



**MALCONTENT NEWS  
RUSSIA-UKRAINE  
SITUATION REPORT**

July 08, 2023



# Malcontent News

## Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

### 7/08/23 23:59\* PST

Malcontent News is an independent group of journalists and researchers in the United States, Canada, Ukraine, Israel, Georgia, and the United Kingdom. We are part of Badon Hill Group, LLC, and operate independently from all entities.

We are funded through Patreon, grants, and donations and aided by volunteers. For media inquiries, you can contact [social@malcontentnews.com](mailto:social@malcontentnews.com). For news tips, you can contact our newsroom at [tips@malcontentment.com](mailto:tips@malcontentment.com).

[Patrons at the Bronze level or higher](#) can access the annotated Russia-Ukraine War Situation Report (SITREP). Patrons at the Silver level or higher get a monthly Q&A viz Zoom Meeting with our Chief Content Officer or other senior staff.

This update is copyright © 2023 by Badon Hill Group LLC, all rights reserved. No parts of the original content can be reused without express written permission. Authors and Analysts: David H. Obelcz, Adam Irving, Jeff Davis, Katie Livingstone, Oskar Hallgrimsson, Ryan Evans, Michael Hering, and Ana Ras, Spanish Editor in Chief

***The reader accepts that the information contained in the Malcontent News Situation Report will not be used for travel, navigation, or personal security assessment. The reader agrees to get real-time information from official channels provided by national, oblast, raion, hromada, city, or local officials and follow their security recommendations.***



**SUMMARY – DAY 499.....3**

**DAILY ASSESSMENT .....4**

**TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP.....6**

**UKRAINE WEATHER .....7**

**SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY.....8**

**KHARKIV .....9**

**DONBAS REGION .....11**

**LUHANSK ..... 11**

**NORTHEAST DONETSK ..... 16**

**SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK..... 21**

**ZAPORIZHIA..... 27**

**BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION .... 31**

**WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE.....32**

**NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE.....33**

**RUSSIAN FRONT.....34**

**THEATERWIDE.....34**

**RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES..... 41**

**RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION, MOBIKS, AND MIR .....42**

## **SUMMARY – DAY 499**

While our report looks backward on the previous 24 hours and bleeds in breaking news to the current today, it has been 3,419 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 134 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine. It has been 500 days since Russia launched its genocidal attack on the Ukrainian people. In 500 days, Russia has not achieved a single military, economic, or political goal.

- The military leaders of the Azovstal defense were released by Türkiye, blindsiding Moscow
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy went to Snake Island to honor its defenders and liberators
- Ukrainian forces have advanced up to 2,000 meters south of Velkya Novosilka
- Ukrainian forces have advanced up to 1,000 meters east of Robotyne
- The use of JDAM-ER precision glide bombs by the Ukrainian Airforce was confirmed
- Moscow is being battered by one political crisis after another, further eroding Putin's power and the abilities of the Russian Information Agency to manage internal and external propaganda

## **DAILY ASSESSMENT**

We assess the following:

1. The release of the commanders of Azovstal from Türkiye, in violation of a September 21, 2022, three-way agreement between Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Türkiye, further weakened Russian President Vladimir Putin. In our assessment, the risk of another attempted insurrection/coup is notable.
2. Ukrainian military leaders' changes to battlefield tactics have created a slower but more effective offensive that reduces the attrition of personnel and equipment.
3. The current Ukrainian military activity is subordinate offensives and shaping operations, and the main operation has not started.
4. The Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces.
5. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community will impact Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.


