

**MALCONTENT NEWS
RUSSIA-UKRAINE
SITUATION REPORT**

May 13, 2023 – A



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.

⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.



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SUMMARY – DAY 443

This is the first update for May 13, 2023.

It has been 3,362 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 79 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

- The Daily Assessment will be updated with each report
- Weather and soil conditions will be in the last report of the day
- If an anticipated report is not created, weather and soil conditions will be released as a Flash Report
- Each report will contain unique information and continue in a condensed format

The map is back! [War Map](#)

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:


1. Our assessment that there was a continued risk of missile and drone strikes across Ukraine continues to be accurate.
2. Our earlier assessment that the rupture between the Russian Ministry of Defense and Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group could disrupt Russian military operations in the Soledar and Bakhmut Operational Areas was accurate, with PMC Wagner's leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin and Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, escalating their dispute.
3. We maintain that Ukrainian forces have ended their retrograde operation in Bakhmut and continue to opportunistically launch limited offensives on the northern and southern flanks while holding combat destroyed PMC Wagner units in place.
4. We maintain that Ukraine has seized the battlefield initiative in all operational areas. This is the last day of this entry.
5. In preparation for larger offensive operations, Ukrainian forces continue shaping operations on multiple axes, creating panic and uncertainty among

gauleiters, Russian administrators, and military leaders.

6. We have identified shaping activity by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in four locations that could indicate a larger attack is being prepared.

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
TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

UKRAINE WEATHER



The ECMWF Euro model forecast is unchanged, with sunny and seasonable weather in eastern Ukraine through May 19. Highs will be from 17° to 27° Celcius, with lows from 6° to 14°. Winds up to 40 kph are possible overnight on Thursday. The new moon is on May 19, and the full moon is on June 4.


SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY



May 20, 2023 GFS forecast indicates soil saturation will be from 25% to 75% to 40 centimeters depth in Zaporizhzhia and the Donbas. The black line is the current line of conflict.


Soil saturation along the line of conflict is at 35% to 70%, with no rain in the forecast through May 19. Ground conditions are now favorable for armored vehicles and mobility along the entire line of conflict.

KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, hold current defensive lines, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict


Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



Dvrichna Operational Area

- The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported a Russian attack in the area of [Masyutivka](#) was repulsed¹


¹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEDT](#)



Kupyansk Operational Area

- The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) reported that Ukrainian surveillance, reconnaissance, and sabotage (DRG) units were operating near [Orlyanske](#)²

² https://t.me/mod_russia/26542 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




Svatove Operational Area

- RMOD also reported that Ukrianian DRG units were active in the area of [Berestove](#)³

³ https://t.me/mod_russia/26542 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


Free Kharkiv

- The city of  [Kharkiv and the settlement of Zolochiv were hit](#) by Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missiles used for a ground attack⁴
- Missiles struck the Novobavarsky District of Kharkiv, striking transportation infrastructure and damaging a dormitory and an apartment building
- Two missiles landed between residential buildings in Zolochiv, breaking windows and destroying outbuildings
- While the area is small, a Russian withdrawal to the Kharkiv-Luhansk administrative border would put the P-66 Highway Russian Ground Line of Communication (GLOC – supply line) and the logistic hub at Troitske into artillery range

⁴ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/96221>


DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, prevent further Ukrainian advances, control insurgent activity


Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kremynna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents



Svatove Operational Area

- GSAFU reported a Russian offensive in the direction of [Novoselivske](#) was unsuccessful⁵

⁵ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report PM EEDT](#)




Kreminna Operational Area

- Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo reported fighting continued in the [Serebryansky Woods](#) with no change to the situation⁶

⁶ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12493>


NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Capture Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties

Bakhmut Operational Area

- PMC Wagner leader Prigozhin released multiple videos moving from rage to calm analytics in the span of 24 hours – in one video,  [Prigozhin seemed to hint that](#)

[armed rebellion could occur](#) in Russia if troops aren't treated better, "In this stupid war, the only saint and totally innocent of all mistakes is the Russian soldier, who has been abandoned to his fate and decided that he must die the way they like from their mahogany offices. When the Russian soldier realizes what is going on around him and raises his head, I am sure he will figure out who is framing him and hang [?] their asses from the fascist sign of those guilty of the tragedy he was abandoned in."⁷

- On May 12, Prigozhin claimed Wagnerites were shooting Russian troops for abandoning their positions⁸
- Prigozhin issued a statement claiming that the Russian Ministry of Defense has broken off all channels of communication with Wagner Group, writing, "...an employee of the PMC Wagner tried to send a letter from Yevgeny Prigozhin to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Sergei Shoigu through the courier postal service on Frunzenskaya Embankment (6 Central Department of the FSP). The acceptance of the letter was refused due to the personal order of Shoigu and the proceedings after the acceptance of previous letters. The letter reflected the problems with the units of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense

⁷ https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1657428866078584834


⁸ <https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/1657197255894376448>

on the flanks, and also attached mass appeals of mobilized people who wish to join the Wagner PMC due to the lack of control in the units of the RF Ministry of Defense. The detailed text of the letter is not published in connection with an attempt to resolve these issues in a non-public way."⁹

- ***Editor's Note: In a "non-public way?" The disintegration of cooperation between RMOD and Wagner has been on public display since November 2022, when we first assessed Prigozhin's actions and words would be viewed as a threat by the Kremlin.***
- RMOD said Russian forces conducted 98 fire missions, and army aviation and Airforce (VKS) carried out nine close air support sorties¹⁰
- We estimate that Ukrainian forces maintain control of 2.8 square kilometers of Bakhmut (1.08 square miles), or roughly 6.7% of the city, which is 41.6 square kilometers

⁹ https://t.me/concordgroup_official/961

¹⁰ https://t.me/mod_russia/26542 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]



Northwest Bakhmut

- GSAFU reported that Russian-aligned forces attempted to regain lost positions near [Orikhovo-Vasylivka](#) and [Hryhorivka](#) and were unsuccessful¹¹
- WarGonzo reported that Russian troops had withdrawn from their positions south of the [Berkhivske Reservoir](#) and retreated to [Berkhivka](#) – we made a minor adjustment to the war map east of the reservoir base on open source intelligence shared by PMC Wagner leader Prigozhin¹²

¹¹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEDT](#)

¹² <https://t.me/wargonzo/12493>

- Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting in the area of [Bohdanivka](#) with no change to the situation^{13 14 15}
- WarGonzo reported that fighting continued near [Khromove](#) with no change to the situation¹⁶
- RMOD baselessly claimed that Russian troops had captured two non-specified districts in northwest Bakhmut – the claim is false¹⁷



¹³ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report PM EEDT](#)

¹⁴ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16550>


¹⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12493>

¹⁶ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12493>

¹⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/26542 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

Northern Bakhmut

- Fighting continued with no change in the situation^{18 19}
20 21



West-Central and Southern Bakhmut

- Russian artillery [blanketed Bakhmut with smoke rounds](#) from artillery to obscure Russian troop movement – you would be correct that the smoke

¹⁸ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEDT](#)


¹⁹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report PM EEDT](#)

²⁰ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16550>

²¹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12493>

impacts both combatants, also obscuring Ukrainian troop movements²²

- There were no reported territorial changes^{23 24 25 26}



- South of [Ivanivske](#), WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian forces made marginal gains in the direction of Klishchiivka – we did not update the map due to a lack of additional supporting intelligence²⁷

²² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/96131>


²³ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEDT](#)

²⁴ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report PM EEDT](#)

²⁵ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16550>

²⁶ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12493>

²⁷ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12493>




Klishchiivka Operational Direction

- PMC Wagner continued attempts to restore lost positions on the west bank of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal east of [Stupochky](#) without success²⁸
- WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian forces made additional gains in the direction of [Klishchiivka](#) from the [Predtechyne](#) direction without providing supporting information – we did not update the map

²⁸ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEDT](#)

- GSAFU reported an attack by Russian-aligned forces near [Bila Hora](#) was unsuccessful, while WarGonzo reported Ukrainian forces went on the offensive in the direction of [Kurdyumivka](#) and expelled Russian forces from the west bank of the canal^{29 30}



Toretsk-Niu York Operational Area

- WarGozno reported that Ukrainian forces launched a successful offensive in the direction of [Mayorsk](#), capturing a critical highway junction, severing a

²⁹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report PM EEDT](#)

³⁰ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12493>

Russian Ground Line of Communication (GLOC – supply line)

- A graphic video, allegedly recorded in Mayorsk, showed a squad of Ukrainian soldier bodies in a row, with claims that an attack was made and that it had been repulsed³¹
- There were no changes made to the map

Free Donetsk


- Kostyantynivka was  [shelled by Russian forces](#), killing two, including a 15-year-old girl, and wounding ten³²
- The  [attack damaged houses](#), high-rise apartment buildings, industrial facilities, and civilian infrastructure³³
- Russian forces attacked civilian areas of Druzhkivka with Smerch rockets fired by MLRS armed with cluster munitions, wounding two

³¹ https://t.me/russian_collective/85

³² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/96233>

³³ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/96147>


SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, consolidate gains made during the winter offensive, and set conditions for September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Lock Russian military assets in place, defend the existing line of conflict while finding and exploiting weaknesses, destroy troop concentrations and

command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics





Avdiivka Operational Area

- Fighting continued west and north of Novobakhmutivka along the H-20 Highway to the west and the railroad tracks to the north^{34 35}

³⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/26542 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

³⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12493>



- A Russian attack on [Avdiivka](#) from the direction of Opytne was unsuccessful^{36 37 38}
- [West of Mineral'ne](#), a Russian forward operating base (FOB) and supply node at the defunct H-20 Highway and Donetsk Bypass junction  [caught on fire, with small arms ammunition and fuel cooking off](#), along with military equipment³⁹
- A Russian offensive near [Vodyane](#) was repulsed⁴⁰


³⁶ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEDT](#)

³⁷ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16550>

³⁸ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12493>

³⁹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/96140>

⁴⁰ 40



Marinka Operational Area

- Fighting for [Marinka](#) continued with no change in the situation^{41 42 43 44}

Donetsk Oblast

- GSAFU reported that units that have been on the line of conflict for months are rotating in the Donetsk region and being replaced by newly formed formations

⁴¹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report AM EEDT](#)

⁴² [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Facebook Report PM EEDT](#)

⁴³ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16550>

⁴⁴ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12493>




– the troops coming off of the front line are being sent on leave⁴⁵

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⁴⁵ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/9617>

ZAPORIZHIA



Russian Objective: Prepare for a Ukrainian offensive, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate Russian-occupied areas, prevent further Russian advances, exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, and protect civilians

Free Zaporizhia

- Russian forces executed 90 fire missions, two airstrikes, and three drone attacks along the line of conflict in Zaporizhia⁴⁶

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

- No update

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

- Operational Command South (OKS) reported that Black Sea Fleet has ten vessels on patrol, including three frigates and one Kilo-class submarine capable of launching up to 25 Kalibr cruise missiles^{47 48}

⁴⁶ https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/18737

⁴⁷ https://t.me/Nazars_look/14204

⁴⁸ https://t.me/Nazars_look/14204


WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE


Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Free Kherson

- Russian forces carried out 90 fire missions, firing 434 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad rockets, indirect tank fire, and drone-delivered IEDs, bombs, and rockets
- The city of Kherson was struck twice with 15 munitions, wounding six





- Russian drone video of [Dachy](#) showed Ukrainian forces moving through the settlement with impunity, further confirming our previous assessment that Ukrainian forces have  [established a permanent bridgehead north of the Konka River](#) and on the approach to Oleshky⁴⁹

Ternopil

- The city was attacked twice by cruise missiles, with the first strike hitting an area of commercial warehouses and a distribution center for a religious charity⁵⁰

⁴⁹ <https://twitter.com/georgewbarros/status/1657501932489957376>

⁵⁰ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/05/14/7402108/>



- Russian milbloggers are claiming the area was a military base because a Ford pickup truck and a Kamaz truck were damaged in the attack
- The second missile strike occurred when Ukrainian musical artist TVORCHI, who was part of the Eurovision 2023 competition that held its finals on May 13 and is from Ternopil, was performing⁵¹
- After performing, the duo said, "Ternopil is the name of our hometown, which was bombed by Russia while we sang on the Eurovision stage about our steel hearts, indomitability, and will."
- The second missile  [struck a residential area](#), wounding two⁵²
- As a further indication that the attack was planned in coordination with the performance by TVORCHI, a  [coordinated disinformation campaign started](#) after the first missile strike on Russian-aligned social media circulating pictures of a 2022 explosion in Iran and attributing it to Ternopil⁵³

⁵¹ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65586701>

⁵² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/9623>

⁵³ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/96198>

Khmelnyskyi

- After  [reviewing numerous videos](#), geolocation, and analyzing the historical satellite imagery of the area attacked by Shahed-136 kamikaze drones on May 12, we assessed the area was not an ammunition depot⁵⁴
- A video montage provided a timeline, showing the first drone struck around 04:27 hours local time, with additional explosions at 04:57, and 05:07 – the blasts were consistent with an  [explosion of fuel, fertilizer, or other volatile chemicals](#)⁵⁵
- The fire had burned itself out by 06:11 hours, with no visual evidence of missile or ammunition cookoff
- The sound in some videos that some have attributed to secondary explosions more closely aligns with falling debris
- The area attacked was part of the defunct 19th Missile Brigade of the Soviet Union nuclear forces, and the engines and fuel of SS-19 missiles [have been stored at the site](#) since the Budapest Memorandum was signed

⁵⁴ <https://twitter.com/intelcrows/status/1657431391972347906>

⁵⁵ <https://twitter.com/WarMonitors/status/1657426222341652481/video/2>

- The railroad connection near the site is abandoned and in ruins, with rusty railroad cars blocking the approach





NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

No major activity

RUSSIAN FRONT

- Over Bryansk, four Russian aircraft – a Mi-8, a Mi-8 MTPR, a Su-34, and a Su-35 – were shot down over a one to two-hour period, resulting in the loss of eight pilots and one electronic warfare operator
- Russian state media confirmed the loss of all the aircraft and their crews, and blamed Ukrainian forces for the interceptions despite the attacks being as far as 50 kilometers from the Ukrainian border^{56 57}
- We cannot determine if the anti-aircraft missiles fired were from Russian air defenses misidentifying friendly aircraft, Ukrainian air defenses, Ukrainian special operation forces (SOF) or DRG, or Russian partisans
- Video of  [helicopter number one](#)⁵⁸
- Video of  [helicopter number two](#)⁵⁹
- Video of  [Su-34 shot down](#)⁶⁰
- Picture showing debris of one aircraft  [with Russian VKS markings](#)⁶¹
- The Mi-8 MTPR helicopter is an electronic warfare variant, with only 19 produced, and scrambles radar to prevent the detection and tracking of Russian aircraft

⁵⁶ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/96123>


⁵⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/96139>

⁵⁸ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/96105>

⁵⁹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/96144>

⁶⁰ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/9611>

⁶¹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/96110>

- One of the S-300 anti-aircraft missiles fired from Belogord toward Kharkiv  [failed shortly after launch](#) and exploded⁶²

THEATERWIDE

- The British Ministry of Defense Defense Intelligence Directorate validated our earlier assessment that Russian forces are in a combat-ineffective state theaterwide, writing, "...the force is mostly poorly trained mobilized reservists and increasingly reliant on antiquated equipment, with many units severely under-strength. It [*Russian forces – Ed.*] routinely only conducts very simple, infantry-based operations. Critically, it is unlikely that [Russian Combined Grouping of Forces] has been able to generate a large, capable, mobile reserve to respond to emerging operational challenges. It is unlikely to be an organization which will effectively cohere large-scale military effect along a 1,200-kilometer front line under stress."⁶³

⁶² <https://twitter.com/TreasChest/status/1657500030717116416>

⁶³ <https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1657643236989517825>

- Ukrainian air defenses shot down 18 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones and one Russian Lancet UAV during the evening of May 13 - 14⁶⁴
- Five Russian Tu-95 strategic bombers launched five Kh-101/55/555 cruise missiles, with three intercepted by Ukrainian air defenses⁶⁵
- At the time of publication, Ukrainian air defenses had achieved a 92% success rate
- Germany announced another military aid package to Ukraine worth 2.7 billion Euros as part of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's visit to Berlin – the package includes 20 Marder infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), 30 Leopard-1 tanks, 4 IRIS-T air defense systems with 12 launchers and "hundreds of missiles," 200 reconnaissance drones, 100 armored vehicles, 100 rear support vehicles, 15 additional Gepard 35 mm self-propelled anti-aircraft systems, and a "large amount" of ammunition⁶⁶
- We were skeptical that the Swiss National Council would follow up on the Parliament's lower and upper chamber votes to relax Switzerland's neutrality rules to enable the transfer of weapons to Ukraine
- The National Council has passed an amendment that will allow the transfer of certain weapons to Ukraine,

⁶⁴ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/96224>

⁶⁵ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/96178>

⁶⁶ https://t.me/Nazars_look/14188

or in the future other nations, under a strict set of conditions and guidelines, representing the first change to Switzerland's neutrality since 1815⁶⁷ ⁶⁸

- After visiting with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy said, "Here are good things we will do together for our defense on the ground. [We've] reached [an] agreement for weapons and air defense. As Giorgia correctly said, when we defend freedom and our lives from Russian bombs and missiles, defend them from terror in Ukraine, we push the war away from the rest of Europe."⁶⁹

⁶⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/96095>

⁶⁸ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/30128>

⁶⁹ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/05/13/7402088/>

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to May 7, 2023. 10,179 Russian vs. 3,264 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	1814	193	9.40:1	—
Medium Duty Tanks	123	302	0.40:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	838	266	3.15:1	↓
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2317	530	4.37:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	309	253	1.22:1	—
MRAPs	43	55	0.78:1	↓
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	190	290	0.65:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	239	12	19.92:1	—
Engineering Vehicles	302	50	6.04:1	—
Towed Artillery	201	121	1.66:1	—
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	388	143	2.71:1	↓
MLRS	195	45	4.33:1	↑
SAMs	107	98	1.09:1	—
Mobile Radars	31	58	0.53:1	↓
EW/ECW	36	2	18.00:1	↓
Winged Aircraft	80	66	1.21:1	—
Helicopters	84	29	2.89:1	—
Naval Vessels	12	26	0.46:1	—