



Malcontent News Russia-Ukraine War SITREP 10/06/23 23:59* PST

Malcontent News is an independent group of journalists and researchers in the United States, Canada, Ukraine, Israel, Georgia, and the United Kingdom. We are part of Badon Hill Group, LLC, and operate independently from all entities.

We are funded through Patreon, grants, and donations and aided by volunteers. For media inquiries, you can contact <u>social@malcontentnews.com</u>. For news tips, you can contact our newsroom at <u>tips@malcontentment.com</u>.

<u>Patreons at the Bronze level or higher</u> can access the annotated Russia-Ukraine War Situation Report (SITREP). Patreons at the Silver level or higher get a monthly Q&A viz Zoom Meeting with our Chief Content Officer or other senior staff.

This update is copyright © 2023 by Badon Hill Group LLC, all rights reserved. No parts of the original content can be reused without express written permission. Authors and Analysts: David H. Obelcz, Adam Irving, Jeff Davis, Katie Livingstone, Oskar Hallgrimsson, Ryan Evans, Michael Hering, and Ana Ras, Spanish Editor in Chief. The executive producer and co-host of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Podcast is Zarina Zabrisky, with her co-host Marina Yevshan.

The reader accepts that the information contained in the Malcontent News Situation Report will not be used for travel, navigation, or personal security assessment. The reader agrees to get realtime information from official channels provided by national, oblast, raion, hromada, city, or local officials and follow their security recommendations.



SUMMARY – DAY 589	3
DAILY ASSESSMENT	3
TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP	6
KHARKIV	7
DONBAS REGION	10
LUHANSK	10
NORTHEAST DONETSK	12
SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK	
ZAPORIZHZHIA	19
BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION .	22
KHERSON	24
WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE	26
NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE	27
RUSSIAN FRONT	
BELARUSIAN FRONT	28
THEATERWIDE	29
RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES	
RUMORS	32



SUMMARY – DAY 589

It has been 3,510 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 225 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

Jump to the Action Report.

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

- 1. We maintain that the soft response by Ukraine's allies after Russian aggression on Ukraine's border will eventually lead to a significant incident that could result in military intervention.
- 2. Our assessment that Russian forces will increase their attacks theaterwide in an attempt to exhaust Ukrainian resources before a resolution on continued United States aid is reached was accurate, with new Russian offensives launched in two areas of operation (AO).
- 3. We maintain the removal of the United States Speaker of the House, Kevin McCarthy, with no indication that a new Speaker will be elected in the short or medium




- term, has put the ongoing Ukrainian offensive at extreme risk. We further assess that the abrupt ending of U.S. military aid will be catastrophic if a resolution is not reached within the next 21 to 28 days.
- 4. The inability of Russian military leaders to stop the ongoing Ukrainian offensive and retake the battlefield initiative has put significant pressure on Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov, who has been in charge of all Russian forces in Ukraine since January 2023.
- 5. We maintain that Russian forces have no plans to withdraw from Tokmak to conserve available combat potential for future offensives or the defense of rear areas of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. This is the last day of this entry.
- 6. Russian Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu remain some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, and waste of military resources, but the Kremlin is showing an increased capacity to adapt on the battlefield.
- 7. Western partners are not meeting their promised military training, heavy equipment, and ammunition delivery dates, and these continued delays are negatively impacting Ukraine's military capabilities.
- 8. We maintain that Russia has started its campaign to destroy Ukraine's energy infrastructure.



9. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.



TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP




About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted <u>like this</u>, it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

Russia-Ukraine War Report Map




KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure





Kupyansk Operational Area

Russian forces have restarted significant combat operations northeast and east of Kupyansk. After setting conditions by targeting bridges and striking Ukrainian troop concentrations with barrel and tubed artillery, significant attacks involving multiple companies and supported by the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) were launched in the direction of Synkivka and Ivanivka. Ukrainian forces held their positions, with Russian troops suffering heavy losses. In our assessment, these are spoiling attacks meant to lock Ukrainian forces in place

¹ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12674

² https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17757




and force the transfer of reserves into the AO. Additionally, Russian forces are likely attempting to force Ukraine to increase the consumption of its ammunition stocks with additional support from Western allies in doubt.



DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, and capture the rest of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents





Svatove Operational Area

Russian forces continued attacks east and northeast of Makiivka and made additional marginal gains. ³ ⁴ The advance through a treeline came at a heavy price, with pictures showing a Russian tank battalion had been rendered combat ineffective, with the loss of an entire Company. ⁵ In an indication that this action is also a spoiling attack, there were no reports of significant fighting near Kreminna or Lysychansk.


³ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12674

⁴ https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17757

⁵ https://t.me/ShrikeNews/10725




NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire Donetsk region

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk, collapse the Russian flanks north of Bakhmut, capture the T-513 Highway south of Bakhmut, liberate the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, advance to the administrative border of Luhansk, and minimize civilian casualties





Klishchiivka Operational Area

South of Bakhmut, fighting continued east of <u>Klishchiivka</u>, where Russian forces tried to regain lost positions.^{6 7} East of <u>Andriivka</u>, Russian forces were trying to hold back a Ukrainian advance, while near <u>Kurdyumivka</u>, Russian forces counterattacked to the north.^{8 9} There were no significant changes to the line of conflict.

⁶ https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17757

⁷ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12674

⁸ https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17757

⁹ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12674




SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive until the winter and maximize casualties

Ukrainian Objective: Find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses, lock Russian troops in place, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics






Marinka Operational Area

Southeast of <u>Krasnohorivka</u>, Russian forces recaptured positions they lost at the start of the summer, advancing in the direction of the mineshaft complex between the settlement and Marinka. Within <u>Marinka</u>, positional fighting continued.¹⁰

_

¹⁰ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12674






Vuhledar Operational Area

Russian forces maintained increased pressure on Ukrainian defensive positions in the Vuhledar AO. While Russian troops with the 1st Army Corps continued their usual attacks east of Novomykhailivka, Russian forces also attempted to advance on Vuhledar. 11

¹¹ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12674





Staromlynivka Operational Area

Russian forces significantly increased their operational tempo, continuing their attempts to advance in the direction of Zolota Nyva from Novodonetske without success. Russian troops also attempted to advance on Staromaiorske, and intense fighting was ongoing near Pryyutne. 13

Occupied Donetsk

¹² https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12674

¹³ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12674




Near Mariupol, Russian air defenses shot down one of their own aircraft. It was unclear if it was a Su-35 or a Su-24, with our analysts leaning toward a Su-35.

 $^{^{14}}$ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/6557



ZAPORIZHZHIA




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, prepare to launch a fall-winter offensive to capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Expand the breakthrough at the second echelon of the Surovikin Line, sever the Russian landbridge from Crimea to Donetsk, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



Free Zaporizhzhia

Brigadier General Alexander Tarnavskyi, commander of the operational-strategic group of troops Tavria, reported that Ukrainian forces carried out 1,270 fire missions, indicating that the counteroffensive has yet to culminate. Russian forces reportedly carried out 931 strikes, the highest number reported since Ukraine launched its counteroffensive on June 4.





Orikhiv Operational Area

There haven't been any significant changes, as heavy fighting continued from the western edges of <u>Verbove</u> to the northern and eastern edges of <u>Novoprokopivka</u>. ¹⁵ ¹⁶ Russian forces attacked the Ukrainian flank west of <u>Robotyne</u> without success. Poor weather will likely slow the operational tempo over the next two to three days.

Occupied Zaporizhzhia

Large explosions were reported in Tokmak, with Ukrainian forces interdicting Russian personnel and material in the city and along the T-408 Highway ground line of communication (GLOC – supply line).

¹⁵ https://t.me/wargonzo/15471

¹⁶ https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12675



BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Occupied Crimea

Air defense in Sevastopol was active, with officials claiming two Ukrainian missiles were intercepted. The Kerch (Crimean) Bridge was closed twice.¹⁷ ¹⁸

The Crimean Tartar insurgent organization ATESH documented Russian D-20 towed howitzers being moved by rail toward the Russian logistics hub of Dzhankoi. 19

Odesa

Port facilities at Chornomorsk were hit by P-800 Oniks antiship missiles used for a ground attack. 20 A boarding house and a granary were hit, and windows were broken in nearby apartments from the concussion. 21 22 Four people were wounded due to the missile strikes.

¹⁷ https://t.me/operativnoZSU/117917

¹⁸ https://t.me/smolii ukraine/44245

¹⁹ https://t.me/atesh_ua/2098

²⁰ https://t.me/uniannet/113495

²¹ https://t.me/our odessa/55118

²² https://t.me/odeskaODA/2839




Chornomorsk has continued operations after Russia left the Black Sea Grain Initiative.



KHERSON

Russian Objective: Prevent Ukrainian advances into eastern Kherson, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks on Ukrainian civilians, lock Russian troops and military assets in place, and protect civilian lives



Kherson Oblast Administrative and Military Governor (OVA) Alexander Prokudin said Russia carried out 52 fire missions on free Kherson, firing 237 munitions, rockets, drone-



delivered IEDs, and bombs.²³ It was the quietest day in weeks, but over 40 artillery rounds, mortars, and rockets struck the city of Kherson. A pensioner was moderately wounded in his yard during an artillery strike.²⁴ An apartment building in the Dnipro District was hit by artillery, shattering windows on three floors and wounding one person.²⁵ The lull may be weather-related, with moving through the region, causing urban, street, and small stream flooding.²⁶

Can we brag? Our exclusive report by Zarina Zabrisky showing how an artillery strike near a Kherson travel agency office iterally knocked Russia off the map was picked up by the Defense Forces of Ukraine.

