

ORDINATIO VOLUME II.I

On Enjoyment

Bl. John Duns Scotus

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"Aid me, Lord, in my inquiry, to as much knowledge as our reason can attain as I examine those things which you have deigned to reveal to us, and that we hold by most firm faith. For you have preached that you are first and last; teach your servant therefore to show by reason that you are sole, true, total being, and first efficient cause of all things and their ultimate end, and above all of those things for which you bear your chief care, namely the intellectual and rational creature. You are blessed for ages of ages. Amen.

-BL. JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

This translation of the Book One of Distinctions 1 of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. It is based on [the first part of] volume two of the critical edition of the text by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Frati Quaracchi.

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. So comments and notice of errors are most welcome.

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FIRST PART

On the Object of Enjoyment

Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end.

1. On the first distinction,¹ where the Master² treats of enjoying and using, I ask first about the object of enjoyment itself, and first whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end.

And that it is not, I argue thus:

First, by the authority of Augustine *On 83 Diverse Questions* q.30: “Invisible goods are what is to be enjoyed,” but there are many invisible goods; therefore the ultimate end is not the only thing that is to be enjoyed.

2. Again, by reason: the capacity of the enjoyer is finite because the idea or nature of the subject is finite; therefore that capacity can be satisfied by something finite. But whatever satisfies the capacity of the enjoyer should be enjoyed; therefore etc.

3. Again, there is something greater than the capacity of the soul, as God, who is sufficient for himself, and something less than the capacity of it, as the body; therefore there is something in the middle, namely what is equal to the capacity of it; that thing is less than God; therefore I have the thing proposed, that not only God or the ultimate end is to be enjoyed.

4. Again, any form at all satisfies the capacity of matter; therefore any object at all satisfies the capacity of a power. The proof of the consequence is that a power relates to the object through a form received in itself; and if one received form satisfies intrinsically, it follows that the object that the power relates to through the form satisfies extrinsically or terminatively. The proof of the antecedent is that if any form were not to satisfy the capacity of the matter, then the matter, while that form is persisting in the

matter, would be naturally inclined to another form, and consequently it would violently be at rest under the first form; for whatever prohibits something from what it has a natural inclination to is violent for it, as is plain about the resting of a heavy body away from the center.

5. Again, the intellect assents more firmly to a truth other than the first truth; therefore, by similarity of reasoning, the will can assent more firmly to a good other than the first good.^a

6. To the contrary:

Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* 1 ch.5 n.5: “The things one should enjoy are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one thing,” therefore etc.

I. To the Question

7. As to this question I will first make a distinction about ordered enjoyment and enjoyment taken generally, second I will speak of the first object of ordered enjoyment, third of the object of enjoyment in general, fourth, how one must understand enjoyment to be about the end – whether about the end truly ultimate, as in the second article, or about the end not truly ultimate, as in the third article.

8. [Article 1] – On the first point I say that enjoyment in general exceeds ordered enjoyment, because whenever some power is not of itself determined to an ordered act, its act in general is more universal than its special ordered act; now the will of itself is not determined to ordered enjoyment, as is plain, because supreme perversity can exist in it, as when things to be enjoyed are used and things to be used are enjoyed, according to Augustine *On 83 Diverse Questions* q.30. Now ordered enjoyment is the sort that is of a nature to be right, namely when it is ordered according to the due circumstances, but enjoyment in general is whether it have

those due circumstances or not.

9. [Article 2] – As to the second [n.7] it seems to be the opinion of Avicenna that ordered enjoyment can be about something other than the ultimate end. The proof is from his statements in *Metaphysics* 9 ch.4 (104vb-105rb), where he wants the higher intelligence to cause through its act of understanding the lower intelligence; and it then seems that the thing produced is perfect when it attains its own productive principle, according to the proposition of Proclus *Theological Education* ch.34 that: “each thing is of a nature to be turned back to that from which it proceeds;” and in such a return there seems to be a complete circle and so perfection; therefore the produced intelligence is perfectly at rest in the producing intelligence.

10. There is argument against this as follows: a power does not rest except where its object is found to exist most perfectly and at its highest; now the object of the enjoying power is being in general, according to Avicenna in *Metaphysics* 1 ch.6 (72rb); therefore the enjoying power does not rest except where the most perfect being is. This is the supreme being.³

11. There is a confirmation by a likeness from matter to form: matter only rests under a form that contains the others, yet something intrinsic does not satisfy as the object does [*supra* n.4].

12. Again, an inferior intelligence seeing a superior intelligence either sees it to be finite, or believes it to be infinite, or sees neither its finitude nor its infinity. If it believes it to be infinite then it is not beatified in it because “nothing more stupid can be asserted than that a soul might be blessed in false opinion,” according to Augustine *City of God* XI ch.4 n.2. But if it sees neither its finitude nor its infinity it does not see it perfectly and so is not blessed. But if it sees it finite, then it can understand that something else can exceed it; now we thus experience in ourselves that we can desire a greater good beyond any finite good at all that is shown to us, or

that we can desire beyond any good another good which is shown to be a greater good, and consequently the will can desire to love that greater good, and so it does not rest in that intelligence.⁴

13. Others⁵ argue against this opinion as follows: the soul is the image of God, therefore it has a capacity for him and can participate him, because according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XIV ch.8 n.11: “the soul is the image of God by the fact it has a capacity for him and can participate him;” but whatever has a capacity for God can be satisfied by nothing less than God; therefore etc.

But this reason does not proceed against the philosophers, because the assumed premise about the image is only something believed and is not known by natural reason; therefore the idea of image which we conceive is only something believed, and is not naturally known by reason, because the idea of image that we conceive is founded on the soul as to God as Triune, and therefore is not naturally known, because neither is the extreme it is related to naturally known to us.

14. Others argue against his opinion [n.9] thus: the soul is created immediately by God, therefore in him it immediately rests and is quietened.

But the antecedent of this reason is only something believed, and it would be denied by them [sc. followers of Avicenna] because he himself [Avicenna] lays down that the soul is immediately created by the last and lowest intelligence. Likewise the consequence is not here valid, nor the like one either made [n.9] on behalf of the opinion of Avicenna: for it is accidental that the idea of first efficient and the idea of end are conjoined in the same thing, not does it give rest as far as it is the first efficient but as far as it is the most perfect object, otherwise our sensitive power, which according to one opinion is created by God, could not perfectly rest save in God; in the matter at hand, then, the same thing is efficient cause and end because in the efficient cause is the fullness of perfection of

the object, and in the idea of efficient cause whereby it is efficient cause is not included the idea of end and of giving rest.

15. Therefore as to this article I hold this conclusion, namely that ordered enjoyment has only the ultimate end for object, because just as assent by the intellect should only be given to the first truth for its own sake, so assent by the will should only be given to the first good for its own sake.

16. [Article 3] – About the third article [n.7] I say that the object of enjoyment in general, as it abstracts from ordered and disordered end, is the ultimate end: either the true end, namely which is from the nature of the thing the ultimate end, or the apparent end, namely the ultimate end which is shown by an erring reason to be ultimate end, or the proposed end, namely which the will of its own freedom wills as ultimate end.

The first two members are sufficiently plain. The proof of the third is that just as to will or not to will is in the power of the will, so the mode of willing is in its power, namely to refer or not to refer;^a therefore it is in its power to will some good for its own sake without referring it to some other good, and thus by proposing the end for itself in that.

17. [Article 4] – About the fourth article [n.7] I say that the idea of end is not the proper idea of the enjoyable object, neither in the case of ordered enjoyment nor in the case of enjoyment taken generally. That it is not so in the case of ordered enjoyment is plain: both because a respect [sc. to another] is not included in the beatific object *per se* as far as it is the beatific object; and because that respect is a respect of reason only, just as is any respect of God to creatures (but a respect of reason cannot be the *per se* object or the idea of the *per se* object of enjoyment); and because if *per impossibile* there were some supreme object to which this will were not ordered as to its end, that object would still quiten it, wherein however there is, by supposition, no idea of the end. In respect

therefore of ordered enjoyment the idea of end is not, in truth, the proper idea of the enjoyable object, but it is a concomitant of the enjoyable object; in disordered enjoyment of an apparent end the idea of end is a concomitant of the enjoyable object (perhaps in apprehension it precedes the enjoyment to be elicited, as the enticing idea of the object, in some other way), but in the case of enjoyment of the prefixed end the idea of end follows the act, because ‘prefixed end’ states either the mode of the act or the mode of the object as such prefixed end actually terminates the act, because the will by willing it for its own sake attributes to it the idea of end.

II. To the Principal Arguments

18. To the first principal argument [n.1] I say that ‘to enjoy’ is taken in an extended sense for a love of the honorable that is distinct from love of the useful or of the pleasant; or ‘things honorable’ [sc. invisible goods] are there spoken of in the plural, not because of a plurality of essences, but because of a plurality of enjoyable perfections in God.

19. To the second [n.2] I say that some finite relation is necessarily to a term or object simply infinite, because what is for an end is, insofar as it is such, finite, even when taken as altogether proximate to the end, namely along with everything that suffices for immediately attaining the ultimate end; and yet the relation of the end, to which it immediately is, is based only on the infinite. And this frequently happens in relations of proportions or of proportionalities, but not of likenesses, because in the former the first extremes are most dissimilar. Thus in the matter at hand I say that between power and object there is a relation not of likeness but of proportion, and therefore a finite capacity can well be finite in nature, just as its nature is finite, and yet be to a term or object simply infinite, as to a correlative.^a

On the contrary, an adequate object satisfies. – I reply: not one

adequate really but in idea of object; such adequacy accords with proportion and correspondence.

20. In the same way to the other argument [n.3] I say that nothing is greater in

idea of object than the object proportioned to the soul; yet there is something greater, that is, something attainable in a greater or better way than can be attained by the soul, but

this 'greater' is not in the object but in the act. I explain this by an example: if some white object be posited with ten grades of visibility, and if a sight be posited that grasps that white thing and another whiteness according to one grade, and if another more perfect sight be posited that grasps them according to ten grades, the second sight will perfectly grasp that white thing as to all grades of its visibility, because it will see that object with as much whiteness as is visible on the part of the object; and yet if there were a third sight, more perfect than the second and more acute, it will see that white thing more perfectly. Hence there will not there be an excess on the part of the visible thing and of the object in itself or of the grades of the object, because it is the same simply and in uniform disposition, but the excess will be on the part of the seers and the acts of seeing.

21. To the fourth [n.4] I say that not just any form satisfies the appetite of matter totally in extent, because there are as many appetites of matter to forms as there are forms that can be received in matter; therefore no one form can satisfy all its appetites, but one form satisfies most perfectly, namely the most perfect form; but that form does not satisfy all the appetites of matter unless in that one form were included all the others. To the matter in hand, then, I say that one object can include all objects in some way, and therefore only that object quietens the power to the extent the power can be quietened.⁶ But things are not altogether alike as to internal and external rest, because anything that is receptive is at rest internally when some finite thing has been received; but externally or terminatively it need not be that it rest in something

finite, because it can be ordered to something more perfect than it can receive formally in itself; because a finite thing can only receive a finite form yet it does very well have an infinite object. – When it is proved that any form brings matter to rest, because otherwise it would be violently at rest under any form whatever [n.4], I say that violent rest never happens except when the thing at rest be determinately inclined to the opposite, as in the example of a heavy object with respect to descent downwards and its being at rest on a beam [n.4]; but prime matter is inclined thus determinately to no form, and therefore it is at rest under any form at all; it is not violently at rest but naturally, because of its indeterminate inclination to any form.

22. To the fifth [n.5] I say that the intellect assents to any truth because of the evidence of the truth itself – the evidence which it is of a nature to produce of itself in the intellect – and therefore it is not in the power of the intellect to assent to a truth more or less firmly but only according to the proportion of the very truth that moves it; but it is in the power of the will to assent more intensely to the good, or not to assent, although less perfectly than when the good is seen, and therefore the consequence does not hold of the true with respect to the intellect as it does of the good with respect to the will.^a

Question 2: Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability

23. Second I ask whether the ultimate end has only one idea of being enjoyable, or whether there is in it some distinction according to which the will could enjoy it according to one idea and not according to another.

And that there is in it such a distinction the proof is:

Because in *Ethics* 1.4.1096a23-27, in the paragraph, “But further, because the ultimate good...” the Philosopher says, and the Commentator [Eustratius *Explanations on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics* 1 ch.6 (17E)], that, just as being and one are in every genus, so also is good, and he speaks there specifically of relation; therefore just as it has its own goodness, so its own enjoyability, and consequently, since there are different relations in God, there will be in him different ideas of being enjoyable.

24. Again, just as one is convertible with being, so also is good; therefore, when they are transferred to divine reality, they are transferred equally. Therefore just as one is an essential and a personal feature there, so also is good and goodness; therefore just as there are three unities in divine reality, so are there three goodnesses, and the intended proposition is as a result obtained.

25. Further, an act does not terminate at an object insofar as the object is numbered unless the object be numbered as it is the formal object; but the act of enjoying terminates at the three persons insofar as they are three; therefore the object of enjoyment is numbered insofar as it is the formal object.

26. Proof of the minor: we believe in God insofar as he is three; therefore we will see God insofar as he is three, because vision

succeeds to faith according to the total perfection of it [*Prologue* n.217]; therefore we will enjoy God insofar as he is three.

27. To the Contrary:

In every essential order there is only one first, therefore in the order of ends there is only one end; but enjoyment is in respect of the end; therefore etc.

28. Again, to the first efficient cause the ultimate end corresponds; but there is only one first efficient cause, and under a single idea; therefore there is only one end. – The reason is confirmed too, because the unity of the efficient cause is so great that one person cannot cause without another causing; therefore similarly the unity of the end is so great that one person will not be able to be end without another person being end, and the intended proposition follows. – This second reason is confirmed by Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15: “The Father,” he says, “and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit as they are one Creator with respect to the creature.”

29. Again, just as there is in God one majesty, so also one goodness; but there is owed to him because of his majesty only one adoration, according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* 1 ch.8, such that it is not possible to adore one person without adoring another;^a therefore it is not possible to enjoy one person without enjoying another.

I. To the Question

30. This question could have a fourfold difficulty according to a fourfold distinction in divine reality, the first of which is the distinction of essence from person, the second the distinction of person from person, the third the distinction of essence from attributes, and the fourth the distinction of essence from ideas. About the third and fourth I will not now speak, because it has not

been shown what sort that distinction is nor whether the things distinguished pertain to enjoyment [cf. 1 d.8 p.1 q.4 nn.1-26; d.35 q.un nn.12-16]. Therefore one must only see now about the first two distinctions.

And as concerns those two distinctions one must first see about the enjoyment of the wayfarer as to its possibility, second one must see about the enjoyment of the comprehender and this when speaking of absolute divine power, third about the enjoyment of the comprehender and this when speaking of the power of the creature, fourth when speaking of the enjoyment of the wayfarer and the comprehender in fact.

A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility

31. About the first I say that it is possible for the wayfarer to enjoy the divine essence without enjoying the person, and this is also possible as to ordered enjoyment. My proof for this is that according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2: “if essence is said relatively it is not essence, because every essence which is said relatively is something after the relative has been removed;” from which he concludes, *ibid.*: “wherefore, if the Father is not something in himself, he is not something which may be said relative to another.” The divine essence, then, is some conceivable object in whose concept relation is not included, therefore it can be thus conceived by the wayfarer; but essence thus conceived has the idea of the supreme good, therefore also the perfect idea of enjoyability; therefore it is possible to enjoy it too in ordered way.

32. A confirmation of this reason is because it can be deduced from purely natural facts that there is one supreme good, and yet from those natural facts we do not conceive God as he is three; therefore about the supreme good thus known it is possible to have some act of will, and not necessarily a non-ordered act; therefore it will have an ordered act of enjoyment about the

essence and not about the person as we conceive person. The converse, however, is not possible, namely that one enjoy the person in an ordered way without enjoying the essence, because the person includes the essence in the idea of itself.

