

**MALCONTENT NEWS
RUSSIA-UKRAINE
SITUATION REPORT**

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Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 582

It has been 3,503 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 218 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine. Due to our EIC's family emergency, there may be no SITREP or bullet reports on Monday and Tuesday.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)

- There wasn't any significant ground fighting in Kharkiv or Luhansk
- Fighting continued in the Klishchiivka area of operation (AO)
- There was positional fighting in southwest Donetsk
- The Paradise Hotel in occupied Horlivka was destroyed by rockets fired by HIMARS while government officials and Russian troops were meeting
- Heavy fighting continued in the Orikhiv area of operation
- Russian air defenses shot down their own aircraft near Tokmak
- The International Atomic Energy Agency signed a resolution calling for Russia to withdraw from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant
- A Russian Shahed-136 kamikaze drone violated Romanian airspace up to 21 kilometers deep

- Romanian military leaders reported that Russia is jamming GPS signals in Romanian territorial waters
- Russian launched 40 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, with 30 shot down and one likely violating Romanian airspace
- A Russian ballistic missile likely hit a Ukrainian ammunition depot in the Vinnytsia region
- A Ukrainian drone destroyed an electrical substation in Kursk, Russia
- A Kasta mobile radar system was destroyed in Kursk, Russia
- Ukrainian DRG assault teams conducted border raids in Bryansk
- Former senior Pentagon official Gregory Weaver wrote a paper for NATO saying the Alliance should be prepared for conflict with Russia, including nuclear war
- Ukraine will start manufacturing its own air defense systems
- Two men in the Kyiv region were arrested for hiding a Tor-1 air defense system with missiles retreating Russian troops left behind in March 2022
- The autumn conscription has started in Russia, with 130,000 to be drafted – there was no mobilization order

- Lieutenant Colonel Irek Magasumov, awarded Hero of Russia by President Putin on August 3, was arrested for the murder of an 18-year-old girl in Luhansk
- Members of the Russian 34th Brigade are submitting dozens of complaints a day about not being permitted to go on leave or rotate
- Russia is blocking multiple VPN services
- Starting on October 3, Norway will ban the entry of cars with Russian vehicle registration

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. Our assessment that the repeated soft response by Ukraine's allies after Russian aggression on Ukraine's border would continue to encourage Moscow to take additional risks was, unfortunately, accurate, with the most serious border incident in Romania to date.
2. The Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, and proxy forces.
3. The inability of Russian military leaders to stop the ongoing Ukrainian offensive and retake the battlefield initiative has put significant pressure on Russian Chief


- of Staff Valery Gerasimov, who has been in charge of all Russian forces in Ukraine since January 2023.
4. Ukraine continues to hold the initiative theaterwide, and the number of combat ineffective and combat destroyed Russian units is growing, eroding Russian combat potential in numerous areas of operation.
 5. Russian Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to accept the realities within the theater of war.
 6. The perceived slow progress of the Ukrainian summer-fall offensive, questions about the capabilities of Ukrainian military commanders at the battalion and brigade level, and ongoing anticorruption measures highlighting the problems within the Ukrainian government are unfairly straining Western support.
 7. Western partners are not meeting their promised military training, heavy equipment, and ammunition delivery dates, and these continued delays are negatively impacting Ukraine's military capabilities.
 8. We maintain that Russia will attempt to destroy Ukraine's energy infrastructure over the fall and winter.

9. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

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
TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

KHARKIV




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure

There wasn't any significant activity in this region.

DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, and capture the rest of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kremynna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents




There wasn't any significant activity in this region.

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


NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire Donetsk region

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk, collapse the Russian flanks north of Bakhmut, capture the T-513 Highway south of Bakhmut, liberate the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, advance to the administrative border of Luhansk, and minimize civilian casualties




Klishchiivka Operational Area

Russian forces continued intense counterattacks at [Klishchiivka](#) with no success. Fighting continued east of the railroad grade southeast of [Andriivka](#).¹

¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12430>

SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive until the winter and maximize casualties

Ukrainian Objective: Find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses, lock Russian troops in place, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics

Avdiivka, Marinka, Vuhledar, Staromlynivka Operational Areas

Russian forces continued attempts to advance on [Avdiivka](#) without success. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported a failed Russian attack in the area of [Tonenke, northwest of Sjevrne](#).² There were no Russian reports of fighting in the area, so in our assessment, this was a sabotage and reconnaissance unit (DRG) of squad or platoon size.