²³ https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/1581

²⁴ https://t.me/kherson non fake/10624

²⁵ https://t.me/kherson non fake/10625

²⁶ https://t.me/hueviyherson/46927



WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks and protect civilian lives

Poltava

A Russian Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile hit the Ukrainian military airfield at Myrhorod, with Russian propagandists once again that the supply of Storm Shadow cruise missiles was destroyed. There is no evidence that the claim is accurate, as a strike on an ammunition depot with cruise missiles would create a large signature detected by NASA FIRMS.



NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity.



RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent renewed insurrections, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

Moscow

Moscow mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed that a drone was shot down in the Istra District, with the debris landing in an unpopulated area.²⁷

BELARUSIAN FRONT

The dark potato prince and self-declared president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, after realizing that Private Military Company Wagner Group expected to be paid in hard currency, the Russian Ministry of Defense plundered

²⁷ https://t.me/readovkanews/67263



his ammunition stocks and withdrew their troops, now wants to play nice with Poland. "We have been good neighbors (with Poland) and will continue to be. We do not want the Poles to consider us strangers — enemies. We never set out to aggravate relations."²⁸

THEATERWIDE

Over the last four days, 96 Shahed-/136 kamikaze drones have been launched at targets in Ukraine. Russia has likely expanded its production capabilities beyond the 60 to 70 units produced in Tatarstan, in addition to its purchases from Iran.²⁹

Minister of Defense of Sweden, Paul Johnson, announced a new \$200 million military aid package for Ukraine that includes ammunition and spare parts for maintenance and sustainment. Johnson added that an analysis on providing Ukraine with Saab Jas 39 Gripen fighters was ongoing, but no aircraft could be provided until Sweden officially joins NATO. 30 31

²⁸ https://t.me/rusbrief/161864

²⁹ https://t.me/smolii ukraine/44223

³⁰ https://t.me/uniannet/113420

³¹ https://t.me/couch_IU/44224



German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall has accepted a "large order" to supply Ukraine with ammunition.³²

An early warning missile detection system provided to Ukraine by Israel is ready for deployment and testing in Kyiv. The Ambassador of Ukraine to Israel, Yevhen Korniychuk, said that if the test is successful, the system will be deployed in other cities.

The United States has requested Poland to provide one of its Patriot missile air defense systems to Ukraine in exchange for an Israeli-made Iron Dome air defense system. Our analyst team is doubtful that Poland will accept the request, as Iron Dome is a completely different system from Patriot, and intercepts different targets.

The table for equipment losses was **updated on September 30, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

_

³² https://t.me/operativnoZSU/117872



RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the <u>Oryx Database</u> from February 24, 2022, to September 30, 2023. 12,319 Russian (including <u>Chef's Rebellion</u>) vs. 4,510 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2179*	292	7.55:1	_
Medium Duty Tanks	150	364*	0.41:1	_
Armored fighting Vehicles	985	327	3.00:1	_
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2817	765	3.68:1	Û
Armored Personnel Carriers	354	347	1.02:1	Û
MRAPs	48	164	0.29:1	_
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	212	375	0.57:1	_
Command and Communications Vehicles	251	17	14.76:1	_
Engineering Vehicles	345	84	4.11:1	仓
Towed Artillery	310	160	1.94:1	_
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	538	222	2.42:1	Û
MLRS	278	50	5.57:1	仓
SAMs	182	129	1.41:1	_
Mobile Radars	45	79	0.57:1	_
EW/ECW	54	4	13.50:1	_
Winged Aircraft	93	73	1.27:1	_
Helicopters	113	37	3.05:1	Û
Naval Vessels and Submarines	17	27	0.63:1	



RUMORS

Many messages and e-mails we receive ask why we didn't cover a certain story or whether we are aware of a report and what we think. The rumor section is a list of claims or stories we are aware of but not reporting on because there isn't enough information to support or discover the truth.

- Did Russia destroy two Mig-29s and three Su-25s at Kryvyi Rih with new long-range Lancet kamikaze drones?
- Have more than 280,000 Russian soldiers died in Ukraine since February 24, 2022?
- North Korean ammunition is coming to Russia?
- Will Ukraine get Taurus cruise missiles?
- Were two Russian generals seriously wounded and one admiral killed in Sevastopol?



Notes on Sourcing Information

Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.

Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report: We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.

Rybar: We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.

War Gonzo: We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for *unique claims* about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.



Readovka: We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation. This is by no means a complete list of the sources we monitor.

Igor "Girkin" Strelkov: We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

Andrei Morozov: Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media: We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or unique Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination: The organization has not posted any update since June 9, 2023, and we have ceased monitoring.



Leonid Pasechnik: We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia: We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense: We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

Denis Pushilin: We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

Ramzan Kadyrov: The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

DeepState: We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or



misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

Institute for the Study of War: We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

Ivan Fedorov: We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

Vitaly Kim: When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government officials to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

Oleksiy Arestovych: We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.