



MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

June 3, 2023



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 464

It has been 3,384 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 99 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine. Today's report is combat only.

Because the Russian Front has become the most active axis, we have moved it to the top of the report.

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. In preparation for larger offensive operations, Ukrainian forces continue shaping operations on multiple axes, creating panic and uncertainty among gauleiters, Russian administrators, and military leaders.
2. We maintain that the continued incursions into the Belgorod region along a 275-kilometer stretch of the Russia-Ukraine border are meant to force the Russian Ministry of Defense to move military assets out of Ukraine to secure the region.


3. Soil conditions and tractability are now favorable for large-scale military operations.
4. We have identified shaping activity by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in four locations that could indicate a larger attack is being prepared.
5. We assess that Russian forces have surrendered the initiative theaterwide, with the only significant combat operations continuing in the Marinka Operational Area where recently introduced Chechen forces have had little success.
6. Anger and frustration among Russian state media, propagandists, milbloggers, and residents of the oblasts that border Ukraine continue to expand with open discussions on Russian state media and social media about replacing Russian President Vladimir Putin, questioning Russian nuclear doctrine and the repeated irresponsible threats, and widespread criticism of Moscow's inability to secure Russian borders and airspace.
7. Political infighting between the Russian Ministry of Defense, Chechen leaders, and Private Military Company Wagner Group continues to escalate, negatively impacting Russian combat operations throughout the theater of war.
8. We maintain that Russian Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to

their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.

9. We assess that despite the less-than-acceptable performance of Russian air defenses in Moscow, General of the Army Sergey Surovikin appears to have survived the current political environment within the Russian Ministry of Defense.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)


TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the *Moskva* and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

UKRAINE WEATHER



Dry weather will continue through June 9, according to the ECMWF Euro ensemble model. High temperatures will be from 16° to 29° Celcius, and lows from 6° to 15°, with temperatures steadily increasing through the week. Winds up to 45 kph are expected on Sunday and Monday, which will accelerate soil drying. The full moon is on June 4, the new moon is on June 18, and the longest day of the year is June 21.


SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY



The June 11, 2023 GFS forecast indicates soil saturation to 40 centimeters deep will be 10% to 50% across most of Ukraine.


Soil saturation from Zaporizhia through the Donbas is 50% to 70%, with eastern Kherson holding at 20% on the east bank of the Dnipro. Soil saturation can support heavy equipment and armored vehicles theaterwide, and there is no significant rain in the forecast through June 9. If the long range model holds, Russian logistics in the deep rear along the Russia-Ukraine border could be impacted by wet conditions that don't reach the line of conflict.

RUSSIAN FRONT





Russian Objective: Repel Russian partisan attacks, stabilize the border, and maintain civil order

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest




Belgorod Operational Direction


For the fourth day, Russian partisans with the Free Russian Legion (FPL) and the Russian Volunteer Corps (PVC)  continued fighting against Russian nationalists in Novaya Tavolzhanka and the outskirts of Shebekino.^{1 2} The FPL released a brief statement: "There is  active fighting near Novaya Tavolzhanka. Putin's troops continue to cover houses with civilians with heavy artillery. We urge the locals not to come out of their shelters."

¹ <https://twitter.com/i/status/1665252670997659654>

² <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/78564>

The PVK also released a statement, saying, "The Bihorod People's Republic [*what Russian partisans have named the Belgorod region – Ed.*] is turning into a gray area from Russia: abandoned houses, abandoned residents, [the] complete absence of local administration and police representatives."³

Russian nationalist soldiers geolocated at the Lukoil gas station on the 14K-3 Russian Ground Line of Communication (GLOC - supply line) near Krutologskoe, 17 kilometers northwest of Shebekino,  [recorded a video of the city being shelled by incendiary thermite munitions.](#)⁴ Russian nationalists and partisans traded accusations of shelling the city, once home to 40,000 people.