Russia did Russian things in [Marinka](#), where fighting continued.³

In the Vuhledar area of operation (AO), Russia also did Russian things east of [Novomykhailivka](#) and maintained a 20-month tradition of suffering losses and retreating to previous positions.⁴

In the Staromlynivka AO, Russian forces attempted a counterattack west of [Staromaiorske](#) without success.⁵

² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12430>


³ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12430>

⁴ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12430>

⁵ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12430>

Numerous analysts reported that Russian forces made marginal gains northeast of [Pryyutne](#), and we aren't ignoring those reports. We previously never mapped a Ukrainian advance in that region due to the lack of pictures, videos, or satellite intelligence. Our map is unchanged, and it is highly likely that Ukrainian and Russian forces are repeatedly trading the same 250 to 500-meter strip of no man's land.


Occupied Donetsk

Rockets fired by HIMARS destroyed the Paradise Hotel in Horlivka, which was holding a meeting between occupation officials and area Russian troops. The illegitimate mayor of Horlivka broke operational security shortly after the attack, and  [shared a video showing the hotel was completely destroyed](#).^{6 7}

⁶ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116819>


⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116793>

ZAPORIZHZHIA



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, prepare to launch a fall-winter offensive to capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Expand the breakthrough at the second echelon of the Surovikin Line, sever the Russian landbridge from Crimea to Donetsk, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



Orikhiv Operational Area

There's no other way to say it. Fighting continued from [Verbove](#) to [Novoprokopivka](#) with no significant change to the situation.⁸ Russian sources claim they are clinging to the heights east of Novoprokopivka, which holds the same operational importance as the Klishchiivka plateau.⁹ They describe the situation as "desperate."

⁸ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12430>

⁹ <https://t.me/zloyodessit/20182>



Occupied Zaporizhzhia

We strongly disagree with the Institute for the Study of War's assessment that Russia is preparing to withdraw from Tokmak and fall deeper into Zaporizhzhia because Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov wants to preserve personnel. This goes against 20 months of Russian military doctrine in Ukraine, and the last major goodwill gesture in Kherson did not provide Russian forces with a strategic advantage. Further, Russian troops are furiously upgrading their defenses at Tokmak, including building concrete bunkers and reinforcing trenches.

We have repeatedly stated that Russia should have fallen back to the second echelon of the Surovikin Line weeks ago. Despite multiple breaches that have turned into gaps and limited territory to maneuver, Russian forces continue to execute a "not one meter back" defense.

We agree with their report that Gerasimov may be lobbying to end the defense of Bakhmut, which lost its strategic value a year ago during the Ukrainian Kharkiv counteroffensive. Without the control of Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, it is extremely unlikely that Russian troops can advance past the ruined city. Redeploying units with offensive capabilities to other AOs while falling back to at

least the Bakhmutkova River would be a strategically sound decision.

Russian air defenses   [shot down their own Su-35 multirole fighter plane](#) near Tokmak, with Ukrainian and Russian sources confirming the incident.¹⁰

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference approved a resolution on the immediate return of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to the full control of Ukraine. During the 67th session of the IAEA General Conference, 69 countries supported the resolution on nuclear safety in Ukraine. Canada, Finland, and Costa Rica proposed the resolution. The resolution calls for the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw all military and other unauthorized personnel from the ZNPP and return the plant to the full control of the competent authorities of Ukraine, per the existing license issued by the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNIRA)."

¹⁰ https://twitter.com/front_ukrainian/status/1707679523657945525

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

OCS reported 13 Russian Black Sea Fleet ships on patrol, with two missile carriers capable of launching up to 14 Kalibr cruise missiles.¹¹

Romania

Romanian officials are searching for the crash site of a Russian Shahed-136 kamikaze drone, which, according to radar, violated Romanian airspace on September 29-30.¹² Dozens of firefighters, police officers, and at least one helicopter are searching the city of Galati. A resident called police overnight, reporting an explosion on the outskirts of the city in the Dimitrie Cantemir district.

The Romanian army confirmed that radar tracked a "possible unauthorized penetration into the national airspace." NATO has maintained an official policy that there is no evidence that the increasingly deeper border incursions are intentional.

¹¹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116848>

¹² [Digi24 HD](#)

According to the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations, the Ministry of Defense authorized an air raid alert in the Tulcea and Galati regions, lasting over three hours.