6. Russian forces on the forward line of friendly troops (FLOT) suffer from critical shortages of heavy weapons, effective radio communications, food, and potable water, increasing casualties and lowering morale.
7. Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.
8. Chairman of the Council of the Union of the All-Ukrainian Energy Assembly, Ivan Plachkov, agreed with our June 30 assessment that the biggest danger to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is Russian occupiers sabotaging the facility to make it unusable and irreparable.<sup>1</sup>
9. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)

---

<sup>1</sup> <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1674903372917538816>


## TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



**About the maps:** Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the *Moskva* and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

### [Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)


# UKRAINE WEATHER



Most of eastern Ukraine and parts of the south, including the occupied territories of Crimea, are under the equivalent of a Severe Thunderstorm Watch with torrential rain, hail, and winds up to 55 kph possible. CAPE of 1,500 to 2,000 (ECMWF model) is projected over far eastern Ukraine, creating a marginal possibility of severe weather. High temperatures will be from 20° to 29° Celcius, with a warming trend at the end of the upcoming week. Low temperatures will be from 11° to 23° The new moon is on July 17.




## SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY



*July 16, 2023, GFS forecast predicts soil saturation will range from 10% to 30% to 40 centimeters deep across the theater of war within Ukraine.*


***The soil saturation model does not consider the lakebed of the Kakhovka Reservoir.*** Soil saturation is between 20% to 65% in southern and eastern Ukraine and remains stable through July 16. Temporary tractability issues were reported on July 8 in several areas due to severe thunderstorms. The weather may have contributed to the reduced operational tempo.

# KHARKIV



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

**Ukrainian Objective:** Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



## Svatove Operational Area

For the second day in a row, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported that a Russian attack to the northwest of [Berestove](#) was repulsed.<sup>2</sup>


***Editor's Note:*** The GSAFU report again stated "northwest of Berestove," but there have been no reports from any source of Russian forces recapturing [Krokhmalne](#) or an advance to [Pischchane](#).

---

<sup>2</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)


# DONBAS REGION

## LUHANSK



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections

# Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents




## Svatove Operational Area

Russian forces continued attempts to advance on [Novoselivske](#) and launched an attack in the direction of [Stelmakhivka](#). Both Russian offensives were unsuccessful.<sup>3</sup>

4

<sup>3</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)


<sup>4</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)




Russian mercenary milblogger Rybar reported that Russian troops attempted a wet crossing of the Zherebets River west of [Karmazynivka](#), which ended in failure.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/13697>



## Kreminna Operational Area


Video released by Ukraine showed a captured TOS-1 thermobaric multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) that Ukraine captured last year  [being used against Russian troops](#) in a woodblock west of Kreminna.<sup>6</sup>

**ASSESSMENT:** The strike was further west from Kreminna than where Russian forces have been previously recorded. Based on geolocation information, we moved the line of conflict further west toward Tors'ke. This does not represent a recent territorial gain and is a change based on improved intelligence.

---


<sup>6</sup> <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1677888021650370560>

## Occupied Luhansk

The Storm Shadow missile strike on the  [Russian ammunition depot](#) between Sukhodilsk and Sorokyne was more significant than we first reported. The facility struck is reportedly the largest Russian base in occupied Luhansk, and there were significant losses of munition and troops. The Russian leadership has not acknowledged the strike.




## NORTHEAST DONETSK





**Russian Objective:** Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections

**Ukrainian Objective:** Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties




## Soledar Axis

The Ukrainian Airforce  [struck a Russian forward operating base \(FOB\) in Paraskoviivka with JDAM-ER glide bombs provided by NATO.](#)<sup>7</sup> Ukrainian officials released a picture  [of a JDAM-ER mounted on a Mig-29,](#) acknowledging for the first time that the precision-guided bombs have been deployed.<sup>8</sup>


<sup>7</sup> [https://twitter.com/bayraktar\\_1love/status/1677724866407981056](https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1677724866407981056)

<sup>8</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/104579>



## Bakhmut Operational Area

Russian sources released a video showing intense fighting within the center of [Berkhivka](#), including several dead Ukrainian troops, and allegedly prisoners were taken. We did not adjust the map beyond moving the battle indicator, which is the rough location of where the video was recorded. We have elected not to share the video due to the intensely graphic content.




## Klishchiivka Operational Area

Ukrainian forces made additional tactical gains northwest, west, and southwest of [Klishchiivka](#). Based on the latest intelligence we can share, we made changes to the gray area west of the settlement and a small adjustment to the line of conflict.