33. Second I say also that the wayfarer can enjoy in an ordered way one person without enjoying another. I prove this, because with respect to the three persons there are three distinct articles of faith; therefore one person can be conceived to whom one article corresponds while another person is not conceived to whom another article corresponds, and then in the former person the idea of the supreme good is conceived; one can therefore enjoy the person thus conceived without enjoying another.

If you say that ‘person’ is relative, therefore it cannot be conceived unless its correlative be conceived, I reply: although the knowledge of a relative require knowledge of its correlative, it is nevertheless not necessary that the knower and enjoyer of one relative know and enjoy the other relative, because it is possible to enjoy God insofar as he is Creator without enjoying the creature that is nevertheless the term of that relation. – Likewise, although the Father is said correlatively to the Son and therefore cannot be understood insofar as he is Father without the Son being understood, yet he is not said relatively to the Holy Spirit insofar as he is Father; therefore it will be possible to conceive the Father as Father and to enjoy him without conceiving and enjoying the Holy Spirit.

B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God

34. About the second article [n. 30] it is asserted that it is not possible, when speaking of the absolute power of God, that anyone who comprehends should enjoy the divine essence without enjoying the person.

The proof of this is first about vision [about enjoyment see nn. 40-41], namely that it is not possible absolutely for any intellect to see the divine essence without seeing the person:

The first proof is as follows, because confused knowledge is imperfect knowledge; the vision of that essence cannot be imperfect; therefore visive knowledge of it cannot be confused. But if it were only knowledge or vision about the essence and not the person, or of the essence and not the person, it would be confused vision, because it would be of something common to the persons and would not be of the persons, which seems unacceptable.

35. The second is as follows: vision is of the existent as it is existent and as it is present to the seer according to its existence; and in this respect vision is distinguished from abstractive understanding, which latter can be of what is not existent or of what is existent not insofar as it is present in itself; and this distinction between intuitive and abstractive understanding is in the intellect as the distinction between the act of vision and the act of imagination is in the sensitive part. There is then an intuitive knowledge of the divine essence different from that which is abstractive knowledge, and the former is vision of the existence of it as it is existent and present according to its existence to the knowing power; but the divine essence only exists in a person; therefore there can only be vision of it in the person.

36. Again, something in which there are many things distinct by the nature of the thing cannot be known by intuitive knowledge unless all those things also be distinctly and perfectly seen. An example: whiteness is not seen distinctly unless all the parts that are at the base of a pyramid be seen, which parts are distinct by the nature of the thing. But the persons are in the essence and are distinct by the nature of the thing; therefore the essence is not distinctly seen unless the persons be seen.

37. From this there is an argument to the intended proposition

[n.34] as concerns the second distinction, namely of the persons between themselves [n.30], because if the essence cannot be seen save in the person – and it is not seen more in one person than in another, because it is seen with equal immediacy to be related to any person whatever – therefore it cannot be seen unless it be seen in any person whatever, and so it is not seen in one person unless it be seen in another.

38. There is also further argument as to the enjoying proposed [n.34], because the will cannot abstract its object more than the intellect can show it; therefore if the intellect cannot distinctly show essence without person or person without person, then neither will the will be able to enjoy them distinctly.

39. And there is confirmation too as follows, because the will cannot have a distinct act on the part of the object unless a distinction either real or in idea is posited on the part of the object; but if the intellect apprehend the essence and person indistinctly, there will not be on the part of the object a distinction either of the thing or of the idea; therefore the will cannot have a distinct act on the part of a distinction in the first object. That there is not a real distinction on the part of the object is plain; that there is not a distinction in idea the proof is because the intellect does not distinctively comprehend, or does not distinctly apprehend, this and that; therefore it does not distinguish this and that.

40. On the part of enjoyment the argument is as follows: enjoyment gives rest to the enjoyer; one person without another does not give rest perfectly to the enjoyment of the enjoyer, nor does the essence without the person, because then the power at rest in it could not be made to be at further rest; nor can it be made to be at rest in anything else, because what is at ultimate rest cannot be made to be at further rest, and consequently that power could not be made to be at rest in another person or to enjoy it, which is false.

41. Again, if it were at rest in this person alone, and it is plain that it can enjoy another, then either the enjoyment of the other person can exist with the enjoyment of this person, or they will be impossible, so that one of them will not exist with the other; if in the first way then two acts of the same species will exist at the same time in the same power, each of which acts is equal to the capacity of the power, which is impossible; if in the second way then neither act will be enjoyment, because neither act will be able to be perpetual.⁷

42. [Scotus' own opinion] – As to this article [n.34] I say that, speaking about the absolute power of God, there seems to be no contradiction in the possibility that, on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will, the act of each be terminated by the essence and not the person, or terminated by one person and not another, to wit that the intellect see the essence and not the person, or see one person and not another, and that the will enjoy the essence and not the person or enjoy one person and not another.

43. Proof for this is as follows:⁸ any act has a first object on which it essentially depends, and it has a second object on which it does not essentially depend but does tend toward it in virtue of the first object; although, therefore, the same act could not remain in the same place unless it have a relation to the first object, yet it can stay the same without a relation to the second object, because it does not depend on the second object. An example: the act of vision of the divine essence and of other things in the divine essence is the same, but the essence is the first object and the seen things are the secondary object; now the seeing could not stay the same unless it were of the same essence, but it could stay the same without the fact of being of the things seen in the essence. Just as God, then, can without contradiction cooperate with that act insofar as it tends to the first object and not insofar as it tends to the second object, and yet it will be the same act, so he can without contradiction cooperate with the seeing of the essence, because the essence

has the idea of the first object, while not cooperating with the same act of seeing or of enjoying insofar as it tends to a person, and, by parity of reasoning, insofar as it tends to one person and not to another.

44. Hereby to the arguments against this way [n.34]. When a statement is first made about confused vision [n.34], I say that the universal in creatures is divided through its singular instances; but this thing, which is 'to be divided', is a mark of imperfection, and so it does not belong to what is common in God, nay the divine essence, which is common to the three persons, is of itself 'this'. So that is why knowledge of some universal abstracted from singulars is confused and imperfect, because the object is confused, being divided in the things which are confusedly conceived in it. But this knowledge of the divine essence is distinct, because its object is what is of itself 'this', and yet there is no need that in the distinctly conceived concept the person be distinctly conceived or known, because the person is not the first term of enjoyment or of vision, as has been said [n.32].

45. To the second, when argument is made about existent essence etc. [n.35], I say that it is necessary that the term of vision be existent as far as it is existent, but it is not necessary that subsistence, that is, incommunicable essence, belong to the idea of the term of vision. But the divine essence is of itself 'this' and actually existent, although it not of its idea include incommunicable subsistence, and therefore it can as 'this' be the term of vision without the persons being seen. An example: a white thing is seen intuitively insofar as it is existent and is present to vision according to its existence; but it is not necessary that the white thing be seen as subsistent or insofar as it has the idea of a supposit, because it does not have the idea of a supposit nor have the supposit in which it exists or is seen. As to the form of the argument, then, it is plain that although vision is only of the existent insofar as it is existent and is existent only in the person, yet the inference does not follow 'therefore it is of the existent insofar as it is in the person', but

what should be inferred is only that it is of what subsists, or of what exists in a subsistent.

46. To the third [n.36] I say that the first proposition is false except when in those things that are distinct by the nature of the thing the first thing seen is distinct, as is clear in your example about the base of a pyramid, for whiteness and a seen white thing are distinguished into the parts in which they are seen, and therefore the white thing is not distinctly seen unless these parts in which the seen white thing is distinguished be distinctly seen. But in the matter at hand, although the divine persons are distinct by the nature of the thing, yet the seen essence is not distinct in them, because it is of itself 'this'; therefore the essence can be distinctly seen without those that subsist in it being seen.

47. As to the further deduction about the will [n.38], although there be no need to reply to it, because the antecedent must be denied, yet a reply can be made because the consequence does not seem to be necessary. When it is said that 'the will does not abstract more than the intellect shows', I say that the intellect can show some first object to the will and show in this first object some *per se* and not first object (and here the whole of that in which the act of the power terminates is called 'first object', and what is included *per se* in the object that first terminates is called '*per se* object'). Now each idea there shown [the idea of first object and of *per se* object] suffices for the will to have its own act with respect to it; for there is no need that the will wills the whole of the first object shown, but it can will the first object shown and not will what is shown in that first object shown. Let the following sort of example be posited: in bishop-hood is shown priesthood; such showing suffices for the will to have an act of willing or of not willing with respect to priesthood, so that it could from such showing have an act of willing with respect to bishop-hood and not with respect to priesthood; and yet there is only one showing, and a showing of one first object, in which first object however is included something as *per se* object. I say that the will does not

abstract the universal from the singular, but there are many willed things shown to the will by understanding, which understanding is of some several things included in the first object, each of which, as thus shown, the will can will.

48. To the confirmation, when it is said that 'the object differs either in reality or in idea' [n.39], I say that it differs in idea. And when the criticism is made that it does not, 'because the intellect does not conceive this distinctly from that' [n.39], I say that for a distinction of reason it is not necessary that the intellect possess them as distinct objects, but it is enough that it conceive them in the first object.

49. To the other point about rest [n.40] I say that the Father rests in his essence as it is in himself; nor does it follow that 'therefore he cannot rest in it as it is in the Son or the Holy Spirit', rather he rests in the essence as communicated to them and does so with the same rest with which he rests in the essence as it is in himself. For that which rests first in some object rests in it as to whatever it is according to that mode; so here, if the blessed first enjoy the essence and then the person, he does not rest with a further rest beyond what he was resting with first but with the same rest, insofar as the object giving rest is the term as it is in any of them, and was not first the term as it is in that one.

50. Hereby to the fifth argument [n.41] I say that there will not be two acts there, because whatever act there is there of enjoyment or of vision, it is of the first object under one formal idea; but that one act can be of all of them or of the object *per se* by virtue of the first object, or it can be only of the first object itself; there will not then be two acts, at the same time or in succession, of the same species.⁹

C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature

51. As to the third article about the power of the creature [n.30]

I say that the intellect cannot by its own natural power see the essence without seeing the person, because, since the intellect is of itself a natural and not a free power, when the object acts the intellect acts as much as it can; therefore if the object on its own part acts by manifesting the three persons to the intellect, it is not in the power of the intellect that it see something shown and something not see.

52. Likewise neither is it in the power of the will to have ordered enjoyment in this way without having enjoyment in that way, because just as it is not in the power of the will not to enjoy in ordered way (for if it were not enjoying when not impeded in this respect, it would be sinning and deserving not to enjoy), so it is not in the power of the will to enjoy something in ordered way and not to enjoy whatever it can enjoy; and therefore it is not in its power, while remaining in ordered state, not to enjoy under any idea under which it can enjoy.¹⁰

53. On the contrary: whatever is not necessarily concomitant to an act is in the power of the will that elicits it; or in this way: whatever things the act of will does not at the same time necessarily regard, the will itself as it elicits the act also does not regard; or in this way: whatever things can be separated as they are the term of the act of will can also be separated in respect of the power as eliciting the act.

D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact

54. As to the article about the fact [n.30] I say that in fact there will be one vision and one enjoyment of the essence in three persons. And this is what Augustine says *On the Trinity* I ch.8 n.17: "Neither can be shown without the other," and he is speaking of the Father and the Son; and the remark is to be understood of ordained power, of which Philip spoke when wanting the Father to be shown to him [*John* 14.8], as if he could in fact have seen the

Son without the Father. And Augustine treats there of the words of Philip and of Christ's response. Augustine also means this in *On the Trinity* XV ch.16 n.26: "Perhaps we will see the whole of our knowledge in one view all at once." And the fact that he says 'perhaps' is not referred to the beatific object but to seeing other things in it.

55. Likewise about the wayfarer I say that in fact necessarily the habitual, though not the actual, ordered enjoyment is of the three persons together; for no wayfarer or comprehender can have ordered enjoyment of one person without enjoying another (that is, unless he habitually enjoy another, namely that he is in proximate disposition to enjoying another), if this person is conceived distinctly from that; and therefore enjoyment of one person does not stand with hatred of another person, because, as the Savior says, *John* 15.23: "he who hates me hates my Father also."

II. To the Arguments

A. To the Principal Arguments

56. To the principal arguments. To the first from the *Ethics* [n.23] I say that good is in one way convertible with being, and that in this way it can be placed in any genus; but good in this sense does not have the idea of enjoyable object, and therefore it is not necessary that the idea of enjoyable object should properly be wherever good taken in this way exists. For the idea of enjoyable object is not the idea of good in general but of perfect good, which is good without any defect, or is so at least in appearance or according to what has been prefixed by the will [n.16], and of such sort a relation is not.

57. To the second [n.24] it is said that things that regard in a uniform way the essence and the person are only the essential features, if those that belong only to a person are precisely the personal features; but things that under one idea regard the person and under another the essence are essential and personal features.

'Good' is related in the first way while 'one' is related in the second, namely 'indivision', which under one proper idea pertains to the essence and under another proper idea pertains to the person.

But on the contrary: the cause of this fact is what the argument [n.24] is looking for; for it argues: since these two things seem to be equally convertible with being and equally transferred to divine reality, therefore each will be equally essential features only, or each will be personal and essential features.^a

58. To the third [n.25] I say that the 'insofar as' can denote only the fact that what follows is taken according to its formal idea or, in another way, it can beyond this denote that it is the formal idea of the inherence of the predicate in the subject. In the second way reduplication is taken most properly, because the reduplicated thing, whether it is taken for the whole of what it itself first is or for something that is included in the understanding of it, taking reduplication formally to be always that for which it is taken, is marked out as being the formal idea of the inherence of the predicate in the subject.

To the matter at hand, then, I say that if this reduplication be taken as to both these ways in the major, the major is true and the minor is false; but if it is taken in the first way and not in the second, the minor is true and the major is false.

And when the proof of the minor is given [n.26], I say that in the first way of taking it we will see the three insofar as they are three, that is, the formal idea of the Trinity will be seen, but the Trinity itself is not the formal idea of seeing or the formal cause of the inherence of the predicate, namely of 'enjoyment' or 'vision', but the unity of the essence is. And when proof is given further through the act of faith [n.26], which is of the three insofar as they are three, or triune insofar as triune, I say that the case is not similar, because the divine essence does not cause in us immediately the act of believing as it will cause in us immediately the act of see-

ing, and this is because of the imperfection of our understanding for the present state, because we understand the distinct persons from creatures and distinct acts. And therefore, as far as concerns our knowledge now, the Trinity can be the formal idea of knowing; but then the Trinity will be precisely known as it is and will not be the formal idea of knowing, because then it will be seen through the idea of the essence in itself precisely as through the idea of the first object.

B. To the Reasons for the Opposite

59. To the reasons for the opposite. To the first [n.27] I say that there is only one ultimate end in itself, yet it has several distinct ideas which are not formally ideas of the ultimate end, and so one can enjoy it under the idea of the ultimate end without enjoying it under those ideas.

60. To the second [n.28] I say that, as was said in the preceding question [n.14], that it is *per accidens* that the idea of efficient cause and the idea of end come together in the same thing, yet in fact one is the formal idea of the end itself just as one is the formal idea of the efficient cause itself, but in that one idea the power can be at rest although it is not at rest in the personal ideas that are in the end.

As to the confirmation when it is said that 'one person cannot cause unless the other cause, therefore one person cannot terminate the act of enjoyment unless the other terminate it' [n.28], I say that the conclusion does not follow; for it does well follow that one person from the nature of the thing is not the end unless another person is the end, but it does not follow about the end of the act as the act is elicited by the power, because the end of the act as elicited is the one to which the power as eliciting orders the act and because of which it elicits the act. But the end from the nature of the thing is the good, to which the act of its own nature is of a nature to be ordered, not indeed in idea of the object which is

attained by the act, but in the way that all created natures are in their degree ordered to the ultimate end.