On Friday, Army Chief of Staff of Romania General Daniel Petrescu said Russia is "actively and constantly" jamming GPS signals in Romania's territorial waters. Speaking at the Euroatlantic Center for Resilience, General Petrescu issued the strongest language from a Romanian official, saying, "We do not see the end of this war now, and while we admire the resilience of Ukrainian society in the face of Russian attacks, we must also prepare for a long-term confrontation with the regime of the Russian Federation."

"There is a constant risk associated with the increasing probability of incidents at the NATO border, caused by the possibility that certain drones or missiles may miss. Romania's infrastructure or commercial ships in territorial waters could be hit by mistake."

KHERSON


Russian Objective: Prevent Ukrainian advances into eastern Kherson, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks on Ukrainian civilians, lock Russian troops and military assets in place, and protect civilian lives



Kherson Oblast Administrative and Military Governor (OVA) Alexander Prokudin said Russia carried out 96 (not a typo, same number as yesterday) [fire missions on free](#)

[Kherson](#), firing 432 munitions, rockets, drone-delivered IEDs, bombs, and one missile strike, with three people wounded.¹³ ¹⁴ During the September 29, 2023, Russia-Ukraine War Podcast, the Chief Rabbi of Kherson, Yosef Y Wolff, reported that 70% to 80% of the population has left the city due to the constant attacks and a lack of jobs.¹⁵

Two linemen restoring power in the central part of the city were wounded in a “double tap” attack. Both are hospitalized, with one in critical condition.¹⁶ A missile struck a residential area of Kherson, destroyed a catering business, and  [left a massive crater in the street](#).¹⁷

¹³ <https://t.me/genichua/14619>

¹⁴ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116749>

¹⁵ <https://www.threads.net/@malcontentmenttango/post/CxzTuxBLjRi>

¹⁶ <https://t.me/uniannet/112801>

¹⁷ <https://t.me/suspilnenews/24664>

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks and protect civilian lives

Vinnytsia

The Ukrainian ammo depot in Salnyk, which had a massive explosion in 2017, was struck by at least one Russian ballistic missile.¹⁸ The evacuation of area residents was considered, but the fire was quickly controlled. Sentinel Hub Sentinel 2-L2A imaging showed significant activity at the facility between September 2022 and May 2023. The 2017 explosion, which destroyed 70,000 tons of serviceable ammunition, and a fire in 2019 are widely believed to have been caused by sabotage.

¹⁸ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/43594

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives


There wasn't any significant activity in this region.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent renewed insurrections, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

Kursk

A Ukrainian drone  [struck an electrical substation](#) in Belaya Sloboda, knocking out power to 4,000 households.¹⁹ Ukrainian forces also destroyed a Kasta radar near Girya. The Kasta is a low-frequency radar that can detect stealth aircraft and aircraft flying at extremely low altitudes.²⁰

¹⁹ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/6470

²⁰ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116742>

Bryansk

The Freedom of Russia Legion is conducting cross-border raids with up to 50 personnel in the area of Bryansk Narodna.^{21 22 23 24}

BELARUSIAN FRONT

There wasn't any significant activity in this region.

THEATERWIDE

The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine reported Russia launched 40 Shahed-136 drones, with 20 shot down in Vinnytsia, six in Odesa, and four in Mykolaiv. One reportedly violated Romanian airspace, and we could not account for the remainder.²⁵

NATO published an article by former senior Pentagon official Gregory Weaver where he calls for the Alliance to

²¹ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/6472

²² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116828>

²³ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116825>

²⁴ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/43569

²⁵ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116847>

prepare for a possible war against the Russian Federation using tactical nuclear weapons.²⁶

"The sluggish performance of Russian troops in the early days of the war in Ukraine risks convincing some in NATO that a future Russian threat to the Alliance can be contained "primarily through NATO's conventional superiority and increased deterrence against Russia's use of nuclear weapons in a future conflict. This is a dangerous misconception," wrote Weaver. He believes Putin's decision to invade demonstrated an appetite to take high risks while deeply miscalculating the resistance Russia would face. "This combination of risk and miscalculation is extremely troubling, especially when combined with repeated threats of nuclear escalation from Russia...NATO leadership must understand that the actions of Russian forces in Ukraine are likely to increase Russia's dependence on nuclear weapons. In a hypothetical future war with NATO, Russia would likely need to use nuclear weapons earlier in the conflict, either to achieve victory or to prevent defeat. This means containing limited Russian nuclear escalation would become even more important than containing Russian conventional aggression."