**ASSESSMENT:** Russia's continued defense of the settlement is untenable, with Ukrainian forces consolidating their recent gains. Ukrainian snipers are starting to shoot Russian soldiers within Klishchiivka, and multiple Russian units have reported catastrophic losses, supply and

logistics challenges, poor command and control, and a lack of artillery support.




The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed Ukrainian forces continued their offensive in the direction of [Mayorsk](#).<sup>9</sup>

Donetsk Oblast Administrative and Military Governor (OVA) Pavlo Kyrylenko reported that the number of casualties due to Russia's Smerch rocket attack on Lyman increased to ten dead and 12 wounded.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28184](https://t.me/mod_russia/28184) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>10</sup> [https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko\\_donoda/8721](https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/8721)


# SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

**Ukrainian Objective:** Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,

destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics




## Avdiivka Operational Area

GSAFU reported that Russian forces attempted to advance in the direction of [Novokalynove](#) and [Stepove](#) from Krasnohorivka without success.<sup>11 12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>12</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)




The 1st Army Corps continued attempts to advance on [Avdiivka](#), suffered losses, and retreated to their defensive positions. Former FSB Colonel and convicted war criminal Igor Strelkov Girkin condemned Russian tactics in the Avdiivka operational area, writing, "Near Avdiivka, **our** troops continue the 'meat assaults.' It seems that the headquarters of the 1st Army Corps is in a hurry to destroy the maximum number of our fighters in the most useless way in order to lose the war quickly."<sup>13</sup> The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) claimed that fighting continued in the gray area between [Sjeverne and Vodyane](#).<sup>14</sup> Russian and Ukrainian sources reported mutual fighting on the

<sup>13</sup> <https://t.me/strelkovii/5941>

<sup>14</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28184](https://t.me/mod_russia/28184) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]



eastern edge of [Pervomaiske](#), and in a repeat from yesterday, GSAFU reported a Russian attack in the direction of [Nevelske](#) was unsuccessful.<sup>15 16 17</sup>



## Marinka Operational Area

Russian and Ukrainian sources reported mutual fighting in and near [Marinka](#) with no change in the situation.<sup>18 19 20 21</sup>

<sup>15</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>16</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)


<sup>17</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28184](https://t.me/mod_russia/28184) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>18</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>19</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>20</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28184](https://t.me/mod_russia/28184) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>21</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/13697>



## Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction

Yesterday we indicated that we had additional information that we elected not to share to support Ukrainian operational security (OPSEC). We can share the information faster than we expected. Over the last week, Ukrainian forces have advanced 1,500 to 2,000 meters in depth on a 12-kilometer-wide front between [Pryyutne](#) and [Staromaiorske](#). Since June 4, Ukrainian forces have advanced up to 8 kilometers from their starting positions. Ukrainian forces have also reached the administrative borders of Pryyutne, Staromaiorske, and [Novodonetske](#). Russian troops have fallen back to reserve defensive lines. We have additional information that we cannot share due to OPSEC.

**ASSESSMENT:** While progress appears to be slow and the offensive is bogged down, Ukrainian forces collapsed numerous small salients, as we previously assessed would happen. While many find the lack of liberated settlements frustrating, Ukrainian military tactics are based on not attacking Russian strong points head-on but bypassing and forcing a withdrawal. The density of landmines deployed exceeds Russian Federation doctrine, making maneuver warfare difficult.