To the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* [n.28], it is plain that he is speaking there of the fact and of the formal idea of it.

61. To the final point about adoration [n.29] I say that there is one habitual adoration of the three persons, because whoever adores one of them habitually is subjecting himself to the whole Trinity; but this need not be the case actually; for he need not think actually of another person when he adores one of them, as is plain about someone praying to one of the persons by a prayer that is not directed actually to another person, as is plain of the hymn ‘Come, Creator Spirit’, and of many prayers established in the Church. Hence the prayers of the Church are frequently directed to the Father and at the end the Son is brought in as mediator; therefore while someone is actually directing his intention to adoring the Father, he need not then actually think of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, until after he introduces the Son in his adoration and thought, namely as mediator. And just as it is the same adoration in habit but not in act, so it is the same enjoyment in habit although not necessarily the same in act.

NOTES:

¹ Rubric by Scotus: “On the object of enjoyment two questions are asked, on the act of enjoying itself two questions are asked, and on the one who enjoys five questions are asked.”

² Master Peter Lombard, the author of the *Sentences*, around which the *Ordinatio* is organized.

a. [Interpolation] Again, Ambrose [Ambrosiaster *On Galatians* ch. 5, 22] on the verse of *Galatians* 5.22-23: ‘Now the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy,’ etc., says that here he names not ‘works’ but ‘fruits’,

because they are to be desired for their own sake; but what is to be desired for its own sake is the enjoyable; therefore it is fitting to enjoy the virtues; but they are not the ultimate end; therefore etc. And there is a confirmation of the reason, because the good by its essence is the due object of enjoyment; but the virtues are good by their essence.

³ Text cancelled by Scotus: “Again, a power that is inclined to many objects does not rest *per se* in any one object perfectly unless that object include all the *per se* objects as far as they can be most perfectly included in any one object; but the enjoying power is inclined to all being as to its *per se* object; therefore it does not most perfectly rest in any single being unless that being include all other beings as far as these can be included in some single one. But they can be most perfectly included in one infinite being; therefore the power can only rest there in the supreme being.”

⁴ Text cancelled by Scotus: “Again, I reduce his [Avicenna’s] reason [n.9] to the opposite, because the second intelligence only causes a third intelligence – if it be conceded to him that it does cause it – in virtue of the first intelligence; therefore it does not complete it by its own virtue but by another’s. Now what completes something by reason of another does not bring that something to rest, nor does that something rest save in the other thing; therefore etc.”

⁵ Bonaventure, *Sent.* I d.1 a.3 q.1 ad 1.

a. [Interpolation] because within the power of any agent whatever is acting and the mode of acting.

a. [Interpolation] just as any being whatever for an end, however finite it may be, is yet never referred to an ultimate end unless that ultimate end be infinite. Or in another way, and it comes back to the same, one should say that although the appetite of the creature is, in its subject, finite, yet it is not so in its object, because it is for the infinite. – And if an argument is made about adequacy,

namely that an adequate object satisfies, one should say that adequacy is twofold, namely in entity, and this requires a likeness in the nature of the things that are made adequate, and there is no such adequacy between the created power of enjoyment and the enjoyable object; another is adequacy according to proportion and correspondence, which necessarily requires a diversity in the natures that are adequated, and such adequacy does exist between the power of enjoyment and the enjoyable object. An example, about adequacy between matter and form [n.21].

⁶ Text cancelled by Scotus: “as was argued in the second article against Avicenna [n.10: canceled text in footnote 3].”

a. [*Interpolation*] To the sixth [interpolation to n.5] one must say that ‘to desire for its own sake’ is double, either formally, and in this way the virtues of which Ambrose speaks are to be desired, or finally, and in this way only God is. And to the confirmation one should say that being by its essence, or being such by its essence, is in one way distinguished from ‘accidentally’, and in this way any thing is what it is by its essence; in another way existing by its essence is distinguished from that which exists by another, and thus only God exists by his essence; for he is not reduced to any other prior being that might be more perfect than he or be his measure, and thus too only God is good by his essence.

a. [*Interpolation*] as it seems

⁷ Text cancelled by Scotus: “Again, in our soul there is naturally the image of the Trinity; therefore it cannot be made to rest except in the Trinity; therefore it cannot enjoy anything in ordered way except the Triune God.”

⁸ Text cancelled by Scotus: “The Father is first in origin perfectly blessed before he generates the Son, because he gets from the person produced no perfection intrinsic to himself. Blessedness is a perfection intrinsic to the blessed person. But if in the prior stage

the Father be perfectly blessed, then in the prior stage he has the object as perfectly beatifying; but he does not seem in that prior stage to have the essence communicated to the three persons as object, but the essence absolutely, or the essence as it is in one person only; *per se* then it is not of the idea of the essence as it is the beatific object that it beatify insofar as it is communicated to the three persons, and so there seems to be no contradiction, either as to enjoyment or as to vision.

Response: the Father has the essence for object as it is in the three persons, and yet he has it first according to origin, because he has it of himself as an object for himself, and this is to be first in origin; but there is no other priority there according to which his essence, as it exists in one person and not as it exists in another, is an object for himself, just as neither in any prior stage of nature is it an object for one person and not for another, but it is an object only for one person from himself and an object for another person not from himself.

On the contrary: any of the persons whatever understands formally with the intellect as it exists in that person, not as it exists in another person, nor as it exists in all three, from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.7 n.12; therefore in this way it seems that each person understands by perfectly understanding the essence as it exists formally in itself; therefore perfect understanding, which is beatific understanding, does not necessarily of itself require that the essence is understood as it exists in the three persons.

Proof of the consequence: the intelligible thing is required for understanding no less than the intellect is; therefore in one who understands perfectly of himself there is required no less that he have in himself the object as it is formally intelligible than that he have in himself the intellect as that whereby he understands.

The reason is confirmed because if the Father were by the beatific vision to understand the essence as it is in the Son, then he would

as it were receive something from the Son, or from something as it exists in the Son. The consequence is proved by the argument of the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 12.9.1074b28- 35, whereby he proves that God does not understand something other than himself, because then his understanding would be cheapened since it would receive perfection from the intelligible thing; therefore so it is here, nay rather, something that is more unacceptable, the Father would as it were receive perfection simply, as beatific vision, from the three persons as from three objects, or from something as it exists in the three. And then two absurdities seem to follow: first that the Father does not have all perfection from himself, second that the whole and essential perfection simply is not in any way prior to the properties, but some is as it were posterior to the persons themselves, namely that which is from the object as it exists in the three.

Again, if the intellect as it is in something produced were the principle of the Father's beatitude, the Father would not be blessed of himself, Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.7 n.12; therefore if the essence as it exists in something produced be the *per se* object of beatitude, the Father will not be blessed of himself. The proof of the consequence is that the object as object is no less required for beatitude than is the intellect.

Response: it is required as present but not as existent within; the intellect is required as existent within, because by it one formally understands; not so by the object. An example: [the Archangel] Michael is not blessed except by his intellect existing within him; but he is blessed by an object that does not exist within him, and he would be naturally blessed if he naturally had the object present to him although not existent in him; not so about the intellect.

On the contrary: of whatever sort something is of itself, it would be of that sort even if, *per impossibile*, any other thing whatever did not exist.

Again, the Father would receive something from the Son, or from something as it exists in the Son, as from the object of his beatitude; that which exists of itself does not necessarily require for its being anything which is not from itself, and this with a necessity as great as the necessity with which a dependent thing requires what it depends on.

This reason well concludes that the Father has of himself, not only on the part of the intellect but also on the part of the object, the source whereby he is blessed, and consequently that he has of himself the essence as it is what beatifies; not, however, as it exists in the three, because in this way an object present of itself is required just as an intellect of itself is required, so that he might be blessed of himself. Let there be a brief enthymeme: he is blessed of himself; therefore he has of himself the object as it is the beatific object; but he does not of himself have it as it exists in the three for beatific object, because then as it exists in the Son it would *per se* as it were act for the beatitude of the Father.

Response: in comparison with the Father, the essence as essence is the first beatifying object, although it be at the same time necessarily beatified in the three; thus too does it necessarily understand creatures, although it does not expect understanding from them but from the essence which it has of itself; thus the first object can, in comparison with the created intellect, be posited without the second object. The manner of positing it is as follows: etc. [as in the body of the text].

⁹ Text cancelled by Scotus: "To the other point about the image [in footnote 7 above] the response is clear from what has been said [n.13]."

¹⁰ Text cancelled by Scotus: "But about the absolute power of the will there is more doubt. However it can be said there that it is not in the power of the will to enjoy in this way and not to enjoy in

that way, because although some act be in the power of the will for being posited or not being posited, yet it is not in its power that an act posited in being should or should not have the condition that naturally belongs to the act from the idea of the object. An example: although it be in the power of the will to elicit or not to elicit a sinful act, yet if the act posited in being is disordered, it is not in the power of the will that the act so posited be or not be disordered; now the act of enjoyment, as far as depends on the nature of its first object, is of a nature to be of the three persons in the essence, because on the part of the object – barring some miracle – it will of itself be of the three persons; therefore it does not seem to be in the power of the will that an act posited in being should be of the essence as it is or is not in the three persons.

If you say that this reasoning concludes that it is not in the power of God that an act be of the essence and not of the three persons, I say that it does not follow, for the elicited act is in the power of God as to any condition that might naturally belong to it from the object, and yet the act as to that condition is not within created power. An example: it is in the power of God that an act elicited by a sinning will be referred to God because God refers it to himself, yet it is not in the power of the will, once the act has been posited in being, that the will use it for God because the creature is enjoying that act; and it cannot at the same time enjoy the same thing other than God and use it for God. – This example does not, however, seem a good one, because that act of the sinner is referred by one power and not by another. Let the example be dismissed then, and let the reasoning [above] be held onto, because an accident necessarily consequent to a posited act cannot not be in the act while the act persists, and this is subject to the divine will though not to the created will which elicits the act; so let it be said of a condition that the act is of a nature to have in respect of a secondary object necessarily, as far as depends on itself, but not essentially; therefore that the condition not be present is subject to the divine will.”

a. *[No reply by Scotus to this argument is given in the Ordinatio.*

Replies are, however, given in the following interpolations] Therefore there is another response, that it is necessary for the object of enjoyment to be some quidditative good and not a perfection of a supposit, because the perfection of a supposit, as it is distinguished from quidditative perfection, is not the formal idea of acting, nor is it the formal idea of the term of any action; but quidditative perfection is only a perfection abstracted from a supposit, which of itself indifferently states or regards any supposit. And therefore it is necessary that goodness, as it is the term of the act of enjoying, be only a quidditative perfection; but unity can be both a quidditative idea and an idea of the supposit, because it does not of itself state the idea of the principle of an act nor the formal idea of the term of any act. The good, then, is not the term of enjoyment when taken in any way at all but when taken quidditatively, because it is a quidditative perfection, which is an essential feature and not the idea of the supposit. But unity is in one way an essential idea and is in another way the idea of a supposit; in the second way it is not the formal idea nor the formal term of the act of enjoyment.”

[Interpolation in place of this interpolation, starting at ‘to be some quidditative good and not a perfection...’ (from Appendix A)] But relation is not another thing or another goodness than the essence, therefore [the argument] is not valid. Therefore it can in another way be said that in the consequent of the first consequence only one sense can, by the force of the words, be held to, namely that this predicate, which is ‘being another thing than the essence’, is present in the property; and therefore the sense is false, because in this way a false thing, that which is inferred in the second consequence, well follows. And therefore I likewise deny the first consequence, since the two propositions in the antecedent are false and the consequent is false.

To the proof of the consequence I say that ‘the same’ and ‘other’ are not immediate in any predicate as said *per se* of a subject, nay not even contradictories are as it were immediates; for man is not

per se white nor *per se* not-white. However between contradictories said absolutely of anything there is no middle; thus, if a property is a thing, 'it is the same or other' is true because it is the same; but with '*per se*' it is not valid that it is '*per se* the same' or '*per se* other'.

[*Two further interpolations follow on these interpolations (from Appendix A). The first interpolation:*] Therefore I say that being in its first division is divided into quidditative being and into being having quiddity, which is subsistent being. But now whatever is a formal perfection is quidditative being and quidditative entity; for formal perfection is what in any being is better existing than not existing. But nothing is such unless it is a quidditative entity insofar as it abstracts from subsisting. But subsistent being that possesses quiddity is what contracts that perfection, and it is not formally that quidditative perfection. But now things are such that one, which is converted with being, is both quidditative being and subsistent being; and therefore it is both essential and notional. But good – as we are here speaking of it – in the way it states the formal idea of terminating an act of will, is quidditative essence; and therefore it is only an essential. Etc.

[*The Second interpolation*] To the third it can be said that, although necessarily an act of will follow an act of intellect, yet the mode of the will does not necessarily follow the mode of the intellect, because the intellect can make many formations about things that are not in the things, because it can divide what is united and unite what is divided, and thus it can form diverse ideas. But the will is borne to the thing not according to the mode which it has in the intellect but according to the mode of the thing. However, after a preceding showing by the intellect, enjoyment now states an act of will that is terminated in some object, beyond which act it is not appropriate to proceed.

But in the terminating of something there are two things to consider, that which terminates and the idea of terminating, – just as

light does not terminate but is the idea of terminating, while the colored thing terminates. In the same way the idea of terminating in respect of the act of enjoyment is the divine essence as it is a certain absolute form, on which the idea of true and good follow, because from the idea by which it terminates the intellect the idea of the true follows, and from the idea by which it terminates the will the idea of good follows; but that which terminates is the essence existing in the three persons.

Then to the remark 'we enjoy God under one idea' [nn.34, 30]: that idea is the essence; what terminates is the essence existing in the three persons; one person cannot terminate without another – and he is speaking about ordered enjoyment.

Responses to the arguments are plain from what has been said.

The concept of essence is other than the concept of relation. The mode of the will does not follow the mode of the intellect, as has been said. Hence the intellect can form many ideas, and the will does not have to follow. Hence the respect of an idea is a respect of reason, but it is not an object of enjoyment.

That 'God can make a creature see the essence and not the person' [nn.51, 30], the proof is because the vision of the essence and of the person, and of the attributes and of the creatures or the ideas, in the essence, whether they are two acts or one, come freely from God, and both, each, namely *per se*, are the same. Because, once the first has been produced, the other is producible freely and not by any necessity, therefore one is producible without the other. The consequence is plain.

The proof of the antecedent, because it is not repugnant by way of contradiction for the vision of the essence to be created and no vision with respect to the persons or with respect to the creatures in the essence to be created; the proof is because since the essence is an absolute and first and distinct object, different from

creature or relation or person (Augustine, *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2: 'everything that is said relatively is something', etc.), it can, as taken precisely and distinct from all the aforesaid predicated objects, none of which it includes quidditatively as an essential or integral part, be the total object of an act of a created and limited intellect, whether intuitively or abstractly, although not of an uncreated and unlimited intellect (but this is because of the infinity of the intellection, not because of the distinction of that object from others). Thus is it plain because the intellect can distinguish this object from all the others; therefore it can also have an act only about it. Again, the intellect can abstractively understand it taken precisely, and therefore it can likewise do so intuitively. Again if, once the essence is seen, it cannot not see the attributes, then it cannot not see the infinite perfections shining out in it, and so it does comprehend, which is false.

Through this is plain the solution to the argument 'he who sees something white sees all the parts of it' [n.36], because these parts are something of that white object, because they are integral parts, – just as, when seeing a man, perhaps animal that is included in him is seen, but not risibility.

On the contrary: the essence as distinct from the will represents itself to the blessed intellect, therefore it does so naturally; therefore as to the persons and the creatables shining out.

Again, to the same: the same principle has one mode of acting. But the divine essence represents itself naturally to the divine intellect, therefore to whomever it represents itself it naturally represents itself and all the things that are in God.

