MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

June 24, 2023

Malcontent News
Russia-Ukraine War SITREP
6/24/23 23:59* PST

Malcontent News is an independent group of journalists and researchers in the United States, Canada, Ukraine, Israel, Georgia, and the United Kingdom. We are part of Badon Hill Group, LLC, and operate independently from all entities.

We are funded through Patreon, grants, and donations and aided by volunteers. For media inquiries, you can contact social@malcontentnews.com. For news tips, you can contact our newsroom at tips@malcontentment.com.

Patreons at the Bronze level or higher can access the annotated Russia-Ukraine War Situation Report (SITREP). Patreons at the Silver level or higher get a monthly Q&A viz Zoom Meeting with our Chief Content Officer or other senior staff.

Authors and Analysts: David H. Obelcz, Adam Irving, Jeff Davis, Katie Livingstone, Oskar Hallgrimsson, Ryan Evans, Michael Hering, and Ana Ras, Spanish Editor in Chief

The reader accepts that the information contained in the Malcontent News Situation Report will not be used for travel, navigation, or personal security assessment. The reader agrees to get real-time information from official channels provided by national, oblast, raion, hromada, city, or local officials and follow their security recommendations.

 Sunday, June 25, 2023

SUMMARY – DAY 485

It has been 3,405 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 120 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

The intelligence community beyond our organization is exhausted after the last 48 hours. Many Russian sources were either silent or fixated on the situation in Russia. Most combat reports from Ukraine came from the General Staff and by geolocating videos. This will be a condensed report.

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. We assess that while the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is low, the Russian threat of a provocation reported by the Defense Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (GUR) on June 22 has not been resolved and should still be taken seriously.
2. We maintain that the loss of the Chongar Bridge between occupied Kherson and Crimea and additional

 Sunday, June 25, 2023

attacks on the ground line of communication to Melitopol will create significant supply and logistics issues for Russian forces and their operations as local supply nodes exhaust their materials.

3. Our assessment that the infighting between Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Private Military Company leader Yevgeny Prigozhin was reaching a culmination point was accurate, with an attempted insurrection resulting in PMC Wagner forces taking control of two Russian cities, shooting down seven aircraft, and killing at least 15 members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

4. In our assessment, while a short-term resolution has been reached for Yevgeny Prigozhin to be exiled to Belarus, the damage to Russian President Vladimir Putin's power and reputation is significant, and low-intensity violence and reprisals masked as accidents and illness will happen in the coming weeks.

5. While a final determination will take a site inspection by subject matter experts and months of investigation, the body of publicly available evidence indicates that on June 6, 2023, between 02:25 and 02:50 hours local time, Russian occupiers blew up the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, dam structure, or both, causing its catastrophic failure. The issue of intentional or accidental is academic – the outcome is still the same. This is the last day of this entry.

6. We maintain the current Ukrainian military activity is subordinate offensives and shaping operations, and the main operation has not started.

7. Our assessment that the Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces, was also accurate. It remains unclear what will happen to Russian units that pledge their allegiance to Yevgeny Prigozhin or did not follow their orders to stop the advance of Wagnerites into Russia.

8. Russian Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.

Jump to the Action Report.

TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP

About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted like this, it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

Sunday, June 25, 2023

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Repel Russian partisan attacks, stabilize the border, and maintain civil order

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

Rostov Region

Our assessment of the end of the PMC Wagner Group insurrection can be 🌐 read here. Russian channel Fighterbomber, which has been an accurate source during

the insurrection, claims at the time of publication that PMC Wagner forces have not released Millerovo or Rotstov Military Airfields or the Russian Airforce (VKS) Command Center.[1]

Yevgeny Prigozhin confirmed that the fixed-wing aircraft shot down was an Il-22, with ten crewmembers on board, not eight. That brings the death toll among the Russian VKS, army, and unspecified ground forces to 17. Prigozhin claims he has agreed to pay 50 million roubles to the families as compensation. It was unclear if that money was to be divided only among the aircrew of the Il-22 or the aircrews of the VKS and army aviation aircrews. It also wasn't specified if the compensation was for each crew member, $588,250 per person, or to be divided.[2]

Another video from a dashcam showed a 📺 [Russian VKS attack on civilian vehicles](https://twitter.com/jabuttee/status/1672903041417195520) that wounded three people.[3] This is in addition to two civilians killed when Russian army aviation targeted a bus.