Mutual fighting continued near [Blahodatne](#), [Staromaiorske](#), [Urozhaine](#), and [Pryyutne](#) [Zaporizhia-Donetsk administrative border].<sup>22 23 24 25</sup>

---


<sup>22</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>23</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>24</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28184](https://t.me/mod_russia/28184) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


<sup>25</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/13697>

# ZAPORIZHIA



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks


**Ukrainian Objective:** Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



## Hulyaipole Operational Area

RMOD claimed that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance units (DRG) were operating in the area of [Marfopil](#) and [Dorozhnyanka](#).<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28184](https://t.me/mod_russia/28184) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]



## Orikhiv Operational Area

Positional fighting was reported north and northeast of [Robotyne](#), with Ukrainian forces reaching the administrative border of the settlement.<sup>27</sup> <sup>28</sup> We can also report and update the map to show advances up to 1,000 meters east of Robotyne. Russian mercenary milblogger Rybar reported that Ukrainian forces broke through Russian defensive lines held by the 71st Motor Rifle Regiment.<sup>29</sup> A video released by Ukraine showed the [capture of a Russian command post and ammunition depot](#)

<sup>27</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/28184](https://t.me/mod_russia/28184) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>28</sup> <https://t.me/rybar/49490>

<sup>29</sup> <https://t.me/rybar/49492>


in Pyatykhatky three weeks ago.<sup>30</sup> Fighting continued on the eastern and northern edge of [Zherebyanky](#).<sup>31</sup> Ukrainian forces have reached the administrative border of the settlement.

## Occupied Zaporizhia

Insurgents shared a picture of a [destroyed S-300 antiaircraft battery](#) in occupied Tokmak.<sup>32</sup>

## Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Chairman of the Council of the Union of the All-Ukrainian Energy Assembly, Ivan Plachkov, said that Russian plans to make the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) inoperable, "I think that the Russian Federation is at least preparing to damage and destroy a lot of equipment so that the ZNPP will be unfit for repair after de-occupation. It will be difficult to restore it so that we can [use] it."

On  [June 30, we wrote](#), "There is a sabotage scenario that doesn't appear to be discussed. Russia could contaminate the inside of the outer vessels through a provocation,

---

<sup>30</sup> <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1677916495689523200>

<sup>31</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/13697>

<sup>32</sup> [https://t.me/tokmak\\_ukraine/4201](https://t.me/tokmak_ukraine/4201)

releasing extreme radioactivity within the plant [and] rendering it ruined – scorched earth economically.”

**ASSESSMENT:** We maintain this is the most likely scenario when de-occupation occurs.

The water level in the cooling reservoir and the feed channel remained at acceptable levels.

## **BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION**

### **Black Sea**

Operational Command South (OKS) reported five Black Sea Fleet vessels on patrol with no missile carriers.<sup>33</sup>

### **Occupied Crimea**

Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Maliar appeared to admit that Ukraine was involved in the Crimean Bridge's October 8, 2022, destruction. In a post on Telegram, she wrote, “273 days since the first strike was

---

<sup>33</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/104664>



made on the Crimean bridge to break the Russians' logistics," which has been widely interpreted as an admission of Ukrainian involvement.<sup>34</sup> The Ukrainian government has not confirmed nor denied involvement in the attack. On May 26, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Vasily Malyuk, stated that the bridge was a valid military target because "it was a logistical route that we were obliged to cut."

## WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

**Russian Objective:** Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

**Ukrainian Objective:** Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

### Free Kherson

Kherson Oblast OVA Alexander Prokudin reported that Russian forces carried out 59 fire missions, firing 334 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad rockets fired by MLRS,

---

<sup>34</sup> <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/35889>

drone-delivered IEDs, and bombs.<sup>35</sup> Sixteen munitions hit the city of Kherson, wounding one person.

## Occupied Kherson

Social media posts in Hola Prystan from residents indicate they are trying to find vaccinations for cholera, and occupation officials are withholding treatment. We cannot independently verify the claims.<sup>36</sup>

## NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

**Russian Objective:** Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

**Ukrainian Objective:** Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity.

---

<sup>35</sup> <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/7824>

<sup>36</sup> [https://t.me/tokmak\\_ukraine/4195](https://t.me/tokmak_ukraine/4195)


## RUSSIAN FRONT

**Russian Objective:** Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent further insurrection, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

**Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective:** Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

There wasn't any significant activity.