SECOND PART

On Enjoying in Itself

Question 1: Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will

62. Next in order I ask about enjoying in itself, and first – on the supposition that it is something precisely of the will – I ask whether it is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will, to wit some delight.

That it is delight my proof is:

Because the fruit is the final thing expected from a tree, and ‘enjoying’ is named from ‘fruit’;¹¹ but the ultimate in fruit is not the eating itself but delight, because of which fruit is eaten and for which fruit is sought. So it is similar in spiritual matters, namely that fruit is the final thing expected from the object; but such is delight, because delight too follows act, *Ethics* 10.4.1174b31-33, therefore it is the final thing; therefore etc.

63. Again, *Galatians* 5.22: “The fruits of the Spirit are peace, joy, etc.” All these are passions – and especially joy, which is delight – or they are at least not acts but things consequent to act; but fruit we *per se* enjoy; therefore enjoying is something *per se* consequent to the act, as it seems.^a

64. **On the contrary:**

The will loves God by an elicited act; so either for the sake of something else, and then it uses God and so is perverse, or for its own sake, and then it enjoys him (from the definition of ‘enjoying’ [n.62]), and so enjoying is an act.

I. To the Question

65. In this question one must see first about the concepts themselves and second about the thing signified by the name.

66. As to the first I say that just as there are in the intellect two acts of assenting to some proposition – one by which assent is given to something true for its own sake, as to a principle, another by which assent is given to some true proposition, not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else true, as to a conclusion – so there are in the will two acts of assenting to the good, one by which assent is given to some good for its own sake, another by which assent is given to some good for the sake of something else to which that good is referred, just as assent is given to the conclusion because of the principle, because the conclusion gets its truth from the principle. This likeness can be taken from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6.2.1139a21-22, where is said that “in the mind there is affirmation and negation, but this in appetite is pursuit and flight;” and so, further, just as in the mind there is a double affirmation, because of itself and because of another, so there is in the appetite a double prosecution or adhering, both because of itself and because of another.

67. There is between these, however, a double difference. First, because the two assents of the intellect are distinguished by the nature of their objects; for they are different according to the different evidence of this and that truth, and therefore they have distinct objects corresponding to them and causing them. Here however these assents are not from distinction of objects but from a distinct act of a free power accepting its object in this way or in that, because, as was said before [n.16], it is in its power to act in this way or in that, referring or not referring it [sc. to another]; and so distinct proper objects do not correspond to these acts, but any willable good at all can the will have as object according to this act or according to that.

The second difference is that the two assents of the intellect con-

stitute a sufficient division of the assent of the intellect in general, nor is there any middle between them, because there is on the part of the object no intermediate evidence from which could be received a truth other than the truth of a principle or of a conclusion. But there is in addition to the two assents of the will some intermediate assent, because to the will can be shown some good that is apprehended absolutely, not under the idea of something good for its own sake or good for the sake of something else. Now the will can have an act in respect of such a good thus shown, and not necessarily a disordered act; therefore it can have some act of willing the good absolutely, without relation to something else, or without enjoyment for its own sake; and further, the will can command the intellect to inquire into what sort of good that is and how it should be willed, and then can it thus assent to it, – and the whole idea of the difference on this side and on that is the freedom of the will and natural necessity on the part of the intellect.

68. From this further: an act of an assent to a good for its own sake is a perfect act; but on a perfect act delight follows, from *Ethics* 10.4.1174b14-23; therefore on an act of willing a good for its own sake some delight follows.

We have, therefore, as to the matter in hand four distinct things: an imperfect act of willing a good for the sake of something else, which is called use, and a perfect act of willing the good for its own sake, which is called enjoyment, and a neutral act, and a delight consequent to the act.

69. On the second principal point [n.65], namely to which of these the term ‘enjoying’ belongs, the answer can be collected from the authorities that speak about the word ‘enjoying’ [from Augustine, nn.70-72]; it is plain that it is not a neutral act, nor is an act of use an act of enjoying, but there is only dispute about perfect act and the delight that follows it.

I reply: some authorities seem to say that enjoying is this perfect

act alone, some that it is the delight alone; some that it includes both, and then it does not signify any being that is *per se* one but one by aggregation from two beings, or a being *per accidens*: nor is it unacceptable that one name signify many things, because the *Iliad*, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.4.1030a6-10, is able to signify the whole Trojan War.

70. That it is only the act is seen from the authority of Augustine *83 Questions* q.30: “All perversity, which is named vice, is to use things which are to be enjoyed and to enjoy things which are to be used.” Perversity exists formally in an elicited act of the will, not in delight, since delight is only depraved because the act is depraved, and delight is only in the power of the one delighted because the act is in his power; but sin insofar as it is sin is formally in the power of the sinner. This too Augustine seems manifestly to say *On Christian Doctrine* I ch.4 n.4: “To enjoy is to inhere with love in some thing for its own sake.” This inhering seems to be through the moving power of the inherer, just as in the case of bodies (from which this name ‘inhere’ there is adopted) inhesion is by virtue of the inherer.¹²

71. But that enjoying is only delight seems to be said by the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* I ch.8 n.18: “Full joy is to enjoy the Trinity;” but if the authority is not twisted toward causality or to some other understanding, which the words do not signify, joy is delight formally. Likewise too in the question alleged before from Augustine: “We enjoy the thing from which we take pleasure;” if the phrase is meant as identity or as it were a definition, then ‘to take pleasure’ is to enjoy essentially.

72. But that enjoying may be taken for both things, namely for the act and the delight together, is proved from the definition of ‘to enjoy’ in *On the Trinity* X ch.10 n.13: “We enjoy things known, wherein the will delighted for its own sake rests.” For to the act pertains what is said, that ‘we enjoy the things we know’, because to the act of will the object known is presupposed; but afterwards

there is added ‘wherein the will delighted for its own sake rests’ etc., which, if delight were an accident of enjoyment, should not be placed in the definition of it.

Likewise, if it be posited that both the act and the ensuing delight essentially pertain to beatitude [cf. n.70 footnote], then all the authorities that say to enjoy is the highest reward or is our beatitude say that it includes each of them, both the act and the delight. This minor is stated by the authority of Augustine in *On Christian Doctrine* I ch.22 n.35: “Supreme reward is that we enjoy him himself.”¹³

73. But one should not contend about the signification of the word, because according to Augustine *Retractions* I ch.15 n.4: “when the thing is clear, one should not force the words.” The thing is clear, because the will has a triple act, and a fourth, to wit the ensuing passion [n.68]; and to two of the acts this name in no way belongs [n.69]; some people seem to use the word for either of the other two and for both together, and then it will be equivocal, – or if it is univocal some of the authorities [nn.70-72] must be expounded as speaking causally or concomitantly.

II. To the Principal Arguments

74. To the first argument [n.62] I say that fruit is the final thing that is expected from a tree, not as something to be bodily possessed, but as something to be had by the act of the power that attains it as object; for an apple is not the fruit insofar as it is expected as something to be possessed but insofar as it is expected as something to be tasted and to be attained by the act of tasting, which tasting is followed by delight; if therefore fruit be said to be that which is to be enjoyed, delight is not fruit but that which is to be expected last; but delight will not be the enjoying either if the first thing by which I attain the expected thing as expected is to enjoy it, – which seems probable, since fruit is what is expected under the first idea, under which it is expected as needing to be at-

tained by the power.

75. To the second [n.63] I say that the authority is to the opposite. For since the authority says that ‘acts are not fruits but passions are’, it follows that to enjoy is not to be delighted, because fruit is the object of enjoyment; but a passion cannot be thus the object first of itself as it can be the object of an act; therefore to enjoy, if it is of a passion as of its object, as the authority indicates, will not be a passion but some act, able to have those passions for objects as it were proximate to its first object. – And when it is said that ‘we take joy in fruit *per se*’, this is not to be understood as formal principal idea, in the way ‘it is hot by heat’ is to be understood, but in the idea of object, as if one were to say that ‘we take love in the lovable’; now enjoyment is what, in idea of formal cause, we have joy by. But the authority does not say that something consequent to act is enjoyment but that fruit is, that is, the object of enjoyment.

76. The opinion that love and delight are the same, for four reasons: first, of the same power about the same object there is a single act; second, the same knowledge is followed immediately only by the same thing; third, things whose opposites are the same are themselves also the same; fourth, things that have the same effects and the same consequences are the same. – Love and delight differ in idea as from this to that and conversely; also as union and resting, privation of division and privation of motion.

On the contrary: the definition of love in *Rhetoric* 2.4.1380b35-81a2 and the definition of delight in *Rhetoric* 1.11.1369b33-35 are different.

Response:

On the contrary about sadness in four ways: not to want exists both in God and in the blessed; not to want does not require apprehension of the existence of a thing, or it is about that which neither exists in reality nor is apprehended as existing; most intense not- wanting before the coming to be of the thing; I voluntarily do

not want.

On the contrary about love: delight is *per se* the object of love, as also of the preceding desire, Augustine *On the Trinity* IX ch.12 n.18: “The desire of him who yearns, etc.”

Again, Lucifer is able to love himself supremely, Augustine *On the City of God* XIV ch. 28 and Anselm *On the Fall of the Devil* ch.4.

Again, the more intense the love the less the delight [cf. *Ethics* 3.12.1117b10-11, about the happier and more virtuous man being sadder at death].

Against the first distinction of the idea [n.76, end of first paragraph], different agent; against the second, union is a relation [*ibid.*]. The solution is in *Ethics* 10.2.1174a4-8.^a

Question 2: Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it

77. Second with respect to enjoying I inquire into the mode of eliciting this act, namely whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it.

Argument that it must:

Avicenna in *Metaphysics* 8 ch.7 (101rb): “Delight is the conjunction of agreeable with agreeable;” the end necessarily agrees with the will; therefore from the conjunction of it with the will there is delight, therefore enjoyment.

78. Again, the end moves metaphorically as the efficient cause moves properly [cf. *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b9-11; 12.7.1072a26-27, 1076b3]; but an efficient cause proximate to the passive thing does, when not impeded, of necessity move properly; therefore the end that is proximate, that is, present to the will, does, when not impeded, necessarily move metaphorically.

79. Again, everything changeable presupposes something unchangeable [*Physics* 8.5.256a13-b3]; therefore various and changeable acts of the will presuppose some unchangeable act; such an act is only about the end, therefore that act is necessarily unchangeable.

80. To the Contrary:

Natural necessity does not stand along with liberty. I prove it: because nature and will are active principles possessing an opposite mode of acting as principles [*Physics* 2.5.196b17-22], therefore nature’s mode of acting as a principle does not stand along with

the will's mode of acting as a principle; but the will wills the end freely, therefore it cannot will the end by natural necessity, nor, as a result, in any necessary way.

The assumption, namely that the will wills the end freely, is proved: because it is the same power that wills the end and what is for the end, therefore it has the same mode of acting, because diverse modes of working argue diverse powers; but the will works freely in respect of what is for the end, therefore etc. – Now that there is the same power for both is plain,^a because otherwise there would be no power of a thing for the end willing it for the sake of the end; for the power must be one, having an act about both extremes, as the Philosopher argues about the knowledge of the common sense, *On the Soul* 3.2.426b15-29.

81. Note, this reason [n.80] does not reject all necessity of unchangeableness but only natural necessity; therefore let there be a more general reason proving the opposite, – and then in the first article [n.83] it is set down that it does [sc.act by natural necessity], but Henry sets down that it tends freely to the end, others that it does so naturally: they agree in this common term 'necessary', therefore against them in general are the reasons given here against the opinion in the first article [below, nn.91-133], but against the mode 'naturally' in particular there is this reason [n.80], as well as Augustine in *Handbook on the Faith* ch.105 n.28 (Lombard, *Sentences* 2 d.25 chs.3-4; here see 1 d.10 q. un. n.10).

I. To the Question

82. This question can be understood either about the end obscurely apprehended in general, as we conceive beatitude in general, or about it obscurely apprehended in particular, as we conceive beatitude in the Triune God; or about the end clearly seen in one who has his will supernaturally elevated, as in the case of one who has a perfect will by supernatural habit, or fourth about the end clearly seen in one who does not have a supernatural habit in

his will, and this on the position that God would, of his absolute will, show himself to an intellect without giving any supernatural habit to the will.

A. The Opinion of Others

83. [Article 1] – About these four articles [n.82] it is said first, as to the first, that the will of necessity enjoys the ultimate end thus apprehended obscurely and in general. There is a triple proof:

First by the remark at *Physics* 2.9.200a15-16: "As the principle is in speculative things, so the end is in doable things;" but the intellect of necessity assents to the first speculative principles; therefore the will of necessity assents to the ultimate end in things doable.

84. There is a second proof for the same thing, because the will necessarily wills that by participation in which it wills whatever it wills; but by participation in the ultimate end does it will whatever it wills; therefore etc. – The proof of the minor is because it wills nothing else except insofar as it is a certain good; but every other good seems to be a certain participation in the ultimate end, which is the supreme good, as seems to be proved by Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.3 n.4: "Take away this good and that good," etc., "and see the good itself if you can, the good of every good."

85. Third, the same thing is proved in this way: the will cannot not will something unless in it there is some defect of good or some idea of evil; in the ultimate end apprehended in general there is not any defect of good or any idea of evil; therefore etc.^a

86. [Article 2] – As to the second article [n.82] it is said that, when the end is thus obscurely apprehended in particular, the will is able not to enjoy it; which can be proved because it can enjoy something which it knows to be impossible with such end, as is clear of someone sinning mortally.

87. [Article 3] – As to the third article [n.82] it is said that the will

necessarily enjoys the end thus seen because of the third reason to the first article [n.85], since no idea of evil is found in it, no defect too of good discovered in it, – and this if it see the end with practical vision, whatever may be true of speculative vision; and added here is that the connection, or the necessity of the connection, is so great that God by his absolute power cannot separate practical vision of him from enjoyment.

88. [Article 4] – As to the fourth article [n.82] it is said that it is impossible for a will not elevated by charity to enjoy the end even when seen, because acting presupposes being; therefore supernatural acting presupposes supernatural being; but a will of this sort does not have supernatural being, therefore it cannot have a supernatural act.

89. Again, it would then be possible for such a will to be blessed. The consequent is false, because then charity would not be necessary for beatitude of the will. The consequence is proved as follows, because to enjoy the end when seen in particular seems to be beatitude, or to include beatitude formally.

90. An argument is also given in another way thus: when vision is posited, enjoyment is necessarily posited, when it is not posited, enjoyment is taken away; therefore vision is the total cause of enjoyment; therefore it is simply nobler. Proof of the first consequence: otherwise is taken away all knowledge what the cause is whose ‘through’, the sine qua non, anything at all will act on itself. Proof of the second consequence, because a total equivocal cause is more perfect.

B. Attack on the Opinion of Others

91. [Against article 1] – Against the first article I argue. First as follows: Augustine in *Retractions* 1 ch.9 n.3 and ch.22 n.4 says that “nothing is so in the power of the will as is the will itself,” which is not understood save as to the elicited act.

92. From this, two conclusions: first, therefore the act of the will is more in the power of the will than any other act; second, therefore that act is in the power of the will not only mediately but immediately.

From the first conclusion further as follows: the act of the intellect about the end is in the power of the will; therefore the act of the will is too.

From the second conclusion there comes further as follows: therefore if an act of the will is in the power of the will by the mediation of an act of some other power, much more is it immediately in the power of the will; but to will or not to will the end by the mediation of an act of the intellect is in the power of the will; therefore this is immediately in the power of the will. The minor is plain, because it is in the power of the will to turn the intellect away from consideration of the end, which when done, the will will not will the end, because it cannot have an act about something unknown.

Response: it is supremely in its power because it is immediately in its freedom; everything else is in its power by the mediation of some volition, even what is not free but is not in possibility of contradiction.