²⁶ <https://t.me/uniannet/112839>

Ukraine plans to manufacture its own air defense systems, according to the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine.²⁷

On the subject of air defense, Ukrainian officials arrested two men in Boryspil for keeping a Russian TOR-1 air defense system with missiles.²⁸ The duo are facing up to seven years in prison. Russian troops abandoned the air defense system in March 2022 when they withdrew from the Chernihiv region.²⁹

The French Minister of Defense, Sebastien Lecornu, reported that representatives from 20 military contractors signed letters of intent or memorandums of understanding with Ukrainian companies for joint weapon production and sharing military technology.³⁰

Switzerland allocated almost \$110 million to Ukraine for demining from 2024 to 2027. In 2023, Switzerland.

²⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116787>

²⁸ https://twitter.com/front_ukrainian/status/1707744434962538540

²⁹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116779>

³⁰ <https://t.me/uniannet/112827>



The table for equipment losses was **updated on September 24, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

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RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to September 24, 2023.

12,286 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,486 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2182	289	7.55:1	↓
Medium Duty Tanks	150	366	0.41:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	982	327	3.00:1	—
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2797	755	3.70:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	354	344	1.02:1	↓
MRAPs	48	161	0.30:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	210	373	0.56:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	251	17	14.76:1	—
Engineering Vehicles	343	84	4.08:1	↓
Towed Artillery	308	160	1.93:1	↑
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	536	220	2.44:1	—
MLRS	275	50	5.50:1	↑
SAMs	181	129	1.40:1	—
Mobile Radars	45	78	0.58:1	—
EW/ECW	54	4	13.50:1	—
Winged Aircraft	92	72	1.28:1	—
Helicopters	112	35	3.20:1	—
Naval Vessels and Submarines	17	27	0.63:1	—

RUSSIAN MOBIKS, MOBILIZATION, AND MIR

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the biannual conscription decree, calling for 130,000 to be drafted into the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation between October 1 to December 1.³¹ The decree also released conscripts who had completed their one year of service.

Military registration and enlistment offices in Russia are dealing with hundreds of employers trying to provide a list of eligible employees for mobilization and conscription.³² The State Duma passed a law that fines employers up to 500,000 roubles for not providing their list by October 1. The lists were supposed to be provided electronically, but the Russian military registration app and database were falsely reported as completed.

The offices are only open on Mondays and Wednesdays; in larger cities, hundreds are standing in line to submit their lists.

³¹ <https://t.me/uniannet/112826>

³² <https://t.me/astrapress/39016>

The Russian 1st Army Corps of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic has been looking for 2,800 soldiers listed as deserters since January 1, 2023.³³

Russian Lieutenant Colonel Irek Magasumov, whom President Putin named Hero of Russia on August 3, has been arrested and is under investigation for murder. Magasumov is accused of shooting an 18-year-old girl in Luhansk while intoxicated.³⁴

Members of the Russian 34th Brigade are complaining that Russian law is being violated, with almost no unit members being permitted to go on mandatory two-week leave in over a year.³⁵

The Russian RIA started another wave of blocking VPN access to the Internet.³⁶ Users of MTS, Beeline, Megafon, and Tele2 reported widespread problems.

³³ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/13847>

³⁴ <https://t.me/astrapress/39036>

³⁵ https://t.me/Separ13_13/19727

³⁶ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/43951>

GEOPOLITICS

Norway will ban entry of cars with Russian license plates starting on October 3.³⁷

Ukraine has agreed to suspend the status of OTP Bank and five Greek cargo carriers as international war sponsors to convince Hungary to release 500 million euros if the European Union had previously allocated aid.³⁸

RUMORS

Many messages and e-mails we receive ask why we didn't cover a certain story or whether we are aware of a report and what we think. The rumor section is a list of claims or stories we are aware of but not reporting on because there isn't enough information to support or discover the truth.

- Did Russia destroy two Mig-29s and three Su-25s at Kryvyi Rih with new long-range Lancet kamikaze drones?


³⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116775>


³⁸ <https://t.me/uniannet/112842>


- Have more than 260,000 Russian soldiers died in Ukraine since February 24, 2022?
- North Korean ammunition is coming to Russia?
- Will Ukraine get Taurus cruise missiles?
- Were two Russian generals seriously wounded and one admiral killed in Sevastopol?


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


 **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


 **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.


 **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation. This is by no means a complete list of the sources we monitor.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** The organization has not posted any update since June 9, 2023, and we have ceased monitoring.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government officials to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.