## THEATERWIDE

To acknowledge 500 days of Russia's intensified war of aggression, Ukrainian officials released a video showing  [President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visiting Snake Island](#) to honor its liberation one year and eight days ago.<sup>37</sup> Zelenskyy traveled by boat during the early morning,

---

<sup>37</sup> <https://twitter.com/i/status/1677612718721753089>

laying yellow and blue flowers at the landing and placing Ukrainian flags. The video was filmed recently but not in the last several days, as Zelenskyy was visiting Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Turkey.

Flying back from Istanbul on a Czech Republic military plane to Lviv, President Zelenskyy also announced that the commanders of Azov and the leaders of the 86-day defense of Mariupol had been released by Türkiye after 291 days of semi-detainment.<sup>38</sup> Denys Prokopenko, Svyatoslav Palamar, Serhiy Volynskyi, Oleg Khomenko, and Denys Shlega were released to Türkiye on September 21, 2022, in a three-way prisoner exchange brokered by Saudi Arabia. They were among over 200 prisoners released by Russia, including all foreign fighters, in exchange for Viktor Medvedchuk, who Ukrainian officials had arrested for treason and collaboration with Russia. The five Azov commanders were supposed to remain in Türkiye until the war's end. However, Türkiye  [released the Ukrainian military leaders](#).<sup>39</sup>

Talking with reporters, Azov commander Prokopenko told reporters, "We will still have our say in battle," and stated

---

<sup>38</sup> [https://t.me/ukrarmed\\_forces/5271](https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5271)

<sup>39</sup> <https://twitter.com/i/status/1677753506416009217>

that they all intend to return to the front. "Of course, that's why we came back here!"

To say that the Kremlin, Russian milbloggers, influencers, and talking heads were going through some things would be an understatement.

Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that he had been deceived, and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters, "In the context of preparations for the NATO summit, Türkiye was put under great pressure, and Ankara, as a member of the alliance, shows solidarity with it, the Russian Federation understands everything very well."<sup>40</sup> Peskov added that Moscow was not consulted or notified about the impending release.

**ASSESSMENT:** President of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is an autocrat with increasing influence on the world stage and the Black Sea. We do not have expertise in Turkish politics, but combined with the announced support of Ukraine joining NATO, a memo of understanding to build drones jointly with Ukraine, the provision of 155 mm self-propelled howitzers, declining to provide Russia with

---

<sup>40</sup> <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/86436>

Bayraktar drones, and quietly providing Ukraine with DPICM (cluster munitions) since November 2022, Ankara is sending a signal that they no longer see President Putin as a monolithic neighboring power that must be appeased. Why now, and why this way, is unclear.

Russian milblogger Two Majors wrote that news has been devastating among Russian frontline units, who have been told through Russian propaganda they are fighting literal Nazis in Ukraine.<sup>41</sup> The release of these five leaders was problematic in September, but now the message is completely undermined. "According to reports from the front from some of our advanced units, there was extreme resentment at the information about the return of the commanders of the terrorists of Azov to [Kyiv]. This act is associated with the increased activity of [*Roman – Ed.*] Abramovich, who at one time organized the transfer of terrorists to [Türkiye] 'on [Erdoğan's] word of honor.' The colossal damage to the moral and psychological state of the warring fighters can have unpredictable consequences. It is necessary to stop this blow with many long-overdue measures, including taking into account the objective reasons for the armed action of PMC Wagner [*Group – Ed.*]."

---

<sup>41</sup> [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/20586](https://t.me/dva_majors/20586)

But wait, there's more. President Erdoğan invited President Putin to meet in Türkiye in August.<sup>42</sup> "Yesterday, we received the President of Ukraine Zelenskyy, and in August, I hope, we will meet with Mr. Putin. We are trying to protect our country from the negative effects of a war that has been going on for a year and a half now."

Türkiye is not a signatory of the Rome Statute, so the country is not required to arrest Putin on his open warrant with the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, the Republic of Türkiye's website for Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy states, "Even though Türkiye is not State Party to The Rome Statute, the activities of the ICC are closely followed, and the annual meetings of the Assembly of States Parties which take place in The Hague or New York are attended by our officials."<sup>43</sup>

When asked by Russian reporters, Kremlin spokesperson Peskov said, "There is no certainty about the meeting between Putin and Erdogan."