93. There is a confirmation of this reason, namely the first against the opinion [nn.91-92], and it can be the second reason, because what, when not impeded, is compelled to act, of necessity removes, if it can, what prohibits its action; therefore if the will when not impeded is necessitated of its nature to will the ultimate end, it necessarily removes, if it can do so, everything prohibiting the volition; but what prohibits this volition is non-consideration of the end, and this the will can remove by making the intellect stand in consideration of the end; therefore the will of necessity will make the intellect stand in consideration of the end. – The major of this argument is plain, because that which of itself is necessitated to act will never be prohibited except by something re-

pugnant to it that overcomes its active virtue, as is apparent about a heavy object; for a heavy object is prevented from falling because of something repugnant to it that overcomes its [downward] inclination, and, by parity of reasoning, the heavy object removes, if it can, what is prohibiting it, and once that thing is removed it descends unimpeded, because the heavy object removes what is repugnant to its effect as necessarily as it brings about the effect which that thing is repugnant to.¹⁴

94. If objection be made to this reason [n.93] by saying that the will does not simply necessarily enjoy the end but with a conditioned necessity, namely that the end be shown to it, and if the major be said to be true of something acting simply necessarily, I reply: this is not a solution, because things that can be impeded do not act simply necessarily but only with conditioned necessity, namely if they not be impeded, and in these cases the major is true; therefore what is taken in the major is not ‘whatever necessarily acts necessarily removes, if it can, what prevents it’ but: ‘whatever is not impeded necessarily acts’, etc. [n.93], where a specification is made in the major about conditioned necessity.

95. If it be objected in another way that the major [n.93] is true of those things that have a like necessity with respect to what is principally intended and with respect to things that are necessary for that of which there are agents merely natural, which agents throughout the whole process up to the ultimate thing intended act merely of natural necessity – but the will in another way regards the end in which all goodness exists, and for that reason necessarily, and regards otherwise any other being in which there is a defect of good, and therefore regards anything else contingently – on the contrary: it is impossible for an extreme to regard another extreme with any necessity and not to regard with as much necessity any middle necessarily required between those extremes, otherwise a necessary thing would depend necessarily on a non-necessary thing; therefore the will tends to the end with the necessity with which it necessarily tends to the showing of the end,

without which it is impossible for it to tend to the end.¹⁵

96. If, thirdly, an objection be made to the minor [n.93], that non-consideration does not properly prohibit the will from enjoying, it can be argued otherwise as follows: whatever necessarily rests in something present to itself, necessarily holds it present to itself if it has it and can; the will for you necessarily rests in the end presented; therefore it necessarily holds it once presented so that it might always be present to itself. – The major is proved by induction: if a heavy object necessarily rests at the center, it necessarily makes itself present to the center if it can, and the center present to it, and necessarily holds onto that presence as much as it can. The thing is apparent in sensitive appetite: if it necessarily rests in a present delightful thing, it necessarily as much as it can keeps the sense in that sensible object so that the object might be present to it to delight it. – The major is also proved by reason because¹⁶ the fact that something necessarily rests in something present is on account of the perfect agreement of the latter to the former; on account of the same agreement it seems equally necessarily to desire it to be conjoined to itself as much as possible; but this conjunction takes place in the presence of the latter to the former.¹⁷

97. A response is made in another way to the major of the first reason [n.93], that it is true of what is said properly to be impeded, namely that it is prohibited from acting because of something else that overcomes its active virtue; it is not so here, but there is something else acting whose action is previous to the action of the will, and therefore the cessation of this something else is by extension said to prevent the will from willing, and about such the major is false. For although an agent that presupposes to its own action the action of another could move that other to act and, with that other acting first, would itself necessarily act by conditioned or concomitant necessity, yet it does not necessarily move that other to act first, because it does not simply necessarily act, just as that which is said properly to be impeded would simply necessarily act as much as depends on itself, but it only acts with

conditioned necessity, namely once the previous action is in place; an example is about a power acting contingently, and yet once the act that generates the habit is in place, it acts with the necessity of concomitance.¹⁸

98. On the contrary: the necessity of acting only comes through something intrinsic to the active principle; the previous action is not something intrinsic to the active principle; therefore, with that circumscribed, there is a necessity of acting, and so absolute necessity. – And then as before: if there is a simple necessity for acting, then there is for doing that without which it cannot act, provided however this is in its power; but here it is; therefore etc.

Confirmation: here the necessity is not of action to action, because one action is not the active idea with respect to another; therefore the necessity is on account of the inclination of the power to the action; therefore the power is also necessarily inclined to the required intermediates, because there is no necessary connection between the extremes unless there is also a necessary connection of all the intermediates required for the connection of the extremes.

99. Response to these and to the principal argument [n.93]: here the necessity is conditioned, namely on the presupposition of something else; and I concede that the necessity is through what is intrinsic to the principal agent and that it is for the intermediates as of extremes among themselves, but the whole is conditioned, namely with the showing of the object presupposed.

On the contrary: an agent that can be impeded does not act simply necessarily but conditionally, ‘if it is not impeded’ [n.94], but yet it necessarily removes the impediment if it can; therefore so here. Nor is the first response valid about what is properly impeded, ‘the will is not properly impeded by non-understanding’ [n.97].¹⁹

100. [Again, propositions against article 1] g.^a Whatever^b power operates necessarily about the most perfect object, and not about

something else, necessarily continues its operation as much as it can [n.133].

101. n. Whatever power necessarily rests-operates about an object present to it, necessarily moves toward it when absent as much as it can; agreement is the common cause [n.96].

102. t. If a power principally necessarily acts-operates about an object present to it, in that power is the idea, as much as depends on itself, of always necessarily about it, either whenever it can or if it can [n.96].

103. m. If there is a necessity simply, or as much as depends on itself, of extreme to extreme, there will be a similar necessity of it to any simply necessary intermediate between them [n.95].

104. a. Whatever when not impeded necessarily acts, necessarily takes away the impediment if it can [n.93].

105. b. Whatever necessarily acts when a preceding action is in place, necessarily makes determination for that preceding action if it can [nn.97, 98].

106. c. A principal agent that necessarily acts whatever is placed in a secondary agent, is necessitated by an active principal principle [n.98].

107. d. Whatever necessarily acts about an object present to it, necessarily determines that it be present if it can [n.96].

108. e. Whatever appetite necessarily tends to a known object, necessarily determines itself to knowledge of it if it can [n.96].

109. f. Whatever appetite necessarily tends to the sole supremely most perfect object when apprehended, necessarily determines itself to apprehension of the object if it can [n.96].

110. g. Whatever power necessarily operates about the sole most

perfect object, necessarily continues its operation as much as it can [n.100].

111. Note,^a g [nn.100, 110] appears to be truer among these: first because there seems generally to be the same reason for necessarily acting or operating as for necessarily continuing – if simply, simply, if when it can, when it can; next because of t above [n.102]; next because we see this by sense and understanding in sensitive appetite; next it seems most true in the will, because the will does not cease of itself to act about any object except by turning itself to some other object, either one more perfect or more agreeable, or one to which it is more determined or inclined, which object prevents it operating about this [other] object at the same time; but the end is the most perfect, most agreeable object: to it alone is the will necessitated, to it is it most inclined and in it does it most delight; the volition of it stands with the volition of anything else.

112. From the proof of g. there follows f. [n.109], at any rate if one understands in the predicate ‘to apprehension of it’ that being already posited it needs to be continued. If it be taken that ‘to apprehension of it’ must be posited if it has not been posited, in this way it does not follow from g. but is proved by the reason given above a, “on the contrary: it is impossible for an extreme to regard...” [n.95]; but there is a necessity that the appetite tend to the object when it can, because it cannot save in the present; therefore in this way there is a necessity with respect to any intermediate when the proximate power is able. – Not so now e. [n.108]; it is more universal, because it does not specify the object as ‘most perfect’ nor as ‘only’ [n.109]; it is proved however as f. is, but above here, e—e. [n.96], it is not proved first except about a posited apprehension. To be set down are k. [n.96] and q. [footnote to n.96]; they are as it were a single proof. – d. [n.107] and b. [n.105] are very universal, hence let them be proved: a. [n.104] is sufficiently dealt with [nn.93-95, 97-99], and is improper; what is proper returns in

b.; but b. and d. are proved from c. [n.106], along with the major ‘on the contrary: it is impossible for one extreme...’ [n.95]; the deduction is made here under ‘Confirmation for the reason...’ [footnote to n.93]. – Therefore g. stands; c. is disputed; k. and q. are probable.

113. Note the following four points as a gloss on the many things posited above [nn.94-112]: g. is well proved [n.111], and is a more evident way to a negative conclusion in the first article of the question [n.82]; g. can also be proved from c. here [n.106], and c is proved hereunder, namely on the appended sheet [n.98, first paragraph], at c c [nn.98-99]. – From m. here [n.103], major, and from c. here [n.106], made major [n.98, first clause], a. follows, b. follows, d. and e. and f. follow, each of which can serve as major for a negative conclusion of the first article. – From n. here [n.101] follows e., which is a more particular major than a. or b. or d. – g. entails that a willing and an understanding already posited are necessarily continued, two other reasons (the first from m. and c., the second from n. [n.112]) entail that what is not posited must necessarily be posited; the second entailment is more unacceptable but it less manifestly follows, the first contrariwise.

114. To the first way g. [nn.100, 110, 111], for the negative conclusion to the first article [n.82], which is about necessarily continuing the willing as much as the will can:

Let the conclusion be conceded, nor does the will ever stop unless the intellect first at least in nature stop considering the end, etc.

115. And if it be argued that the will necessarily will continue that understanding as much as it can, by commanding it [n.93], – response: it does not follow, because the will does not necessarily will the understanding as it does will the end [n.95].

116. It is argued in another way: at least the will would never turn away from this understanding, because the will, when necessarily continuing dependently, does not by commanding destroy that on which it depends.

Response: while the consideration of the end stands, and as a result the willing of it, something else is offered confusedly, the consideration of which is commanded by the will, and thus indirectly the will turns the intellect from consideration of the end; and for the 'now' for which it is averted the consideration first in nature ceases and next in nature the volition itself.

117. Against the first response [n.115]: the necessity that is of extreme to extreme is the same as to any necessary intermediate [n.103].

But here there is the reply on the preceding page above [n.95] that there is not the like relationship to any intermediate as there is to the end, and then it might be conceded that I can will this and not will that without which I cannot will this [n.95].

118. Against the other response [n.116]: the fourth proof of g. [n.111], because no other object is more perfect nor to which it is equally, or more necessarily, inclined as it is to this; a more perfect and necessary volition of what is both more perfect and more agreeable more impedes a volition when less such than conversely.

119. Again, a superior power inclines an inferior in a concordant way; therefore where it is more superior it more inclines.

120. Again, if an object is necessarily willed, then the willing of it is more determinately to be willed than any other willing; so also the understanding of it more than any other understanding. The proof of both consequences is because the will wills to will on account of the object, and to understand on account of the willing.

121. Again, we experience that the will impels us to the understanding of the object to which the will is more prone.

122. Therefore it is conceded that it never turns [us] away from it [n.116] but only an occurrent phantasm does, which is not in the

power of the will, Augustine *On Free Choice of the Will* 3 ch.25 n.74.

Here against the second response [n.116], also against the first [n.115]; it always continues as much as it can, but it cannot continue when another phantasm occurs whose movement is not subject to it.

Confirmation: the separated intellect will always persist in consideration of the ultimate end and in the volition of it, although sometimes of something else; they do indeed stand well together [n.111].

123. On the contrary: we experience that the will as freely turns the understanding from consideration of the end to a different object as it does in the case of other objects.

124. Again, the intellect would, as much as depends on itself, always persist in consideration of the end, because the end is the maximally moving object; therefore if it sometimes cease, this will be by command of the will.

125. Response: if the end were the object that moves in itself or even in its proper species, it is true that it would maximally move. But now, according to some, it moves only in something else that is more of a nature to move toward itself in itself than to that. Or, for you, many phantasms together move it to the concept of a description of it as taken from common notions; therefore less than to other objects, for two reasons: first, because it is difficult to persist in consideration of a transcendent universal [*Ord.* 1 d.3 p.1 q.3 n.26], for a phantasm moves rather to the most specific species [*Ord.* 1 d.3 p.3 q.1 n.9], Augustine *On the Trinity* 8 ch.2 n.3: "When you begin to think what truth is, at once phantasms will present themselves to you;" second, because it is more difficult to use the many common notions at the same time for a description than to use individual ones separately.

126. Against this response: at any rate the separated intellect al-

ways considers these common notions at the same time; likewise, according to Henry [of Ghent] it has a proper concept of God.

127. Again, to the principal, for a negative conclusion of the first article [n.82]:

The damned apprehend the ultimate end. If they necessarily will it, then they do so by the love or willing of friendship or of concupiscence. Not in the first way, for that enjoyment is supremely right; nor in the second way, because they apprehend it as impossible for them.

128. Again, if loving the end is necessarily elicited once practical understanding is in place, and yet there is there the supreme idea of right and merit by congruity: because every other act of the will is acceptable and laudable only by virtue of it, then there would stand with any merit whatever the fact that the will would necessarily follow practical understanding, – against Anselm *On the Virginal Conception* ch.4.

129. Again, in something necessitated to acting of itself or whenever it can act [n.102], there cannot be a habit; for thus there could be a habit in a stone, which is not simply necessitated to fall but as much as depends on itself [nn.93, and footnote]. Therefore in the will with respect to the end there can be no habit. There is a confirmation about acquired habit: because it is only generated by act, but then when the will acts it has a necessity to act in *sensu diviso*.

The conclusion is conceded about acquired habit. – But this agrees with the Philosopher, that wisdom is the supreme habit [*Ethics* 6.7.1141a16-20, *Metaphysics* 1.2.983a6-7].

A proof that neither can there be a supernatural habit with respect to it, because it is not capable of another habit with respect to an act to which it is necessitated.

Response: it is not necessitated to love now of the end in

particular, nor of it when seen in the fatherland unless it be elevated. – The first is rejected as below against the second article [nn.134-135], the second as below against the third article [nn.136-140].

130. Against the reason [n.129] there is an objection, because it rejects a habit in the intellect. – It is conceded that the intellect as inclining has no habit but not the intellect as displaying.^a

131. Again, *a priori*, every single power, as it has one first object, so also one mode with respect to the first object; therefore it has the same mode with respect to anything whatever in which its first object is *per se* included.

Response: it has some one mode which is *per se*, but the ensuing modes can vary, which modes belong to the power in its acting from the idea of special objects; of this sort are ‘necessarily’ and ‘contingently’. – But the *per se* mode is ‘freely’ as this is contradistinguished from ‘naturally’; ‘freely’ however does not entail ‘contingently’.^a

132. Again, *a priori*, whatever any will wills necessarily if shown to it, this it simply necessarily wills; the thing is clear about the will of God, where infinity is as simply the idea of necessity as if the object be shown.

133. Again,²⁰ a power free by participation does not tend more to a perfect object than to any object; therefore neither a power free by essence; but there is no difference between the end that is willed and other things that are willed except on the part of the perfection of the object. The antecedent is plain, because sight, which is a free power by participation, namely insofar as its act is subject to the command of the will, does not more necessarily see a very beautiful thing than a less beautiful thing; therefore it is turned away from each equally and each it sees equally contingently.

The response is that the major is true of the cognitive power but

is not true of the appetitive power tending to the object apprehended by its cognitive power; for more necessarily does a very beautiful thing seen delight the seeing appetite than a less beautiful one does, and if the appetite could carry itself to that seen thing by an elicited act, it would more necessarily carry itself or be carried to a more beautiful thing seen than to a less beautiful one.

134. [Against article 2] – Against the second article [n.86].^a It seems that the reasons of the first article destroy the second article, because the reasoning that in the ultimate end there is not any defect of good nor any malice [n.85], seems to be conclusive with equal efficacy about the ultimate end apprehended in particular, or with more efficacy, because in the ultimate end in particular there is apprehended the whole idea of the end in general, nay it is also shown that in it alone can the perfection of the end in general exist, and thus no defect of good nor any malice either.

