

**MALCONTENT NEWS
RUSSIA-UKRAINE
SITUATION REPORT**

July 09, 2023



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 500

It has been 3,420 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 135 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

- Ukraine fired three S-200 anti-aircraft missiles used for a ground attack at the Crimean Bridge and two more missiles at the Kaluga Military Airfield in the Bryansk region
- Russian reports that Valery Gerasimov has been dismissed as the Commander of the Joint Group of Russian Forces in Ukraine were false
- The first month of Ukraine's offensive has liberated more than 193 square kilometers of territory and eight settlements
- Russian forces continue sustained attacks on Novoselivske
- Ukrainian forces advance 1,000 meters northeast of Bilohorivka [Luhansk]
- Ukrainian forces advance deeper between Rozdolivka and Yakovlivka in the Soledar area of operation
- Ukrainian forces have captured the southwestern part of Berkhivka in the Bakhmut area of operation

- Ukrainian forces open a new area of advance toward Ozarianivka from Druzbha/Mayorsk in the Klishchiivka area of operation
- Russian Airforce bombed a humanitarian aid distribution point in Orikhiv with a FAB-500S-E UPMK, killing at least four civilians
- Russian Airforce bombed the hospital in Beryslav with a FAB-500S-E UPMK, wounding at least two
- Russian partisans sabotaged railroad infrastructure in two regions
- Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev threatens to start a nuclear war, again

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. The release of the commanders of Azovstal from Türkiye, in violation of a September 21, 2022, three-way agreement between Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Türkiye, further weakened Russian President Vladimir Putin. In our assessment, the risk of another attempted insurrection/coup is notable.
2. Ukrainian military leaders' changes to battlefield tactics have created a slower but more effective

- offensive that reduces the attrition of personnel and equipment.
3. The current Ukrainian military activity is subordinate offensives and shaping operations, and the main operation has not started.
 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces.
 5. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community will impact Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.
 6. Russian forces on the forward line of friendly troops (FLOT) suffer from critical shortages of heavy weapons, effective radio communications, food, and potable water, increasing casualties and lowering morale.
 7. Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.
 8. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia




Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)

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
TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the *Moskva* and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

UKRAINE WEATHER



The unsettled weather pattern was calmed down, but there remains a chance of pop-up thunderstorms and showers through the week of July 10. High temperatures will be from 21° to 31° Celcius, with July 13 forecasted as the hottest day. Low temperatures will be from 12° to 23° The new moon is on July 17.


SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY



July 17, 2023, GFS forecast predicts soil saturation will range from 10% to 50% to 40 centimeters deep across the theater of war within Ukraine.


The soil saturation model does not consider the lakebed of the Kakhovka Reservoir. Soil saturation is between 15% to 60% in southern and eastern Ukraine, with a drying trend through July 17.

KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorychna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure




Svatove Operational Area

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported that Russian forces attacked [Berestove](#) from the south and were unsuccessful.¹

¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10281>


DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents




Svatove Operational Area

Russian forces continued sustained attacks on [Novoselivka](#) and [Stelmakhivka](#), creating challenging conditions for Ukrainian defenders east of the railroad station between Novoselivka and Kuzemivka.^{2 3}

² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10281>

³ <https://t.me/rybar/49492>



Kreminna Operational Area

The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) claimed that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive east of [Torske](#) in the direction of Kreminna.⁴ Russian sources claimed that fighting increased in intensity in the Serebryanskyi Woods south of [Dibrova and Kuzmyne](#).^{5 6}


ASSESSMENT: Since March, Ukrainian and Russian forces have been trading the same defensive positions in a 750-meter wide strip from south of Dibrova to the Siverskyi Donets River Floodplain west of Shpylivka. Today's

⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/28210 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁵ https://t.me/mod_russia/28210 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁶ <https://t.me/rybar/49492>

Russian advances were between 100 to 200 meters, resulting in a move to where we currently have the line of conflict on the war map. This is why most of the Serebryanskyy Forest is a gray area because of these continued exchanges of the same locations.



Lysychansk Operational Area


Russian forces released a video showing Ukrainian positions northeast of Bilohorivka [being hit by indirect tank fire](#).⁷ Our team was able to geolocate the video [[48.9470 N, 38.2530 E](#)], which showed that Ukrainian forces

⁷ <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1678272885201444865>

had advanced 1,000 meters in the direction of Shypylivka. Based on this new intelligence, we adjusted the map. We find it unlikely that Russian troops remain in the salient that [the bend in the Siverskyi Donets River](#) forms west of the Ukrainian positions, but there is no evidence that Russian troops have withdrawn from this region.


Editor's note: This is a Russian video in the public domain showing Ukrainian forces under attack, so sharing the content does not violate operational security (OPSEC).

NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections


Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties



Siversk Operational Area

GSAFU reported that Russian forces, supported by the Russian Airforce and army aviation (VKS), attempted to advance on Spirne, suffered losses, and retreated to their defensive positions.⁸

⁸ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10286>



Soledar Operational Area

Fighting increased in intensity north of Soledar from [Rozdolivka to Vesele](#).^{9 10} Russian forces attempted to advance to retake lost positions near Vesele with support from the VKS without success. Southwest of Vesele, Ukrainian forces supported by armored vehicles  [advanced along two treelines](#) west of [Yakovlivka](#), capturing several positions.^{11 12}

⁹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10281>


¹⁰ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10286>

¹¹ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17041> [July 8, 2023]

¹² <https://twitter.com/noelreports/status/1677967795261259786>

Editor's note: This is a Ukrainian video produced by the 54th Brigade and released with permission from the Ministry of Defense.

The map was adjusted, and the gray area was reduced north of the line of conflict. We maintain our earlier assessment that Yakovlivka is a critical settlement for the Russian defense of Soledar, and a salient is starting to form around the town.




Bakhmut Operational Area

GSAFU reported a Russian attack “in the area of” the tactically significant village of [Dubovo-Vasylivka](#) was repulsed. Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group Telegram, channel Gray Zone, has figured out Ukraine’s strategy for the village a month too late.¹³ “If a week ago I thought that the enemy [*Ukraine – Ed.*] wanted to take Dubovo-Vasylivka and the heights adjacent to it in order to later create a situation where Berkhivka would be practically forced to be abandoned by us, today, having considered the direction of the enemy’s advance, I believe that [Ukraine] is creating an onslaught to the north and northwest of Dubovo-Vasilyevka, apparently, he decided to implement the plan not by directly taking the heights of Dubovo-Vasylivka, where they would have suffered more losses with a dubious result, but the taking Berkhivka and entering the Bakhmut – Slovyansk Highway [*M-03/E-40 Highway Russian ground line of communication – Ed.*]. When implementing the plan, there is a threat to the semi-encirclement of the personnel located to the west of the above route and our forces holding Dubovo-Vasylivka. For this reason, it may be necessary to retreat to more advantageous lines to the east.”


¹³ https://t.me/grey_zone/19492

Ukrainian forces continued attacks in the southwestern part of [Berkhivka](#), where heavy fighting continues. Ukrainian troops advanced north toward Paraskoviivka have gained control of the western part of the settlement while expanding their area of control west toward Dubovo-Vasylivka. Additionally, the gray zone was reduced west of [Yahidne](#). The war map was updated.



Klishchiivka Operational Area

There was little information from the [Klishchiivka](#) operational area. Colonel General Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Akhmat had arrived in Klishchiivka and that


fighting was only on the "Internet."¹⁴ As proof, the Akhmat TikTok Brigade released a video of a lone infantry fighting vehicle  [traversing a dirt track nowhere near Klishchiivka](#).¹⁵ "As you can see, even in the vicinity of Klishchiivka with a general on board, the driver drives a combat vehicle confidently and very calmly. UkroNATO [*Slur against Ukraine – Ed.*] is fighting more on the Internet for Klishchiivka than on the ground."


Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo claimed that Ukrainian forces were advancing west of [Andriivka](#) but had not captured the top of the ridge.¹⁶

¹⁴ <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1678298639498870786>

¹⁵ <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1678298639498870786>

¹⁶ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13714>




The reports by the Russian Ministry of Defense of Ukrainian attacks from the direction of Druzhba and Mayorsk were accurate, but in our analysis, we got the direction of the advance wrong. Ukrainian forces have started to advance toward [Ozarianivka](#) along the railroad tracks northeast of Druzhba, capturing several Russian positions. The war map was adjusted. The Ukrainian State Border Service used drone-directed artillery  [to target Russian troops in the settlement](#).¹⁷

¹⁷ <https://t.me/DPSUkr/12301>

A spokesperson for the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Andriy Kovalev, reported that Ukrainian forces had liberated 4 square kilometers of territory in the Bakhmut area of operation in the last week and 24 square kilometers since June 5.¹⁸

¹⁸ <https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2480>


SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,

destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics





Avdiivka Operational Area

Ukrainian sources reported mutual fighting in the areas of [Novokalynove](#), [Stepove](#), and [Vesele](#), with no change in the situation.^{19 20}

¹⁹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10281>

²⁰ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17041> [July 8, 2023]




The 1st Army Corps continued head-on attacks in the direction of [Avdiivka](#) without success.^{21 22} On July 8, former FSB Colonel and convicted war criminal Igor Strelkov Girkin condemned Russian tactics in the Avdiivka, and a geolocated video from July 7 likely shows why doomer Girkin was writing on Telegram. Russian forces attempted to advance on Avdiivka from Kamyanka with an entire fully-staffed battalion, employing up to 48 armored vehicles, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers supported by light infantry. The advance fell apart, with the armored columns and Russian troops  [hitting landmines and being targeted by](#)

²¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10286>

²² <https://t.me/wargonzo/13714>

Marinka Operational Area

Russian and Ukrainian sources reported mutual fighting in and near [Marinka](#) with no change in the situation.²⁷ ²⁸ A July 8 video released by the Ukraine Ministry of Defense showed two Russian soldiers had been captured in the shattered remains of the city.