---

<sup>42</sup> [https://t.me/romanov\\_92/40128](https://t.me/romanov_92/40128)

<sup>43</sup> [Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy](#) [Turkish Government Website]

President Zelenskyy announced that Oleksandr Pivnenko had been named the new commander of the National Guard of Ukraine.<sup>44</sup>

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Oleskii Reznikov, acknowledged that air defense in some cities, including Zaporizhzhia, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Odesa has been problematic. "I did not believe the Russians would start shelling peaceful cities with missiles. Because this obviously contradicted their goal. Therefore, I perceive the reliable protection of our sky as a personal challenge. In Kyiv, we have almost solved this task. In Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa – no, but we are working."<sup>45</sup> All of the cities mentioned by Reznikov will be getting additional air defense systems in the near future.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Poland transferred 12 Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters to Ukraine.<sup>46</sup>

Portugal became the 23rd nation officially declaring its support for Ukraine's ascension to NATO.<sup>47</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/104651>

<sup>45</sup> <https://t.me/zaborzp/48570>

<sup>46</sup> <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/86473>

<sup>47</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/104608>



***Errors and Omissions:*** *On July 7, we reported the 155 mm "M864 artillery round can deliver 24 M46 anti-materiel or 48 M42 anti-personnel submunitions up to 29 kilometers away." This was in error. The M864 delivers 24 M46 and 48 M42 submunitions. We thank you for your understanding.*

The table for equipment losses was last updated on July 6, 2023, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.


## RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to July 6, 2023. 11,001 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 3,786 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
<b>Main Battle Tanks</b>	1952	228	8.56:1	↓
<b>Medium Duty Tanks</b>	139	330	0.42:1	—
<b>Armored fighting Vehicles</b>	905	292	3.10:1	↑
<b>Infantry Fighting Vehicles</b>	2483	602	4.12:1	↓
<b>Armored Personnel Carriers</b>	323	286	1.13:1	—
<b>MRAPs</b>	45	107	0.42:1	—
<b>Infantry Mobility Vehicles</b>	194	331	0.59:1	—
<b>Command and Communications Vehicles</b>	245	15	16.33:1	↑
<b>Engineering Vehicles</b>	317	70	4.53:1	—
<b>Towed Artillery</b>	250	130	1.92:1	↑
<b>Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars</b>	441	174	2.53:1	↑
<b>MLRS</b>	230	47	4.89:1	↑
<b>SAMs</b>	123	113	1.08:1	↑
<b>Mobile Radars</b>	35	66	0.53:1	↓
<b>EW/ECW</b>	41	4	10.25:1	—
<b>Winged Aircraft</b>	85	68	1.25:1	—
<b>Helicopters</b>	106	31	3.42:1	↑
<b>Naval Vessels</b>	12	26	0.46:1	—

## RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION, MOBIKS, AND MIR

The Chief of Staff of the Sparta Battalion of the former 1st Army Corps of the so-called Donetsk's People's Republic, Alexander Pukachyov, was killed in action in the Donbas.<sup>48</sup>

Mobilized on September 26, 2022, mobiks from the Altai Krai region  [released a video appealing for help from President Putin](#).<sup>49</sup> They claim they moved into their current positions on April 22 and were forced to retreat on June 24 due to insufficient artillery support. Instead of being moved to the third echelon as initially promised by commanders, they were told there was none and were sent back to the forward line of friendly troops (FLOT – zero line). They claim they were attacked for almost two hours by tanks with no heavy weapons or artillery support. They have no idea what unit they were transferred to and may have been moved to Storm Z. In the video, they claim they requested food and water, and their commander declined the request, saying they already had provisions.

---

<sup>48</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/104668>

<sup>49</sup> <https://twitter.com/i/status/1677622480788226049>


## Notes on Sourcing Information


**Malcontent News** uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for real-time reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.