135. Likewise the second reason for the first member about participation [n.83] concludes more about the end apprehended in particular, for created goods, if they be good by participation, are more truly goods by participation in the ultimate end in particular than by participation in it in general; for they do not participate in it in general save because they participate in it in particular, since the participator has participated for the cause or measure on which it essentially depends, and the dependence of a real being is only on a real being, and so on some singular.

136. [Against article 3] – Against the third article [n.87]. When an elicitive principle does not elicit necessarily, what has that principle does not necessarily act; nor does an elicitive principle, while being disposed in the same way, elicit necessarily now what before it was eliciting contingently, therefore neither will what has that principle necessarily act. But a will having the same charity that it has now was before eliciting contingently the act of enjoying, therefore it does not now necessarily elicit that act, since no change has been made on its part. This is plain in the rapture of

Paul. If before he had a charity equal with that which he had during the rapture, there was no change on the part of his will nor on the part of the elicitive principle; therefore there was no necessity then for eliciting it more than before.^a At any rate there could have been an equal charity during the rapture and prior to it.

137. Or let the reason be formed in this way: the necessity of acting can only be through something intrinsic to the active principle; but, by the fact that the intellect now sees the object, there is nothing new intrinsic to the active principle in enjoyment; therefore not a new necessity of acting either. – Proof of the major: otherwise the necessity of acting would not be through the idea of the active principle, and so it would be by nothing or by something extrinsic; and if by something extrinsic, the acting would be through that, because the acting is through that through which is the necessity of acting. – The minor is plain: if vision in accord with this does not have the idea of active principle with respect to enjoyment, neither does the intellect nor anything in the intellect; also if vision in some other way has some idea of active principle, though not of the principal one but of the secondary one, then let the major be taken determined thus: ‘the necessity of acting is only through something intrinsic to the principal active principle’; for a secondary principle does not give necessity to a principal one, just as neither does it determine it to acting, but conversely the principal agent of itself uses the secondary one in its own way, so that if nothing in the principal one exclude contingency, the whole action will be contingent. The minor is thus plain, because through enjoyment nothing is intrinsic to the principal active principle; therefore etc.

138. Again, either the end moves to this act or the power does. If the end, it is plain there is no necessity, because the end moves necessarily to no created act. If the will moves,²¹ then I argue: the diverse proximity of the passive thing to the agent does not cause necessity but only a more intense action, as is plain of the hot with respect to heatable things that are more and less proximate; but

the diverse presence of a known object, to wit seen and not seen, seems only to be as it were the diverse proximity to the will of what the act of will should be about; therefore this does not diversify necessity and non-necessity, but only makes the act more or less intense.^a

139. Again, what it says in this article, that it is altogether impossible for an act of vision to be without enjoyment [n.87], does not seem true, because any absolute distinct natures at all are so disposed that a prior nature can essentially exist without a later without contradiction; those acts 'vision' and 'enjoyment' are two absolute natures; therefore without contradiction can vision, which is naturally prior, exist without the later, namely enjoyment.

140. A response is that the major is true of those absolutes neither of which depends on the other nor both on a third; but in the proposed case both depend on a third, as on the causing and moving object.

On the contrary: if they do not depend on a third necessarily causing both, nor necessarily causing one though it cause the other, the major will still be true, because the prior will without contradiction be able to exist without the later.^a But they do not depend on a third necessarily causing them both simply, it is clear, nor necessarily causing the later if it cause the prior, because any absolute thing^b that is able non-necessarily to cause immediately is able non-necessarily to cause through an intermediate cause that is also caused, because that intermediate caused cause does not necessitate it to causing the absolute effect of the intermediate cause; therefore if it not necessarily cause a later absolute, it does not necessarily cause it even when the prior cause is in place, if in any respect it be cause.

141. [Against article 4] – Against the fourth article [n.88] the argument goes: that by which someone can simply act is the power;

therefore if the will is not able from its natural properties to have an act about a seen end but it can when it has charity, charity is either simply a power of volition about that object or a part of the power of volition, each of which is false.

142. Again, if a willable object less sufficiently proximate or made present to the will can sufficiently terminate an act of will, much more so if the same object is more perfectly proximate or made present to the will; therefore if some good obscurely apprehended can be willed by a will not elevated by a supernatural habit, much more so can the same object clearly seen be willed in some act by such a will. I therefore concede the conclusions of these reasons [nn.141-142].

C. Scotus' Own Opinion

143. As for the first article [n.82] I say that just as the will does not enjoy necessarily the things that are for the end, so not an end either apprehended obscurely or in general.

144. As to the second article [n.82] I concede along with the first opinion [n.86] that the will does not necessarily enjoy an end obscurely seen and in particular; nor as to the conclusion is there nor should there be an argument against it, but that the reasons put in the first article do conclude against the second article if they are valid [nn.134-135], which however I do not reckon to conclude simply. But how will someone who relies on them in the first article solve them in the second? Nay also the reasoning of them in the second article [n.86] seems to contradict the first article [n.83].

145. As to the third article [n.82] I say that an elevated will does not necessarily enjoy, as concerns its own part, the end thus seen.

146. As for the fourth [n.82] I say that a will not supernaturally elevated can enjoy the end.

D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

147. To the arguments for the opinion [nn.83-90]. To the first [n.83] I say that the likeness would entail many false things, because it would entail that just as we assent necessarily to the conclusions because of the principles, so we would assent necessarily to the things for the end because of the end, which is false. Therefore I say that the likeness holds as to two things, namely as to the order of these things and of those by comparing them among themselves, and as to the order of those by comparing them to powers that tend toward them in ordered fashion; I understand it thus, that as there is an order between those true things in themselves, so also between these good things, and just as those true things are in ordered fashion thus known, so also would these good things be thus in ordered fashion to be willed. But there is no likeness as to the order of necessity in one and in the other, comparing them to powers absolutely. For it is not necessary that the will keep the sort of order in its own acts that willable things are of a nature to have from their nature; nor is the assent alike on this side and on that, because necessity is in the intellect because of the evidence of the object necessarily causing assent in the intellect: but no goodness of the object necessarily causes assent of the will, but the will freely assents to any good at all, and so it freely assents to a greater good as it does to a lesser.

148. To the second, when the argument is about participation [n.84], I say that the major is false because the will wills nothing necessarily; and therefore it need not be that it necessarily will that thing by reason of which it wills everything else, if there were anything such. The minor is false also because by virtue of and participation in the ultimate end it wills whatever it wills, because 'by participation in or by virtue of something the will wills things' can be understood in two ways: either by virtue of or participation in it as efficient cause or as what contains it virtually, or by virtue of it as the first object because of which as willed it wills other

things. If it be understood in the first way, the minor assumed with the major is not to the purpose, because that by virtue of which as efficient cause something is willed need not be willed, just as that which is the efficient cause of something seen need not be seen; for it need not be that I first see God with my bodily eye if I see a color, which is a certain participation of God as efficient cause. If it be understood in the second way, namely about participation of it as first willed object, then the minor is false; for it is not by virtue of God willed that I will whatever is willed, because then every act of the will would be actual using, by referring it to the first willed object.^a

149. To the third [n.85] it is said in one way that, although there be no defect there of any good nor any malice and therefore perhaps the will would not be able not to will it, because the object of an act of not willing is the bad or the defective, yet it is able not to will that perfect good, because it is in the power of the will not only to will thus and so, but also to will and not to will, because its freedom is for acting or not acting. For if it can by commanding move other powers to act, not only thus and so but also to determinately acting and not acting, it does not seem that there be less freedom of it in respect of itself as to determination of act.^{a 22} And this seems capable of being shown through Augustine *Retractions* 1 ch.9 n.3 and ch.22 n.4, where he is of opinion that "nothing is so in the power of the will as is the will itself," which is not understood save as to the elicited act [n.91].

150. It could, however, be said that the will itself, through some elicited willing, commands or prohibits the action of an inferior power. But it cannot thus suspend all willing, because then it would at the same time will nothing and will something. But however it may be about the suspension of all willing, the will can at least suspend every act about this object through some elicited willing, and in this way do I refuse now to elicit anything about this object until it be more distinctly shown to me. And this refusing to will is a certain elicited act, a sort of reflecting back on will-

ing the object, not an object that is present or was present, but one that could be present; which, although it is not shown in itself, is however shown in its cause, namely in the object shown, which is of a nature to be, in some genus of principle, the principle of the act.

151. It is in another way said to the third preceding reason [nn.149, 85] that it has not been proved that the will could not refuse to will a good in which there is found no idea of evil or of defect of good, just as it has not been proved that it could not will that in which is found no idea of good, and this either in reality or in apprehension before that thing is the term of the act of willing. About this perhaps there will be discussion elsewhere [2 d.6 q.2 n.13, d.43 q. un; 4 Suppl. d.49 p.2 q.2 nn.4-10].

152. To the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* [n.84], that everyone wants to be blessed, therefore everyone necessarily wills the ultimate end in where there is beatitude, I say that he does not mean actual volition. For his intention is that the mimic actor, of whom he is speaking, would have spoken the truth about what everyone coming together wanted had he said to them all: "You all want to be blessed." But not everyone who was then coming together to the spectacle had then actually the appetite for beatitude, because they did not all have actual thought about it. So he is speaking of habitual or aptitudinal volition, namely that whereby the will itself is ready for immediately inclining to an act of willing beatitude if beatitude be actually offered by the intellect.

153. Likewise, the authority is not to the purpose. Because if it is certain that everyone wills beatitude, this is not in an act of friendship, by willing the beatific good be well for him, but in an act of concupiscence, by willing the good for himself as a sufficient good, because it is not certain that disordered wills have ordered delight of the first good in itself, but all wills, whether ordered or disordered, have the concupiscence of willing, or the will of concupiscence, for what is good for them. But an act of con-

cupiscence cannot be an act of enjoyment, because everyone who desires with concupiscence desires for someone else what he loves with the love of friendship, and so the act of concupiscence is not an act of enjoyment but only the act of friendship is. Therefore, although Augustine is speaking of the act of willing beatitude, not however of an act of friendship but of an act of concupiscence, and thus not of enjoyment, and so it is not to the purpose.

154. To the argument for their fourth article, when they argue about doing and being [n.88], I say that the act would not be supernatural but natural, because the will can naturally elicit some act about an object in whatever way it is shown by the intellect; and because the act does not exceed the faculty of the power, so neither does the object as it is the term of the act of that power.

155. When it is said, second, that then such a will could be blessed [n.89], I say no, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII ch.5 n.8: "The blessed have whatever they want and want nothing evil." This definition must be understood in this way, that the blessed person is he who has whatever he can will in an ordered way, not merely whatever he now actually wills; for then some wayfarer could be blessed for the time when he is thinking about only one thing that he has in an ordered way. But the will can wish in an ordered way to have charity, because it can will not only to have the substance of the act of enjoying, but it can will to have an enjoyment accepted by God; if therefore it does not have it, it does not have whatever it can will in ordered way. Also, the way charity is required, not only for gratification of act but for some grade of perfection intrinsic to the act, will be discussed later [1 d.17 p.1 qq.1-2].

II. To the Principal Arguments

156. To the principal arguments. To the first [n.77] I say that a thing is agreeable aptitudinally or agreeable actually. Agreeable aptitudinally is what agrees with someone of itself and as much as

depends on the nature of the thing, and such agrees actually with everyone who does not have it in his power that something actually agree or disagree with him; and therefore whatever agrees with someone naturally or aptitudinally, with his natural appetite or his sensitive appetite, agrees with him also actually. But it is in the power of the will that something actually agree or not agree with it; for nothing actually agrees with it save what actually pleases. For this reason I deny the minor, when it is said that ‘the end necessarily agrees with the will’; for this is not true of actual agreement but of aptitudinal agreement.

Or in another way: if aptitudinal agreement alone suffice for delight, yet not for enjoyment; rather it becomes actually agreeable in enjoyment, whether it agree aptitudinally or not. If the first thing supposed in this response is true, one must deny the consequence ‘delight, therefore enjoyment’.

To the second [n.78] I say that there is a different mode of acting in the action; ‘properly’ and ‘metaphorically’ destroy the likeness as far as necessity is concerned. 157. Or in another way: just as something properly acting necessarily moves something else contingently, thus something metaphorically acting necessarily moves something contingently. For the end which necessarily moves the efficient cause, to wit the natural agent, moves necessarily metaphorically, because it is necessarily loved or naturally desired; but the end which moves the efficient cause contingently, moves contingently metaphorically. And here the efficient cause causes contingently and the end moves contingently metaphorically.

158. To the third [n.79] I say that that immovable does not have to be some elicited act. For several different and movable heatings do not presuppose some one immovable heating, but they presuppose a first act, namely heat, which is a sufficient principle for eliciting all those various acts. So here, the volitions do not presuppose some one immovable volition, because then the will

willing something for the end would always be under two acts, or at any rate under one act that is referring this to that, but they presuppose a first act, to wit the will, which is a sufficient reason for eliciting the various volitions.

NOTES:

a. [Interpolation] Thirdly, Augustine *On the Trinity* X ch.10 n.13: ‘We enjoy things known, in which the very will in itself rests delighted’. So delight either is the same as enjoyment, and the point in question is gained, or it is something consequent and posterior (as a certain property), and thus the definition given of enjoying [n.62] is not acceptable, because the posterior is not put in the definition of the prior nor a property in the definition of the subject [n.72].

¹¹ The Latin word for enjoyment is ‘frui’ and for fruit ‘fructus’.

¹² Text cancelled by Scotus: “Likewise ‘inhesion in something for its own sake’ does not seem to be through delight, because the efficient cause of delight seems to be the delightful object and not the end, and thus the one who delights does not tend to the object for its own sake. But this reason does not entail the conclusion – for it proceeds as if the object could not be the efficient cause and end of delight – and it has to be solved by him who holds that delight is of the essence of beatitude, see 4 Suppl. d.49 p.1 q.7 nn.2-7.”

¹³ Text cancelled by Scotus: “But that it be the more proper signification of the word is difficult to prove, yet it can in some way be conjectured from the use of the word: for this word ‘to enjoy’ is construed with the ablative case signifying the object in transitive sense, which sort of construal is appropriated to verbs signifying act, but it is not construed with an object in the ablative case in causal sense, which sort of construal is due to passions signified by verbs that are passive first; for one does not say ‘I am joyed by

God' as one says 'I am delighted by God' or 'God delights me', but I am said 'to enjoy God' transitively in the way I am said 'to love God', and this seems to be the more proper signification of the word." Scotus is here commenting on a peculiarity of Latin grammar, that the phrase 'I enjoy God' has a verb in passive voice (a deponent verb) and an object in indirect or causal case ('fruor Deo'), but in meaning it is active and the object is direct, as in 'I love God' ('amo Deum').

a. *Interpolation 1 (from Appendix A)* Now some say that love and delight are the same really but differ in idea.

The first point is proved in four ways. Firstly, because in the case of one power about the same object there is one act. The proof, because the distinction of an act is only by the power or the object. – Secondly thus: on something the same there follows immediately only something the same; but, once the object is possessed, love and delight immediately follow. – Again: things whose opposites are the same are also themselves the same; but hatred and sadness are the same. It is plain, because each imports a certain inquietude. – Fourth thus: for they have the same effects and the same consequences. It is plain, because each has to perfect an operation of the intellect.

The second is shown thus, because love is asserted according as it is from the power to the object, but delight conversely. Also, delight imports rest, which is the privation of motion; but love states union, which is the privation of division. Now these two privations differ only in idea.