Russian propagandist Readovka shared a video showing widespread damage in at least one part of Shebekino,  [with burned-out buildings, uncontrolled fires, and widespread damage.](#)⁵

Russian milblogger Gennady Alekhin reported from within Shebekino that looting was ongoing, and only 500 residents

³ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/3886

⁴ https://t.me/romanov_92/38703

⁵ <https://t.me/readovkanews/60054>

remained. “Unfortunately, there is [opportunities] for marauders, [and] to stop this...activity...the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Russian Guard are on patrol.”⁶


Unaffiliated Russian state media war correspondent Mariana Batkovna also reported from Shebekino and criticized Russian state media coverage of the situation. “An empty yard, broken glass, burnt-out cars in the yard, and rare civilian cars flying at high speed. Basically, these people were able to take their families and children to safe places and returned for things and documents. In some places in the city, the Internet [was available], possibly through Ukrainian roaming, since there has been no electricity in Shebekino for several days. There is no water, enterprises and organizations are closed, shops and transport do not work, and the city police department is burned down. It is terrible to see an abandoned, mercilessly and unrequitedly shot Russian city, burning houses, bitterness and bewilderment in the eyes of a few local residents. Television? Moscow? ‘We don't believe you...’”⁷

Belgorod regional governor Vyacheslav Gladkov described the night of June 3 – 4 as “restless” and reported there was a lot of damage. “Please, all those settlements, primarily in

⁶ https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7812

⁷ <https://t.me/maryananaumova/1366>

the Shebekino District, which are being shelled, listen to the authorities' position and leave," Gladkov said.⁸


He added that 4,000 area residents  [were in refugee centers](#), calling for public assistance to "get through this common misfortune."^{9 10}

Russian nationalists released a video showing five dead Russian partisans, claiming they had killed up to 50 and destroyed several armored vehicles without supporting evidence. Multiple reports from area residents and Russian milbloggers don't support the official narrative.

⁸ <https://t.me/vvgladkov/2456>

⁹ <https://t.me/vvgladkov/2456>

¹⁰ <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/78599>



Volokonovka Operational Direction

Governor Gladkov reported the Volokonovka region was heavily shelled, with Russian reports claiming that Tishanka, a Russia-Ukraine border crossing checkpoint before February 24, 2022, was heavily damaged.¹¹

¹¹ <https://t.me/vvgladkov/2456>

Belgorod Region

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov maintained the Kremlin talking points that the situation in Belgorod was inconsequential. "No, of course, this cannot have any effect on the course of the military operation," Peskov said, answering the question of whether the intensified border attacks would affect the course of Russia's so-called "special military operation."¹²

Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin inserted himself into the situation in a new statement. "If the Ministry of Defense does not stop the lawlessness that is taking over the territories of the Russian Federation in the near future, we will come to the Belgorod region and protect our Russian people. I emphasize we will protect our people: including Russians, Dagestanis, Chechens, and ethnic Ukrainians. We will not wait for an invitation and ask permission. The only thing is that we will demand ammunition. It is useless to come without them."¹³

ASSESSMENT: Prigozhin is maintaining his information war against the Kremlin by repeatedly shifting the narrative in

¹² <https://t.me/blackcolonel2020/945>

¹³ https://t.me/orchestra_w/7038

the information space that PMC Wagner is a superior fighting force to the Russian Federation Armed Forces, which is unsupported by bad actors within the Russian Ministry of Defense. His request for ammunition will go unanswered, enabling him to continue attacking Russian officials while gaining support from Russian nationals living on the Ukrainian border.