²⁷ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10281>

²⁸ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13714>

Vuledar Operational Area

Russian forces continued attacks east of Novomykahilivka, which ended in failure.²⁹



Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction

Ukrainian forces were likely consolidating their positions after the recent advance. Russian forces continued attacks in the direction of [Blahodatne](#) from Staromaiorske without success.^{30 31 32} RMOD claimed that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance units (DRG) were operating south of

²⁹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10286>

³⁰ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10281>

³¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10286>

³² <https://t.me/wargonzo/13714>

[Rivnopil](#).³³ Fighting continued north and west of [Pryyutne](#) [Zaporizhia-Donetsk administrative border], with WarGonzo confirming recent Ukrainian advances.^{34 35}

GSAFU spokesperson Kovalev confirmed our analysis on July 8 within 600 meters, reporting Ukrainian forces have advanced 8.6 kilometers in the Melitopol and Berdyansk directions.³⁶ Ten square kilometers were liberated last week and 169 square kilometers since June 5.


³³ https://t.me/mod_russia/28210 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

³⁴ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13714>

³⁵ https://t.me/mod_russia/28210 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


³⁶ <https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2479>

ZAPORIZHIA





Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



Orikhiv Operational Area


The only fighting reported in Zaporizhia was near [Robotyne](#), with no change in the situation.³⁷


The Russian VKS   [struck a humanitarian aid distribution point](#) in Orikhiv with a FAB-500S-E UPMK glide bomb as people waited in a queue.³⁸ Four were reported dead, and another 11 were hospitalized at the time of publication.

³⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/28210 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

³⁸ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5301

Occupied Zaporizhia

At least eight explosions were reported in Novopetrivka, northwest of Berdyansk. Pictures shared by local residents showed  [a large fire was burning](#).³⁹

In Melitopol,  [a large explosion was reported](#) at 18:00 hours local time in Zarichne.⁴⁰ The exiled mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov, reported that a hangar [*a large grain storage building – Ed.*] that Russian forces turned into a logistical node.

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

No information was shared about the status of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

³⁹ <https://t.me/brdnews/13328>


⁴⁰ <https://t.me/zaborzp/48604>

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

There were no reports from any source on the composition of the Black Sea Fleet on patrol for July 9.

Occupied Crimea

Russian sources claim Ukraine launched three S-200 anti-aircraft missiles modified for a ground attack at the Crimea Bridge.^{41 42 43 44} All three  [missiles were intercepted](#).⁴⁵ The S-200 air defense system was declared obsolete a decade ago, but Ukraine stored the systems. With radar providing inertia guidance, the missile can be used for ground attacks. At the time of its development during the Soviet era, the maximum range was 255 kilometers, but it is capable of guided flight up to 300 kilometers. The warhead weighs 217 kilograms.⁴⁶

⁴¹ <https://t.me/rybar/49512>

⁴² <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/35933>

⁴³ <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1678291277132234752>

⁴⁴ <https://t.me/rybar/49512>

⁴⁵ https://t.me/shot_shot/53921

⁴⁶ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5289

Vehicle traffic was closed for over an hour, creating traffic delays of up to three hours.⁴⁷ Complicating logistics, the Kerch Strait Ferry was suspended due to severe weather.⁴⁸

There were reports of explosions near Dzhankoi, with no other information available.⁴⁹ Russian state media claimed that two drones were shot down in the Kirovski region of Crimea near Kerch.⁵⁰

Mykolaiv

The mayor of Mykolaiv, Alexander Sienkovych, and the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor (OVA), Vitaly Kim, reported a Russian Iskander-M missile struck an "infrastructure object" in the city.⁵¹ ⁵² ⁵³ There were no reports of casualties or power disruptions.

⁴⁷ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/35933>

⁴⁸ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/35979>

⁴⁹ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/35982>

⁵⁰ https://t.me/shot_shot/53940

⁵¹ <https://t.me/senkevichonline/4914>

⁵² <https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/5601>

⁵³ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/104784>

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity.