But to the contrary. Firstly, because the opposites of these are not the same. Proof, because hatred is a certain not-willing, but not-willing does not require an existing object, while sadness does. – Secondly, because the most intense not-willing precedes the event of the thing, but from the event of such thing sadness arises. – Thirdly, because delight is *per se* the object of enjoyment, but

love is not. – Fourthly, because a bad angel can love himself supremely. It is plain from Augustine *On the City of God* XIV ch.28: "Two loves" etc. – Fifthly, because in *Ethics* 10 [no such reference is found, though there is something close in *Eudemian Ethics* 7.2.1237b35ff.] it is said that one loves old friends more, but finds more delight in new ones. – Again, the definition of love and of delight differ. It is plain from *Rhetoric* 2.4.1380b35-81a2. – Again, where sometimes the love is more intense, there the delight is less. It is plain in the devoted.

To the first of these: the major is false. – To the second: the minor is false. – To the third: it has been shown that the minor is false. – To the fourth I say that they do not perfect in the same way, but delight is as it were an accidental perfection of it, as beauty in youth, from *Ethics* 10.4.1174b31-33, but love is as it were a commanded act or an act joining the parent with the offspring.

Interpolation 2 Note the reasons that the same John [Duns Scotus], in d.1 q.3 in the Parisian *Lectura* [*Rep.* IA d.1 p.2 q.2], gives against this conclusion, that enjoyment or love and delight are the same really.

The first reason is founded on this that hatred and sadness, which are the opposites of love and delight, are really distinct.

His proof for this is that to hate something is to not-want it; now not-wanting and being sad are not the same thing, because the act of not-wanting does not require an object apprehended under the idea of existing that makes one sad, according to Augustine *On the City of God* XIV ch.6.

He also proves the same because it happens that the will changes from not being sad to being said while the not-wanting remains equal, because a thing intensely not wanted can precede the happening of the thing not wanted. Therefore, when the not wanted thing is posited in being, the not-wanting will not be more intense

and it is then necessarily sad but before not.

Third, because the will freely elicits the act of not-wanting as of wanting, but it is not voluntarily saddened; therefore not-wanting is not being saddened. A confirmation is because when the will reflects on an act voluntarily elicited it has pleasure in itself, and so a will willing itself freely not to want has pleasure in itself; but a will that reflects on being sad does not have pleasure in itself but is displeased; therefore etc.

The second reason: in God there is properly found the act of not wanting, but not the act of being sad. The assumption is plain, because just as God is by his willing the cause of things that come to be, so by his not willing he is a cause preventative of bad things.

The third reason: delight can be the *per se* object of some love of which love cannot be the *per se* object. The proof of this is because the will can love to be delighted in the delightful thing when that delightful thing is absent, and of this love delight is the *per se* object, but love is not, because then the will would reflect back on its own act; but it is not necessary that the will reflect back on its own act when it desires to be conjoined to its delightful object, or when it desires to be delighted in the delightful object when it will be present; therefore when by an act of love it loves the delightful thing or to be delighted, it is not necessary that it reflect back, therefore delight can be the object of a love of which there is not love.

Again, a bad angel can love himself supremely, and yet does not have delight. The thing is plain in Augustine *On the City of God* *ibid.* ch.28.

Again, a more intense love is compatible with a weaker delight, as in the case of the devoted.

a. [Interpolation] because the act of using is *per se* one act, therefor

it is *per se* of one power, respecting *per se* each extreme.

a. [Interpolation] Again, Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII ch.3 n.6, says that a certain mimic actor said that he knew about the many people present in a certain theatre what they all wanted, meaning to understand this of happiness; but not all those people would want happiness or their ultimate end if they contingently wanted it; therefore they necessarily wanted it.

¹⁴ Text cancelled by Scotus: “Confirmation for the reason [n.93]: wherever there is a necessary connection of the extremes [sc. the terms], there is also a necessary connection of the intermediates necessarily required for the union of the extremes, otherwise the necessary would depend on the contingent; but if the will necessarily enjoys an end shown to it, there will be a necessary connection of the terms among themselves and by the nature of those very extremes, therefore also of all the intermediates; but the one intermediate necessarily required for the union of those extremes is understanding of the end, therefore etc. Proof of the minor: if there is a necessary connection of the will to the end, it is as of the principal agent to the object about which it is acting; but necessity for acting cannot exist in the principal agent save through that by which it formally acts; but the will acts of its very self, therefore in itself will this necessity to the object exist. Therefore the first minor is plain. – The minor of the prosyllogism is proved in this way: a principal agent acts as a principal by nothing necessary save by what it principally acts, otherwise it would act by the necessity by which it is impossible for it to act; and it does not act principally save by that which is its formal idea of acting.

This confirmation seems to exclude a certain response that might be given to the principal reason, about necessity simply and conditioned necessity; for it proves that if the will also necessarily enjoys the end shown to it, that it does this on account of the proper reasons of these extremes, which reasons have of themselves a necessary connection; therefore the will does not depend on any-

thing other than the extremes, and so it is absolute, although there will be a necessary connection of the extremes between themselves, and therefore of all the intermediates in their order.

Response: the first minor is false unless it is understood of conditioned necessity, that is that, once understanding is presupposed, the necessity of enjoying which follows – which is a necessity in a certain respect, because it depends on the showing of the thing – that necessity, I say, is from the nature of the extremes; which is to say briefly: there is a necessary connection of the extremes if the showing precedes. But the minor is proved of absolute necessity by the nature of the extremes, therefore, in order to prove this, I reply to the minor and say that in a principal agent acting simply necessarily there is nothing by which it necessarily acts, and there is nothing required either for its acting necessarily, save only that by which it principally acts, because in a simply necessary agent the whole idea of its necessity is in it by that by which it is an agent. But in something principally acting necessarily in a certain respect or conditionally the reason of its acting is not a sufficient reason for its acting necessarily but something else is required on which that necessity depends, because it is not from the idea of the agent alone. The second minor is therefore denied, because the conditioned necessity in something's acting is not through that alone by which it principally acts but through that along with the presupposition of something else. – To the proof of the second minor I say that in that 'act necessarily' two things are included, and with respect to 'act' there exists one 'by which', namely the formal reason of acting in the principal agent; with respect to 'necessity' there does not exist that reason alone but along with it the presupposition of something else. To the form [sc. of the argument], therefore, I say that one should not concede that there is something by which it necessarily acts, but that for that necessity there is required both that by which it acts and something else by which it does not act. But because in the proposed case that on which the necessity depends is the same as that on which the action also depends, and that by which it acts is that by which it acts with some

mode of acting (either necessarily therefore or contingently), so in order to prove the second minor one can say in another way that that by which it is active is not that by which it itself acts except on the presupposition of something else, but when the other thing is presupposed then there exists that by which it necessarily acts. [The preceding paragraphs of this cancelled text are marked by Scotus with the letters: c—c.]

On the contrary: in the first instant of nature there is the preceding action, in the second the principal action. I ask how the principal acts in the second instant. If contingently, we have the intended proposition; if necessarily, then since it acts precisely through its proper form, both because it is acting principally and because what precedes is in no way its reason of acting, it follows that the form is then the idea of necessarily acting; but this is only from the determination of the form to the object and to action on the object; therefore the extremes have of their nature a necessary connection, and so with the necessary intermediates. – Again, nothing makes for doing that which is placed under a condition, therefore neither for necessarily acting; therefore if there is necessity from this condition, it will also equally be necessity simply.

Response to the first [objection on the contrary]: it acts in the second 'now' of nature necessarily, that is necessarily in a certain respect, because as second, namely as presupposing something else.

On the contrary: that which, when it acts, necessarily acts, simply necessarily acts, because 'necessarily' and 'contingently' determine action for the time when the cause acts; for the generator necessarily generates, although on the presupposition of alteration, as much as is from its active form. And then further: so it is determined simply necessarily, as much as in its form, to every necessary intermediate; it tends to this necessarily when it can, therefore it tends to every intermediate necessarily as much as or when it can.

Perhaps it is not in proximate potency save to operating about the thing known. – On the contrary: therefore it necessarily wills the understanding of the end if the end is presented to it as an understood object.

¹⁵ The text here from n.94 to n.95 is marked by Scotus with the letters: a—a

¹⁶ Scotus places as a superscript here the letter k. See n.112.

¹⁷ This paragraph 96 is marked by Scotus with the mark e—e. This text cancelled by Scotus follows: “It is proved in another way, because what necessarily rests in a thing when present, necessarily as far as depends on itself moves toward it when absent, at any rate it is apt to do so, although it may be impeded by something; therefore just as it would by that necessity be actually moved if it were not impeded, so if it is a superior mover it moves anything inferior to itself whereby it can take away the impediments; such a movable inferior to the will is in the present case an intellect movable to the consideration of the end” [this cancelled text is marked by Scotus with the letter: q].

¹⁸ This paragraph, n.97, is marked by Scotus with the letters: b—b.

¹⁹ The preceding paragraphs, nn.98-99, are marked by Scotus with the letters: c—c.

a. [Note by Duns Scotus, for the text from here to n.110] And they are against the first article of the opinion [n.83].

b. [*Interpolation in place of nn.100-114*] Again against the first article [n.83] there is first the following argument: whatever power necessarily operates about the most perfect object presented to it and not about anything else, necessarily continues its operation about the same object as much as it can [n.100]; but the will neces-

sarily operates about the ultimate end, which is the most perfect object, therefore it necessarily continues its operation as much as it can; the contrary of which we experience, because the will turns the intellect away from consideration of the ultimate end just as it turns it away from the consideration of other things. – There is proof of the major, and first in this way: the reason for necessarily operating is the same as for necessarily continuing the operation, if simply, simply, if when it can, when it can. Secondly, because if the power principally necessarily operates about the object when present, there is in the power itself an idea of always necessarily acting about it as far as depends on itself, or whenever it can if it can. Thirdly, because we see this in the sensitive appetite, and in the sense and the intellect. But it seems to be particularly true in the will, because the will does not cease to act of itself about any object save by converting itself away to some other object, whether a more agreeable or a more perfect one, or one to which it is more determined or inclined, which prevents it operating at the same time about the first object; but the end is the most perfect and the most agreeable object; to it alone is it necessitated, to it is it most inclined, in it does it most rest, and in it is it most pleased; the willing of it stands along with the willing of any other thing.

Again, any appetite that necessarily tends to the supremely most perfect apprehended object alone, necessarily determines itself, if it can, to continuing the apprehension posited of it. The virtue of this argument depends immediately on the preceding reason. But will necessarily tends to the apprehended end that is the most perfect object, therefore etc.

Again, whatever necessarily acts when some previous action is in place, necessarily determines itself to that previous action if it can [n.105]; but once the previous action of the intellect about the ultimate end is in place, the will necessarily tends to the ultimate end; therefore it necessarily determines itself to the action of the intellect as to the apprehension of it. The virtue of this reason is because necessity for an intermediate thing is the same as neces-

sity for the extreme.

Again, whatever acts necessarily about a present object necessarily determines itself to the presence of it if it can [n.107].

Again, any appetite that necessarily tends to a known object, necessarily determines itself to the knowledge of it if it can [n.108].

To what is adduced against the first article, when it is said 'whatever power necessarily etc.' [at the beginning of this note], because the reason [which is about necessarily etc., as at n.114 below].

[*Interpolation to the interpolation for nn.100-110, from Appendix A*]

a. Anything that, when not impeded, necessarily acts, necessarily takes away the impediment if it can.

b. Whatever necessarily acts when some previous action is in place, necessarily determines itself to that previous action if it can.

c. A principal agent that, when everything is in place in a secondary agent, necessarily acts, is necessitated by the principal active principle.

d. Whatever necessarily acts about an object when present necessarily determines itself, if it can, to the presence of it.

e. If a power principally necessarily operates about an object when present, there is in the power the idea, as far as depends on itself, of always necessarily acting on the object, or whenever it can if it can.

f. Whatever appetite necessarily tends toward the object when it is known, necessarily determines itself to the knowledge of it if it can.

g. Whatever power necessarily tends toward the sole supreme and most perfect object when apprehended, necessarily determines itself to the apprehension of it if it can.

h. Whatever power operates about an object present to it that is most perfect, necessarily continues the action as much as it can.

i. Whatever power necessarily operates-rests in about an object when present, is necessarily moved, as far as depends on itself, toward that object when it is absent; agreement is the common cause.

k. If there is a necessity, simply or as far as depends on itself, of an extreme to an extreme, there will be a like necessity in it to any simply necessary intermediate between them.

a. [*Interpolation, from Appendix A*] From c, when the major is given, a follows, and b and d and f follow, each of which can be a major for the negative conclusion of the first article. – From i follows e. – g implies that the willing and understanding already in place are continued; the first from k, the second from i imply that things not posited necessarily must be posited.

h appears truer among these, because universally there seems to be the same reason for necessarily acting or operating and necessarily continuing, if simply simply, if when it can, when it can. – g is plain because we see this in sensitive appetite, in sense and in intellect. Yet it seems most true in the will, because the will does not cease of itself to act about any object save by turning itself to some other thing, whether to a thing more agreeable or more perfect or to which it is more determined or inclined, which prevents it operating about something else at the same time; but the end is the most perfect and most agreeable object; to it alone is the will necessitated, to it is it most inclined, in it does it most rest and in it is it most delighted; volition of the end stands with volition of

whatever else.

a. [Interpolation] if the reason is valid, no habit will be posited in the intellect. – I say that neither should an inclining habit be posited, but a displaying habit is very well required, which habit cannot be posited in the will but only the inclining one; therefore the reason is good about the will, not about the intellect. I hold therefore that the will is able not to will the end in whatever way it is apprehended, obscurely or clearly, whether universally or in particular.

a. [Interpolation] On the contrary: ‘naturally’ and ‘contingently’ do not imply ‘freely’ in the way inferiors imply their superior; therefore they are not special modes contained under the first mode, which is ‘freely’. – It is said that they are so as compared with the will, although simply speaking they are disposed ‘necessarily’ and ‘freely’ as things exceeding and things exceeded.

a. [Interpolation] which I concede to be true, but

²⁰ Text cancelled by Scotus: “Again, against the first article [n.83], everything acting necessarily acts of necessity according to the ultimate of its power, because just as action is not in its power, so neither its mode of acting, namely to act intensely or not intensely; therefore the will of necessity wills the end always most intensely and as much as it can, the opposite of which we experience. – The conclusion is conceded when the apprehension is equal and there is nothing pulling it back.”

a. [Interpolation] nor consequently for acting.

²¹ Text cancelled by Scotus: “and it does not have a difference on the part of the object except that of greater or lesser proximity.”

a. [Interpolation, from Appendix A, which however is virtually word for word the same as the previous paragraph starting at “the diverse

proximity of the passive thing..” to the end.]

a. [Interpolation] or the argument goes like this: whatever is essentially prior to another can be made to be by that agent by which neither are both produced necessarily nor necessarily the later if the prior is.

b. [Note by Duns Scotus] Note, ‘absolute’ excludes this instance: ‘God is able not to cause a white thing, and thus not to cause a similar thing, therefore he can cause a white thing and a white thing without causing a similar thing’; and this instance: ‘he is able not to cause a body, therefore he is able to cause a body without shape’, if shape only mean the many respects of lines bounding a surface or of surfaces bounding a body as health means many proportions.

a. [Interpolation] When you prove ‘they are good by participation’, I say that there is equivocation over the term participation, namely effectively, and thus it is true, or formally, and thus it is not true.

a. [Interpolation] Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII ch.3 n.6, everyone wants to be happy; therefore everyone necessarily wants the ultimate end wherein is beatitude.

