28905](https://t.me/mod_russia/28905) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>9</sup> <https://t.me/rybar/50410>




## Lysychansk Operational Area

Mutual fighting was reported south and southeast of [Bilohorivka](#) [Luhansk].<sup>10 11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/108429>


<sup>11</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28905](https://t.me/mod_russia/28905) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

# NORTHEAST DONETSK



**Russian Objective:** Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections

**Ukrainian Objective:** Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties




## Bakhmut Operational Area

Russian forces attempted to advance on [Ivanivske](#) from the southern tip of Bakhmut without success.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10825>



## Klishchiivka Operational Area

Northern [Klishchiivka](#) and all of [Andriivka](#) remain unoccupied, with intense fighting along the railroad tracks and the northeastern edge of Klishchiivka.<sup>13 14</sup> Ukrainian forces have taken military control of the Russian defensive lines in the cemetery on the northwest corner of [Kurdyumivka](#) with ongoing house-to-house fighting along the village's first street nearest to the canal.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28905](https://t.me/mod_russia/28905) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>14</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/14171>


<sup>15</sup> <https://t.me/rsotmdivision/9709>

Commander of the Ground Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrskyi, said that the offensive is not going fast enough, telling military leaders, "In the Bakhmut direction, my work was devoted to the urgent problems of increasing the pace of the offensive, the prospects for further actions, solving problematic issues that prevent the successful completion of the assigned tasks."<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10821>


# SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

**Ukrainian Objective:** Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,

destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



## Avdiivka Operational Area


The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported that Russian forces attacked Avdiivka from the north and the southeast, with both attacks failing.<sup>17</sup> Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo claimed Russian forces were successful near Vesele without evidence.<sup>18</sup> GSAFU also reported a Russian attack southeast of [Pervomaiske](#) ended in failure.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10825>

<sup>18</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/14171>

<sup>19</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10825>






## Marinka Operational Area

Mutual fighting continued in and in the area of [Marinka](#), with no change in the situation.<sup>20 21 22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10825>

<sup>21</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28905](https://t.me/mod_russia/28905) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>22</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/14171>




## Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction

Russian counterattacks west of [Staromaiorske](#) and east of [Urozhaine](#) ended in failure.<sup>23</sup> Ukrainian forces restarted offensive operations on the northern edge of [Pryyutne](#).<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10825>


<sup>24</sup> <https://t.me/rybar/50410>

# ZAPORIZHIA



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

**Ukrainian Objective:** Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



## Orikhiv Operational Area

Positional fighting and probing attacks continued between [Robotyne](#) and [Verbove](#), with no change in the situation.<sup>25</sup>

Operational tempo was low, likely due to an unofficial and brief ceasefire to support the rotation of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, who travel on the M-18 Highway and cross into Free Ukraine at Kamyanske.

## Occupied Zaporizhzhia

Rockets fired by HIMARS destroyed a large [Russian ammunition depot in Tokmak](#).<sup>26</sup>

<sup>25</sup> <https://t.me/rybar/50410>

<sup>26</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/108473>

## Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

As previously mentioned, inspectors at ZNPP successfully rotated. Maintenance and inspection of Reactor 5 have started after being brought to a cold shutdown, and Reactor 4 is operating in a hot shutdown state. Russian occupiers are still barring IAEA inspectors from the roof and turbine halls of all the Units at ZNPP and have not removed the directional landmines spotted on July 23.

## BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

### Black Sea


Operational Command South (OKS) reported 11 vessels of the Black Sea Fleet on patrol, including a frigate and Kilo-class submarine capable of launching up to 12 Kalibr cruise missiles.<sup>27</sup>


***Editor's Note: Make that ten vessels.***

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<sup>27</sup> <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/38436>

## Occupied Crimea

Russian occupiers claimed that 13 Ukrainian drones were shot down or disabled by electronic warfare  [near Feodosia](#). Air defense  [was active](#), and there was no evidence of any UAV strikes.<sup>28 29 30</sup>

The Hvardiiske airfield, home of the Russian 37th Aviation Regiment, was hit by at least two Storm Shadow cruise missiles, destroying two hangars.<sup>31</sup> Bad Russian operational security (OPSEC)  [made it impossible to deny the strike](#), or claim that air defense around the base was active.<sup>32</sup> This is the second military base hit on Crimea in 48 hours.

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<sup>28</sup> <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/38478>

<sup>29</sup> <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/38468>

<sup>30</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/1085143>

<sup>31</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/108342>

<sup>32</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/108278>

## WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

**Russian Objective:** Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

**Ukrainian Objective:** Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity in this area.

## NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

**Russian Objective:** Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale


**Ukrainian Objective:** Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity in this area.

## RUSSIAN FRONT

**Russian Objective:** Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent further insurrection, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

**Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective:** Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest




Ukrainian Mk.5 uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) attacked the Russian port of Novorossiysk, where 30% of Russian oil is exported through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. There are reports that the offshore oil terminal gantry, which enables oil tankers to connect to the main terminal in deep water,  [was struck by a USV](#).<sup>33</sup> The Caspian Pipeline Consortium denied its infrastructure was damaged and claimed that operations continued without interruption. The Russian Ministry of Defense closed the port to all shipping, making it unlikely that operations are ongoing.