Retired Russian Colonel and former State Duma Deputy Viktor Alksnis continued criticizing Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin, and the lack of unity among Russian citizens. "I never thought that after Chechnya in the 90s, I would see this horror, when the Russian city of forty thousand turns into dust, and the leadership of the Russian Federation pretends that nothing special is happening and everything is going according to plan. And he [*Putin – Ed.*] doesn't even try to do something real to stop this horror. The President is busy with the problems of ecotourism and creative industries, and the Ministry of Defense reports daily with victorious fanfare about another destroyed Ukrainian tank or a strategic advance of 100 meters. Meanwhile, thousands of Russian civilians are fleeing Shebekino, engulfed in flames, leaving their homes and property. And the rest of Russia lives a normal life and


does not even imagine that a similar disaster is approaching the threshold of their house."¹⁴

A spokesperson for the Defense Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (GUR) said that the operation of the PVK and FPL "is still ongoing" and that the territory of the Russian Federation is defended mainly by "pot-bellied traffic police." He added that the Ministry of Internal Affairs employees are not trained or equipped to execute the Edelweiss protocol because they are "taught to beat with batons participants of peaceful protests and take bribes from pensioners."

"That's why it's so unfortunate. Artillery and Grad [*rockets – Ed.*] have to bomb and destroy civilian houses of the Muscovites themselves. This is all happening live. The whole world is watching all this."


¹⁴ <https://t.me/blackcolonel2020/946>

KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, hold current defensive lines, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorychne and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



Dvorichna Operational Area


Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting in the area of [Masyutivka](#), with no change in the situation.¹⁵

16 17

¹⁵ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16745>

¹⁶ https://t.me/mod_russia/27063 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

¹⁷ <https://t.me/wargonzo/12931>




Kupyansk Operational Area

The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) alleged that Ukrainian surveillance, reconnaissance, and sabotage (DRG) units were operating in the area of [Oralyanske](#).¹⁸

¹⁸ https://t.me/mod_russia/27063 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, prevent further Ukrainian advances, control insurgent activity

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents



Svatove Operational Area


Ukrainian sources and Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo reported continued fighting in the area of [Novoselivske](#) with no change in the situation.^{19 20 21 22}

¹⁹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

²⁰ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

²¹ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16745>


²² <https://t.me/wargonzo/12931>



Kreminna Operational Area


The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported that Russian forces attempted to advance in the direction of [Makiivka](#) and were unsuccessful.²³

²³ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)



RMOD alleged that Ukrainian DRG units were operating in the area of [Kuzmyne](#).²⁴

²⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/27063 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




Lysychansk Operational Area

GSAFU reported that Russian forces continued their attacks on [Bilohorivka](#), suffered losses, and returned to their defensive positions.^{25 26}

²⁵ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

²⁶ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Capture Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties


Bakhmut Operational Area

The British Ministry of Defense Defense Intelligence Directorate reported that Russian airborne units (VDV), which are "greatly degraded," are being transferred to the

Bakhmut Operational Area. The 106th Guards Airborne Division based in Tula, and the 76th Guards Air Assault Division based in Pskov have been deployed to replace PMC Wagner mercenaries. The units no longer maintain their "elite" status, with the 76th withdrawn from the Kreminna Operational Area in March 2023.²⁷

ASSESSMENT: Based on previous history, VDV forces will serve as advisors and blocking troops for the territorial guard from the 1st Army Corps of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DNR), elements of the 2nd Army Corps staffed by mobiks and residents of the so-called former Luhansk People's Republic (LNR), and Storm-Z penal mercenaries. The VDV forces will only engage in combat after the weaker forces have been used to exhaust Ukrainian positions in human wave attacks or to expose Ukrainian strong points through ad hoc attacks without artillery or armor support. There is no reason to believe that RMOD will change its tactics or how the VDV and Naval Infantry have used what they deem are "lesser" troops.