²² Text cancelled by Scotus: “Against this response I prove that if the will is able not to will, it can refuse to will, because if it cannot refuse to will, this is because it necessarily has in itself something to which that refusing is opposed. But that can only be actual willing; the proof is because no habitual or aptitudinal inclination to willing is repugnant to the very refusing. Even if it be granted that it is a not-refusing to will, this does not avoid the problem, because a negation agrees necessarily to nothing positive save on account of some positing necessarily agreeing with that positive thing on which the negation follows; and then that positing in the proposed case cannot be any habitual or aptitudinal inclination, because not-refusing does not follow on it, just as neither is refusing opposed to it, because the positive necessarily agreeing with

the will, on account of which refusing is repugnant to it, will be actual willing. If therefore it cannot refuse to will, it necessarily wills. – And this reason generally shows that to nothing susceptible of contraries and of intermediates, if they have intermediates, is any form of that genus repugnant, or that it is impossible for a form to be present in it, unless some form of that genus is necessarily present in the same thing, or something else is, to which that which cannot be present in it is virtually repugnant. Such a positive that is virtually repugnant to a very refusing cannot be found in the proposed case.

Response: the thing repugnant to the refusing is the will, because the will only has a capacity for possible willing and refusing to will; but to refuse to will the end includes a contradiction, because that is not a possible object of this act. An example: to see a sound includes a contradiction by reason of the act and the object, therefore it is repugnant to sight and sight to it, and it determines for itself not to see this, because sight is of sight. So here. Nor is it unacceptable to deny that the end can be an object of hatred and beatitude of flight, but neither can misery be an object of concupiscence, because according to Augustine in *Handbook of the Faith* ch.105 n.28: “nor can we will to be wretched” [Lombard, *Sentences* II d.25 ch.3-4; Scotus I d.10 q. un n.10] [n.81].”

THIRD PART [BK. 1, D.1]

On the Enjoyer

Question 1: Whether enjoying belongs to God

159. Lastly in regard to this first distinction I ask about the enjoyer, namely to whom as subject enjoyment belongs, and first whether enjoying belong to God.

It seems not:

Because enjoyment is with respect to the end; but God does not have an end; therefore enjoying does not belong to God.

160. On the contrary:

God loves himself; and he does not love himself because of something else, because then he would be using himself; therefore he enjoys himself. The consequence is plain, because if he loves himself, either by using or enjoying.

Question 2: Whether the wayfarer enjoys

161. Second I ask whether the wayfarer enjoys.

It seems that he does not:

Because the wayfarer has only an act of desire in respect of the absent good; but an act of desire is not an act of enjoyment. The proof of this is because desire is an act of concupiscence, but enjoyment is an act of friendship; therefore etc.

162. On the Contrary:

“To enjoy is to adhere by love to something for its own sake,” as Augustine says, and it is contained in the text [Lombard *Sentences* 1 d.1 ch.2, from Augustines’s *On Christian Doctrine* 1 ch.4 n.4]; but the wayfarer thus inheres to God; therefore he can enjoy God.

Question 3: Whether the sinner enjoys

163. Third the question is asked whether the sinner enjoys. And it seems he does not:

Because what does not rely on something immovable does not enjoy nor rest; but the sinner does not rely on any immovable good; the proof, because he relies on a creature, which is movable, for “every creature is subject to vanity” [*Romans* 8.20, *Ecclesiastes* 3.19]; therefore he does not rest nor enjoy.

164. Again, he who wants another for use of his own act does not enjoy him; but the sinner wants God for use of his own act; therefore he does not enjoy him. The major is shown because he who wants another for use of his own act does not value him as the supreme good; therefore he does not enjoy him. The minor is clear because the sinner wants his own act to be; therefore he wants it to be from God, since nothing could exist except from God; therefore he wants God to use him, because God uses everything that is from him.

165. On the Contrary:

Augustine *83 Diverse Questions* q.30: “All perversity, which is named vice, is to use things which are to be enjoyed and to enjoy things which are to be used” [n.70]; therefore it is possible for the sinner to enjoy things he should use.

Question 4: Whether the brutes enjoy

166. Fourth the question is asked whether the brutes enjoy.

And it seems that they do, from Augustine, where as before, *83 Diverse Questions* q.30, he says that: “to enjoy any corporal pleasure the beasts too are not absurdly judged to do.”

167. On the Contrary:

“To enjoy is to adhere by love to something for its own sake” [nn.70, 162]; but the brutes do not have love, because neither do they have will nor do they adhere to anything for its own sake but for their own good; therefore they do not enjoy.

Question 5: Whether all things enjoy

168. Fifth the question is asked whether all things enjoy.

It seems that they do: Because all things desire the good with natural love, *Ethics* 1.1.1094a2-3; and they desire some good not for the sake of something else [*Ethics* 1.4.1096b13-14]; therefore they enjoy.

169. **On the contrary:**

“We enjoy things known” [n72; Augustine *On the Trinity* X ch.10 n.13]; but not all things have cognition; therefore etc.

I. To the Questions Together

170. To solve these questions I put first a certain example, namely how bodies rest in diverse ways [cf. Prol. nn.170-178]. For the ultimate term of rest for heavy bodies is the center. But to this center, as to the ultimate term, a heavy body adheres *per se* and first, to wit earth which does not adhere by the nature of another body from which it participates heaviness and the adhering in question.

171. Now a body adheres to the center immovably and *per se*, but not first, because it adheres by the heaviness and the adhering participated from the earth. However it does adhere *per se*, because it adheres by an intrinsic form and firmly or immovably, because it is as it were intrinsic to the earth, which does rest first, as stones and metals in the bosom of the earth; and such things, although they do not rest first, do yet rest perfectly, because they are perfectly conjoined to the center through the medium of what first rests, to which they are, as it were, perfectly united.

172. In a third way, a body adheres to the center through the

medium of the earth to which it is united, but movably and not firmly, as a heavy object existing on the surface of the earth; and such a thing, although it truly rest for a time, is yet not as determined to rest as a body resting in the second way.

173. In a fourth way, a body can adhere uniformly to a body next to it and rest with respect to it, and not rest with respect to the universe if the body next to it to which it adheres is not uniformly adhering to the center, for example in the case of a man lying in a ship; although it would be in the power of the body to rest itself, that heavy body, which would finally rest in some such movable thing but not in the center, whether mediately or immediately, would be disorderedly at rest, because although, as far as depends on itself, it would be at rest because of its firm adhesion to such a movable body, yet it does not adhere to that to which it should, according to its own nature, adhere in order to be at rest.

174. Applying the example to the matter at hand, the will corresponds in spiritual things to the weight of a body, because “as the body by weight, so the spirit by love is borne wherever it is borne,” according to Augustine *On the City of God* 11 ch.28. The center which of its own nature gives ultimate rest is the ultimate end; hence the wise man says that “God is the intellectual sphere, whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere” [Ps.-Hermes Trismegistus *Book of 24 Philosophers* prop.2] – according to truth. To this center the divine will first and *per se*, because not by participation in anything other than itself, immovably and necessarily adheres,^a for this will, not by habit nor by a different act nor in virtue of any superior cause, most perfectly and necessarily loves the supreme good.

175. In second rank is a blessed created will, which not first, but by participating in God, yet *per se*, because by its own intrinsic form, adheres firmly to this good, and this because it is made to be as it were intrinsic to the will that is first at rest, because it always abides in that will’s good pleasure.

176. In third rank is the will of a just wayfarer, who although he relies on the divine will and, by its mediation, on the supreme good, in which the will itself rests, yet it does not firmly and immovably adhere to the good pleasure of the will; hence now it adheres to the good and now it turns away from the good. – But here there is a certain unlikeness to the third member in the case of bodies [n.172]; because there while the form remains by which the body rests the body is able itself not to be at rest, but here the form, by which it rests, is posited to be destroyed at the same time with aversion of the will from the center.

177. In the fourth rank is the mortal sinner, who although, as far as depends on the act of the will that is resting itself, he adhere vehemently to something other than God, so that neither by its mediation nor immediately is he adhering to God, yet on the part of the object he cannot be simply at rest; nay rather, just as someone at rest with respect to a ship, and not with respect to the center [of the earth], is not simply at rest, because not with respect to what in the universe ultimately brings rest, so the will, which is resting itself, as far as it can, in some object other than God, is not simply at rest, because not at rest with respect to what in the universe makes the will ultimately and most perfectly to rest. The fact is also plain, because the will is there never satisfied, however firmly it immerses itself in it by loving it for its own sake.

178. On the basis of these points I say to the questions posed that to enjoy either means delight or it means the act of adhering to the object for its own sake, to which act the resting of delight is concomitant, or which act is itself the delight or the resting, that is, the act that ultimately terminates the power to the extent that a power terminates itself in its act; so that about the idea of enjoyment, if it means the act, it does not seem to be that it itself makes the power to rest as far as depends on the part of the object, but as far as depends on the part of the power adhering to some object for its own sake: so that the divine will enjoys simply and

necessarily and *per se* and first; but the blessed created will enjoys simply and perpetually and *per se* but not first; the just will of the wayfarer enjoys simply and *per se* but not immovably nor first. The will of the mortal sinner enjoys simply because, as far as depends on the part of the will, it would make itself to rest, and does rest, in the object which it loves for its own sake; but it does not simply rest as far as depends on the part of the object, nor does that object require enjoyment, but because the object does not cause rest as a power by its act makes itself rest in it, therefore is the enjoyment disordered.

179. But in that case there is a doubt as to what object the mortal sinner enjoys, namely whether his act or the object of his act.

I reply: I say that in general he enjoys himself, because he loves the object of his act with the love of concupiscence. Because all love of concupiscence is preceded by love of friendship, and consequently he loves something else with the love of friendship, and that something else is himself, for whom as loved with love of friendship he has concupiscence of that object. He does not then enjoy the object of his act, nor consequently the act itself, on which there is no need for there to be a reflecting back first. This is the opinion of Augustine *On the City of God* 14 ch.28: “Two loves have made two cities: the love of oneself to contempt of God has made the city of the devil, the love of God to contempt of oneself the city of God,” and *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 11 ch.15 n.20. Therefore the first root there is this, that the sinner enjoys himself.

180. To the penultimate question [n.166] it can be said that although the sensitive appetite in some way adheres to something for its own sake, that is, not because of another negatively, because it does not have the feature of referring to another, nor yet contrarily, because the object is not valued as non-referable to another; therefore it is said in an abusive sense to enjoy, because of non-relation, but not properly, because it does not adhere in a non-referring way. Likewise neither does it adhere with love, be-

cause loving does not properly belong to it. Likewise neither does it properly adhere, because it does not apply itself to the object but is as it were fixed by the force of the object, because it does not lead but is led, according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* 2 ch.22. And by following the said simile about the resting of bodies [n.173], it could be said that the sensitive appetite is likened to iron that is as it were fixed by the adamant force of the adamant attracting it, and thus neither mediately nor immediately at rest in the center, nor in anything else, by the force that would give it rest in the center, or by any intrinsic force making it rest in something as if in the center, but only by the force of something extrinsic giving it rest. So here, the force of the object gives it rest, but not the intrinsic force of giving rest in the center or as if in the center, which force is as if freedom alone, which does not belong to the sensitive appetite.

181. To the final question [n.168] the answer is clear from the above. Because, if enjoying proper be denied of sensitive appetite, which however more agrees with the will of which there is enjoyment than natural appetite does, because the act of the sensitive appetite follows an act of knowing, just as the act of will – not so, however, the act of natural appetite, if there is any act of it – it follows that enjoyment proper does not belong to what has only natural appetite, indeed not even as abusively as it agrees with sense appetite.

II. To the Principal Arguments

182. To the arguments. To the argument of the first question [n.159] I say just as was said in the first question of this distinction in the fourth article [n.17], that the idea of end is not the proper idea of the enjoyable, but the idea of the absolute good is to which the idea of end belongs. Although, therefore, God is not the end of himself, yet with respect to his will he is that absolute object to which naturally belongs the idea of end, because he is the supreme

good; but the idea of end cannot belong to him with respect to himself (just as neither is he the end with respect to himself) but with respect to all enjoyable things, of which sort are all the goods that can be ordered to another.

If the objection be raised how God then is said to act for an end, and also that a superior agent has a superior end, I reply: with respect to nothing is there any final cause unless with respect to it there is an efficient cause, because the causality of the final cause is to move the efficient cause to act; God then, not being something that can be effected, has no final cause. But that first common saying [God acts for an end] must be understood to mean that he acts for the end of the effect; but not for the end of himself, because he is not an agent of himself. Likewise the second common saying [a superior agent has a superior end] must be understood of the end of the effect, because a superior agent orders, not himself, but his effect to a more universal end; and so the superior end is the agent's, not as his end, but as that to which he orders what he does.

183. To the argument of the second question [n.161] I say that, besides the act of desire which is with respect to something not possessed, by which the just wayfarer desires God for himself with an act of concupiscence, the just wayfarer has another act of friendship, by wanting well being for God in himself, and this act of friendship is enjoyment, but not the act which is of desire; and this second act is properly the act of charity, but not the first, which is the act of desiring, as will be said in 3 Suppl. d.26 q. un n.17. The major then is false.

184. To the first argument of the third question [n.163] an exposition of the minor can be given, because what adheres to a movable thing does not rest simply, although as far as depends on its own part it makes itself rest in it, and so the conclusion is to be conceded, because the mortal sinner does not simply rest, although as far as depends on his own part, by his own act of

ultimate rest, he rests himself in a movable thing. If it be added that nothing enjoys a thing unless it rest simply in that thing, this must be denied, but one must add: 'unless it be at rest as far as depends on the part of the act itself,' namely the act by which he adheres to the object; and also: 'as far as depends on the part of the object', in ordered enjoyment. Nor ought supreme rest to be understood here, because to all rest on the way there follows the greater rest of the fatherland, but because of an act accepting the object not referable to another.

185. As to the second [n.164], the major can be denied, because although by ordered love no one enjoys anything save what he does not wish anyone to use but to enjoy, yet with disordered love someone can well enjoy what he does not wish another to enjoy but only to use, or to love it in no way, as is evident about inordinate jealousy. – To the proof of the major one can say that although the enjoyer values the enjoyable as the supreme good, yet he does not wish it to be thus valued by everyone when he is enjoying it inordinately; therefore the conclusion does not follow: 'he wishes it to be the supreme good or he loves it as the supreme good, therefore he wishes others thus to love it'.

One can reply in another way by denying the minor. – To the proof, when it is said 'he wishes the enjoyable to be, therefore he wishes it to be from God', the conclusion does not follow. Nor does this follow either: 'he wishes it to be from God, therefore he wishes God to use the act'. And the cause of the defect of each consequence is because he who wills the antecedent need not will the consequent when the consequent is not *per se* included in the antecedent but only follows through an extrinsic topic. So it is in the proposed case.

186. As to the authority of Augustine for the fourth question [n.166], it is clear that his authority is to be expounded of abusive enjoyment, or by extending the term enjoyment, because the sensitive appetite does not refer by understanding negatively, nor

by contrariety, because it does not inhere in the object as something that cannot be referred, because, although the thing cannot be referred by it, this belongs to its natural impotency, not the goodness objectively or in the acceptance of the power. About the difference between these, namely not being referred negatively, by contrariety, and by privation, there will be discussion at 2 d.41 q. un n.3.

187. As to the argument of the final question [n.168], it is plain that although natural appetite inhere to something for its own sake negatively, not however by contrariety for the most part, and if sometimes by contrariety, yet it does not inhere by love; nor does it properly inhere either, but by itself giving the nature it is fixed as it were in the object itself, not indeed by an elicited act other than nature, as is the case with even the sensitive appetite, but by habitual inclination of nature. Hence as was said [n.181], enjoyment belongs less to it than to the sensitive appetite which by an elicited act inheres as to an object now known, though not freely; but natural appetite is perpetually inclined without any cognition.

From what has been said about enjoying, and especially in the third question of this distinction (namely 'whether enjoying be an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will, to wit delight' [nn.62-76]), use can be made plain, which is a more imperfect act of the will ordered to enjoying as to a more perfect act of the same power.

NOTES:

a. [*Interpolation*] Hence the Commentator *Physics* II com.88 says that the disposition of a simply necessary being is that it not exist because of its action but action because of it, and this mode is found in simply eternal things.

BL. JOHN DUNS SCOTUS OFM

Proof