---

[1] https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1672865807649460224
[2] https://twitter.com/VolodyaTretyak/status/1672880651018596353
[3] https://twitter.com/jabuttee/status/1672903041417195520

     Sunday, June 25, 2023

The oil depot in Voronezh, hit by a PMC Wagner antiaircraft missile that missed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter, has been extinguished after burning for 12 hours.[4] A 5,000 cubic meter tank of Jet-A aviation fuel was destroyed.

As a sign of how badly the reputation of Russian President Vladimir Putin has been damaged, multiple Russian state media sources were criticizing the entire episode, the deal with Prigozhin to be exiled in Belarus, the non-punishment for shooting down seven aircraft, and that it took the illegitimate president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, to broker a peace deal on an internal state matter. The critics include 📺 Vladimir Solovyov, saying, "Today, without a doubt, Alexander Grigoryevich [Lukashenko – **Ed.**] earned the title of Hero of Russia because he managed to do the most important thing: not to allow bloodshed," and asking, "if tank columns are advancing [on Moscow – **Ed.**], what is stopping them?"[5] [6]

In Rostov-on-Don, city residents 📺 gave Yevgeny Prigozhin a hero's goodbye.[7] Meanwhile, on the front lines

---

[4] https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/25/7408427/
[5] https://twitter.com/Prune602/status/1672774713116860416
[6] https://twitter.com/Prune602/status/1672793481658392585
[7] https://t.me/romanov_92/39526

in Ukraine, at least one unit 📺 [that pledged their support to Prigozhin](#) is furious.[8]

Belgorod Region

There was only scattered artillery shelling along the border.

Kursk Region

Air defenses in the city of Kursk 📺 [were active](#), with Russian state media claiming four Ukrainian drones were shot down.[9]

---

[8] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1672898587414482944
[9] https://t.me/shot_shot/53335

   Sunday, June 25, 2023

KHARKIV

Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure

Sunday, June 25, 2023

Svatove Operational Area

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) and the Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) reported positional fighting between squad or platoon-sized units in the area of Berestove with no change in the situation.[10] [11]

---

[10] General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report
[11] https://t.me/mod_russia/27811 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

       Sunday, June 25, 2023

DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK

Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objectve: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents

Kreminna Operational Area

Mutual fighting was reported south of [Dibrova](#), and in the [Serebryanskyy Woods](#), with no change in the situation.[12] [13]

---

[12] [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)
[13] https://t.me/mod_russia/27811 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

Sunday, June 25, 2023

NORTHEAST DONETSK

Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties

Sunday, June 25, 2023

Soledar Operational Area

Fighting continued on the ridge between Vesele and Yakovlivka, with Russian forces attempting to recapture the high ground without success.[14] [15] [16]

---

[14] General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report
[15] General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report
[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/27811 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

          Sunday, June 25, 2023

Bakhmut Operational Area

Ukrainian forces consolidated recent gains south of [Berkhivka](), with full military control of the reservoir's south shore to the dam. Marginal gains were made in the direction of [Yahidne](). Russian forces are putting up significant resistance but are being pushed back 100 to 300 meters a day along the northern flank of Bakhmut.

Ukrainian troops are visually confirmed to operate on the southwestern Bakhmut's outer edge in the garden area. We have maintained that Ukrainian troops were in this region, and the geolocation was right on the edge of the gray zone, south of the Litak area.[17] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported fighting within Bakhmut.[18] [19] Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Hanna Maliar, reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive, with one Ukrainian source claiming there were advances of up to "two streets" and another claiming a 500-meter advance. Separate from today's reports, a geolocated video confirmed that Russian

---

[17] https://t.me/z4lpr/566
[18] https://t.me/mod_russia/27811 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]
[19] https://t.me/annamaliar/881

forces occupy or occupied a [block of apartment towers west of Yuvileyna Avenue](). A Murom-M surveillance and thermal imaging complex in an apartment was spotted by a drone and [destroyed by the Ukrainian 93rd Brigade].[20] Based on this intelligence, we updated the map, moving the block to Russian-controlled but in the gray area. Ukrainian forces control 2.5% of Bakhmut in three separate pockets. There were no videos or pictures to confirm the reports of a Ukrainian advance requiring a reduction of the area of control.