²⁷ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/32174>




Klishchiivka Operational Area

GSAFU reported that Russian forces attempted to advance in the direction of [Ivanivske](#) and were unsuccessful.^{28 29}

²⁸ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

²⁹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)


SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, consolidate gains made during the winter offensive, and set conditions for September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Lock Russian military assets in place, defend the existing line of conflict while finding and exploiting weaknesses, destroy troop concentrations and


command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



Avdiivka Operational Area

Ukrainian source DeepState reported localized point attacks by Russian troops south of [Kamyanka](#) in the direction of Avdiivka and south of [Pervomiaske](#).³⁰

³⁰ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16745>



Marinka Operational Area

As we check the calendar to see if this is a day that ends in "y," Chechen forces of the Akhmat 54th Motor Rifle Brigade and the Russian 5th Motor Rifle Brigade of the 1st Army Corps, supported by the VKS continued their attacks on [Marinka](#), which was the most active operational area in Ukraine. Chechen forces suffered significant losses launching 23 separate attacks throughout the day.^{31 32 33 34} GSAFU reported that Russian-aligned forces tried to

³¹ [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

³² [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

³³ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16745>


³⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/27063 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

advance from Russian-controlled [Oleksandrivka](#) and were unsuccessful.³⁵

Occupied Southwestern Donetsk

Insurgents reported that Russian forces are towing – something – from the port of Berdyansk in the Mariupol direction using helicopters instead of a tugboat.³⁶

After the missile strike on Yuryivska a week ago, which potentially killed and wounded dozens of Russian soldiers, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly arrested all of the support employees, management, and property owners for interrogation. Most were released, but three people who were arrested are reported as missing.³⁷

In an apparent traffic accident in Shakhtarsk,  [a Russian armored personnel carrier ran over a civilian car](#), killing two people.³⁸


³⁵ ³⁵

³⁶ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/10396>

³⁷ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/10388>

³⁸ <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/78560>

ZAPORIZHIA



Russian Objective: Prepare for a Ukrainian offensive, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate Russian-occupied areas, prevent further Russian advances, exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, and protect civilians

Free Zaporizhia

Russian forces conducted 85 fire missions, two drone attacks, and two airstrikes, targeting 22 settlements along the line of conflict.³⁹

Occupied Zaporizhia

Local residents reported five  [explosions north of Melitopol](#). At the time of publication, there was no other information.^{40 41}


Between Dolynseke (southwest of Melitopol) and Yakymivka, railroad tracks were destroyed by an explosion. It is unclear if a bridge between the two settlements or a point on the tracks was targeted.⁴²




³⁹ https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/19188

⁴⁰ https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/2159

⁴¹ https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/2158


⁴² https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/2156

Satellite images show that the June 2, 2023, Storm Shadow cruise missile strike  [hit warehouses in the port](#), causing significant damage to both buildings with evidence of secondary explosions.⁴³

The sky was a page out of history, with a video showing the explosions of air defenses covering the sky of Berdyansk  [like World War II flak](#) with the  [continuous sounds of explosions](#).⁴⁴ ⁴⁵ Video showed  [at least one missile was shot down](#).⁴⁶

There was significant fog of war on how many missiles were involved, their composition, and how many were shot down. Local residents reported ten missiles, Russian propagandists reported six, and the RMOD reported two.

Editor's Note: This is why we have trust issues.

Pictures showed the debris of a  [Tochka-U short-range ballistic missile](#) (SRBM) that was shot down.⁴⁷

⁴³ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/32260>

⁴⁴ <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/78654>

⁴⁵ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/32220?single>

⁴⁶ https://t.me/tokmak_ukraine/3608

⁴⁷ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/3223>

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant


There was no change in the situation.

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

Ukrainian Operational Command South (OKS) recorded ten vessels of the Black Sea Fleet on patrol with no missile carriers.⁴⁸

Occupied Crimea

Multiple explosions were reported in Dzhankoi, shattering windows in homes. Russian occupiers claimed the blasts were caused by air defenses shooting down up to five Ukrainian drones, and the blasts and broken windows were caused by missile debris. A teenager can expect a visit from local authorities  [posting a video of himself running](#) from the sound of explosions declaring, "F*** the war."⁴⁹

⁴⁸ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/32251>

⁴⁹ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/32250>

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Free Kherson

Russian forces conducted 56 fire missions firing 287 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad and Smerch rockets, drone-delivered IEDs, and bombs, with the city of Kherson targeted seven times and hit by 39 munitions.^{50 51}