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent further insurrection, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

Bryansk Region

According to Russian officials, two S-200 missiles used for a ground attack targeted the Kaluga Military Airfield.^{54 55 56} The Kremlin claimed both missiles were shot down, but a video from Russian state media agency Mash  [clearly showed an intact S-200 missile](#) striking a sawmill in Bytoshi. The Kremlin dismissed claims by Russian propagandists and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev that the Desnogorsk Nuclear Power Plant in Smolensk was targeted.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ <https://t.me/rybar/49512>

⁵⁵ https://t.me/romanov_92/40155

⁵⁶ <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1678291277132234752>

⁵⁷ <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1678291277132234752>

Oryol Region

Russian state media reported that saboteurs set a railroad relay cabinet between Orel-2 and Kromskaya stations on fire.⁵⁸

Republic of Mari El

In the Medvedevsky District, a relay cabinet was set on fire near the Pemba station, delaying rail traffic.⁵⁹

THEATERWIDE

Someone change the sign! It's been zero days since a Russian government official threatened to start a nuclear war.⁶⁰ "If the attempt to attack the Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant with NATO missiles is confirmed, we should consider the scenario of a simultaneous Russian strike on the Pivdennoukrainsk, Rivne, and Khmelnytsky Nuclear Power Plants, as well as on nuclear facilities in Eastern Europe. There is no reason to hold back," Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Medvedev said.

⁵⁸ https://t.me/shot_shot/53939

⁵⁹ https://t.me/shot_shot/53924

⁶⁰ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/9/7410569/>


GSAFU reported that during the evening of July 8 – 9, five Shahed-136 kamikaze drones were shot down, while others struck industrial and infrastructure facilities in the Dnipropetrovsk and Kirovohrad oblasts.⁶¹

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told United States news agency ABC News that he did not “want to go to Vilnius for fun” and stressed the importance of saying “that NATO is not afraid of Russia. Ukraine should get clear security guarantees while it is not in NATO. And that is a very important point. Only under these conditions will our meeting be meaningful,” said Zelenskyy, adding, “Otherwise, it’s just politics.”

A NATO diplomat told Politico off the record that guarantees will be given to Ukraine at the NATO meeting in Vilnius.⁶² “In essence, this will be a guarantee for Ukraine that we will equip their armed forces for a very long time. We will finance them, we will advise them, we will train them so that they have a deterrent against any future aggression.”

⁶¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10281>

⁶² <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/35974>

A video showed  [Polish Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters being transferred](#) to Ukraine, confirming the earlier reports from the Wall Street Journal.^{63 64}

Alexander Kamyshin, the Minister of Strategic Industry, reported that Ukraine produced more artillery shells in June 2023 than in all of 2022.⁶⁵ He added that his long-term goal is to make Ukraine a major arms exporter again.

The table for equipment losses was last updated on July 6, 2023, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

⁶³ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/104726>

⁶⁴ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/104767>




⁶⁵ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/35966>

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to July 6, 2023. 11,001 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 3,786 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	1952	228	8.56:1	↓
Medium Duty Tanks	139	330	0.42:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	905	292	3.10:1	↑
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2483	602	4.12:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	323	286	1.13:1	—
MRAPs	45	107	0.42:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	194	331	0.59:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	245	15	16.33:1	↑
Engineering Vehicles	317	70	4.53:1	—
Towed Artillery	250	130	1.92:1	↑
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	441	174	2.53:1	↑
MLRS	230	47	4.89:1	↑
SAMs	123	113	1.08:1	↑
Mobile Radars	35	66	0.53:1	↓
EW/ECW	41	4	10.25:1	—
Winged Aircraft	85	68	1.25:1	—
Helicopters	106	31	3.42:1	↑
Naval Vessels	12	26	0.46:1	—

RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION, MOBIKS, AND MIR

Rumors that Valery Gerasimov had been dismissed from commanding the Joint Group of Russian Forces in Ukraine were untrue. We addressed the rumors  [in a July 9, 2023, Flash Report](#). The Kremlin  [released pictures](#) and videos of  [Gerasimov being briefed on the situation in Ukraine](#).⁶⁶ ⁶⁷The bigger question the video raises is that General of the Army Segey Surovkin was not present in person or virtually and has remained missing since June 24.

For the second day in a row, a planned lecture to a private audience by former FSB Colonel and convicted war criminal Igor Strelkov Girkin at Leaves in St. Petersburg was disrupted. Police arrived, claiming a bomb threat had been called in and the building needed to be searched.⁶⁸ After the second delay, his paid admission-only lecture to less than 40 people was held in a backroom at the offices of Another Russia.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1678291277132234752>

⁶⁷ <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1678282381088931840>

⁶⁸ <https://t.me/strelkovii/5969>

⁶⁹ https://t.me/ghost_of_novorossia/13653

"I am delighted! What amazing, what stunning efficiency and effectiveness! In Leaves, 'a bomb was found.' The riot police came to investigate. In six cars...all because the 'former Strelkov' came to St. Petersburg with a lecture on the rebellion of Prigozhin," Girkin mused on Telegram.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ <https://t.me/strelkovii/5968>


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for real-time reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.