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<sup>33</sup> <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1687324100967202817>



The Russian Ministry of Defense also claimed that all USVs were intercepted without incident by the anti-sabotage ship Surorovets and the large landing ship Olenegorsky Gornyak.<sup>34</sup>

About 90 minutes later, a video showed a  [Ropucha-class LLS being towed](#) into the port of Novorossiysk with a significant list to port.<sup>35</sup> The Olenegorsky Gornjak successfully intercepted a Ukrainian USV  [using its hull](#).<sup>36</sup> Minutes later, Ukraine released a first person view (FPV) video of the  [Mk.5 USV intercepting and striking the Olenegorsky Gornjak amidships](#), with no apparent attempts by the crew to destroy the drone, despite being illuminated by spotlights.<sup>37</sup> The USV appeared to pause as spotlights swept it and then accelerated for its attack run. The video's quality and quick release indicate that the Pentagon-provided Starlink system or some other satellite or mesh Internet system was used versus the commercial Starlink system that SpaceX has geofenced.

A later video showed the Olenegorsky Gornjak was still  [taking on water as it was being towed](#) and was down at the


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<sup>34</sup> [https://t.me/shot\\_shot/55126](https://t.me/shot_shot/55126)

<sup>35</sup> <https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1687350645592817665>

<sup>36</sup> <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1687357976288563200>

<sup>37</sup> <https://twitter.com/i/status/1687360059154825216>

aft. A third video from a different angle showed the  [ship's starboard side had almost tipped out of the water](#), with a tugboat on the port side preventing the Gornjak from capsizing.<sup>38</sup>

As of this writing, the Russian Ministry of Defense has not made any statement, and Russian state media has been in full denial.

## THEATERWIDE

An examination of recent Russian missile debris confirmed that Russia is using missiles that Ukraine gave to Moscow in the 1990s. The serial number on the debris of a Kh-55 missile matched a list of missiles given to Moscow in 1999 in exchange for writing off a natural gas debt.<sup>39</sup>

Poland moved attack helicopters to the border with Belarus after a provocation with Belarusian helicopters crossing the border. "These helicopters are armed and ready for battle. If something alarming happens, they will

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<sup>38</sup> [https://twitter.com/front\\_ukrainian/status/1687373855809998848](https://twitter.com/front_ukrainian/status/1687373855809998848)

<sup>39</sup> [https://t.me/ukrarmed\\_forces/5719](https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5719)

use their weapons without hesitation," said Polish General Sokolowski.<sup>40</sup>

The Ministry of National Defence of Romania said it had not found any drone debris in its territory, but it was increasing readiness "according to national and allied plans, continuously monitoring national territory, sea, and airspace, and collaborating with NATO structures to strengthen defense on the entire eastern flank and deter any aggression against allied territory."<sup>41</sup>

The table for equipment losses was **updated on July 31, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

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<sup>40</sup> <https://t.me/ShrikeNews/9785>

<sup>41</sup> <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/3/7166938/>

## RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to July 31, 2023. 11,495 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,067 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
<b>Main Battle Tanks</b>	2047	250	8.19:1	↓
<b>Medium Duty Tanks</b>	141	345	0.41:1	—
<b>Armored fighting Vehicles</b>	936	305	3.07:1	—
<b>Infantry Fighting Vehicles</b>	2595	671	3.88:1	↓
<b>Armored Personnel Carriers</b>	337	313	1.08:1	—
<b>MRAPs</b>	46	134	0.34:1	↓
<b>Infantry Mobility Vehicles</b>	198	344	0.58:1	—
<b>Command and Communications Vehicles</b>	245	16	15.31:1	↑
<b>Engineering Vehicles</b>	327	73	4.48:1	—
<b>Towed Artillery</b>	266	142	1.87:1	—
<b>Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars</b>	473	188	2.52:1	↑
<b>MLRS</b>	251	50	5.02:1	↑
<b>SAMs</b>	139	118	1.18:1	↑
<b>Mobile Radars</b>	40	70	0.57:1	—
<b>EW/ECW</b>	49	4	12.25:1	↑
<b>Winged Aircraft</b>	85	69	1.23:1	—
<b>Helicopters</b>	107	31	3.45:1	↑
<b>Naval Vessels</b>	12	26	0.46:1	—

## Notes on Sourcing Information


**Malcontent News** uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War


Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.