---

[20] https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1672730515886014464

Klishchiivka Operational Direction

The commander of the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, Colonel Andriy Biletskyi, reported that the Russian 57th Guards Motorized Rifle Division had been pushed back across the Siverskyi Donets – Donbas Canal, and no Russian positions were left west of the waterway. Based on the intelligence, we updated the map to remove the gray area west of the canal.[21]

GSAFU reported that Russian forces attempted to retake lost territory south of Ivanivske without success.[22]

---

[21] https://t.me/ab3army/2777
[22] General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report

SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK

Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,

Sunday, June 25, 2023

destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics

Avdiivka Operational Area

Russian forces made marginal gains on June 23 between Kamyanka and Kruta Balka, advancing through the remains of a tree line in the direction of the H-20 Highway. Fighting continued in the direction of Avdiivka with no change to the situation.[23] [24] RMOD reported continued fighting in the area of Pervomaiske with no update on the situation.[25]

---

[23] General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report
[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/27811 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]
[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/27811 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

Marinka Operational Area

Fighting continued in Marinka with no change in the situation.[26] [27] [28]

---

[26] General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report
[27] General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report
[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/27811 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

Vuledar Operational Area

GSAFU reported that Russian forces attempted to advance in the [Vuhledar](#) direction, likely attempting to reestablish positions in the Mykilske dachas, without success.[29]

---

[29] [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

 Sunday, June 25, 2023

Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction

GSAFU reported a Russian attack in the direction of [Zolota Nyva](#), supported by the Russian VKS, was thwarted. Based on the report, we moved the line of conflict to the northern edge of [Novodonetske](#), putting the settlement under Russian control but in the gray area.[30] Ukrainian forces were able to expand their area of control west of [Makarivka](#), liberating over 3 square kilometers of territory and adding pressure to the Russian forces holding [Rivnopil](#).[31] The war map was updated. Fighting continued in the direction of [Pryyutne](#).[32]

---

[30] [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)
[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/27811 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]
[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/27811 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

ZAPORIZHIA

Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

 Sunday, June 25, 2023

Ukrainian Objective: Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians

Orikhiv Operational Area

Ukrainian forces made incremental gains in the direction of Robotyne and now control the last defensive line north of the settlement.[33] GSAFU reported that the Russian VKS conducted airstrikes in the settlement. On June 23,

---

         Sunday, June 25, 2023

Ukrainian forces advanced 400 meters south of [Pyatykhatky](). The map was updated to reflect both changes.

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

The water level in the channel and the reservoir was reported as stable.[34] There were no other updates.

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

Operational Command South (OKS) reported the Black Sea Fleet has six vessels on patrol, including a Kilo-class submarine capable of launching up to four Kalibr cruise missiles.[35]

---

[34] https://t.me/shtab_kakhovska_hes/1188
[35] https://t.me/Nazars_look/14976

 Sunday, June 25, 2023

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Free Kherson

Two settlements continue to have flooding, with only two residential buildings impacted – one in Novoberyslav and the other in Blahodativka.[36] The water level at the Kherson gauge is 3 centimeters above the mean, dropping 3 centimeters a day.[37]

Occupied Kherson

A Russian Rosgvardia base in occupied-Henichesk was hit with at least two Storm Shadow cruise missiles. There was no other information at the time of publication about Russian losses.[38]

---

[36] https://t.me/shtab_kakhovska_hes/1207
[37] https://t.me/shtab_kakhovska_hes/1225
[38] https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1672207750900731904

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Kyiv

At least five people were killed in Kyiv on June 24 when a Russian cruise missile struck a 25-story apartment building during the night of June 23 – 24, causing major damage.[39]

THEATERWIDE

There weren't any signifcant events.

---

[39] https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/25/7408439/

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the Oryx Database from February 24, 2022, to June 10, 2023. 10,609 Russian vs. 3,585 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	1893	204	9.38:1	⇩
Medium Duty Tanks	132	323	0.41:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	879	284	3.10:1	⇩
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2393	562	4.25:1	⇩
Armored Personnel Carriers	312	273	1.14:1	⇩
MRAPs	43	71	0.61:1	⇩
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	190	320	0.59:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	243	13	18.69:1	—
Engineering Vehicles	310	60	5.16:1	⇩
Towed Artillery	232	126	1.84:1	⇧
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	414	166	2.49:1	⇩
MLRS	206	45	4.58:1	⇧
SAMs	118	114	1.03:1	⇧
Mobile Radars	32	62	0.52:1	—
EW/ECW	40	2	20.00:1	⇧
Winged Aircraft	82	68	1.21:1	⇩
Helicopters	90	30	3.00:1	—
Naval Vessels	12	26	0.46:1	—

Notes on Sourcing Information

Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.

⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.

⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is $20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.

⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for *unique claims* about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

🛑**Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

✅**Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

✅**Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

⚠️**Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

⚠️**Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⛔**Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠️**Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⛔**Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⛔**Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠️**Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅**General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅**DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at $10 a month.

✅**Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠️**Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✅**Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for real-time reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⛔**Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.