Occupied Kherson



According to Russian sources, collaborator Yury Patlaty, the illegitimate mayor of Kostogrizove, was killed by an explosion on June 1.⁵²

⁵⁰ <https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/585>

⁵¹ <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/6385>

⁵² v

Dnipropetrovsk

A Russian Iskander missile struck Pidhorodne, north of Dnipro. The attack killed one, a two-year-old girl, and wounded 22, including five children. Ten  [homes](#) and two  [two-story apartment buildings were partially destroyed](#) when the Russian missile landed between the structures.⁵³

54 55

Kirovohrad

Colonel Yuriy Ignat, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Airforce, confirmed that two Russian Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles struck the Ukrainian military airbase at Kropyvnytskyi. No other information was available, but NASA Fire Information for Resource Management Systems (FIRMS) did not record any thermal anomalies, suggesting that no ammunition or fuel reserves were hit.⁵⁶

⁵³ <https://t.me/zaborzp/45740>

⁵⁴ <https://t.me/zaborzp/45711>

⁵⁵ https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/4892


⁵⁶ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/99455>

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Kyiv

Up to two Shahed-136 kamikaze drones struck a factory in the Holosiiv District of Kyiv,  [creating a large fire](#). Firefighters found the building had been struck by a second drone, which malfunctioned and didn't explode, but the warhead was still intact. Explosive ordnance disposal experts donned fire protection gear and disarmed the drone, removing the 50-kilogram warhead despite the conditions. Air defenses intercepted four Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles and three kamikaze drones.^{57 58}

⁵⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/99449>

⁵⁸ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/3900

THEATERWIDE

Ihor Klymenko, Interior Minister of Ukraine, said that law enforcement inspected over 4,800 bomb shelters across Ukraine on June 3 and found that 893 were unfit for use.⁵⁹ In Odesa, the special commission that was created to inspect was not allowed to enter the bomb shelter at Medical Clinic Number 6, with the [security guard declaring that it was "a day off."](#)⁶⁰

Deputy Head of the Presidential Office Igor Zhovkva said that Ukrainian forces did not have everything they needed for a successful counteroffensive. "If you want to launch a successful counteroffensive, you need everything you have at your disposal, including artillery, armored vehicles, and tanks, so we probably don't have enough of them," he said. According to Zhovkva, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited numerous countries in May to source more weapons.⁶¹

Zelenskyy told the Wall Street Journal, "I believe that today we are ready to do it. We would like to have certain things, but we can't wait for months. We strongly believe we will

⁵⁹ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/3/7405135/>

⁶⁰ https://t.me/our_odessa/4800

⁶¹ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/32242>

succeed; I don't know how long it will take." In the same interview, the Ukrainian President said his nation has the minimum it needs, and casualties will be higher than they could be because Ukraine has not received all the arms it requested.⁶²

The table for Russia versus Ukrainian equipment losses based on information from the Oryx Database has been updated for May 31, 2023.

⁶² <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/3/7405125/>

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to May 31, 2023. 10,468 Russian vs. 3,451 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	1871	197	9.50:1	↑
Medium Duty Tanks	130	309	0.42:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	863	277	3.13:1	↓
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2366	543	4.36:1	—
Armored Personnel Carriers	309	265	1.17:1	—
MRAPs	43	58	0.74:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	189	316	0.60:1	↓
Command and Communications Vehicles	243	13	18.69:1	↑
Engineering Vehicles	306	57	5.37:1	—
Towed Artillery	224	124	1.81:1	↑
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	405	161	2.51:1	↓
MLRS	202	45	4.48:1	↑
SAMs	114	114	1.00:1	↓
Mobile Radars	32	60	0.53:1	—
EW/ECW	37	2	18.50:1	—
Winged Aircraft	82	66	1.24:1	—
Helicopters	90	30	3.00:1	—
Naval Vessels	12	26	0.46:1	—

Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War


Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.